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Abstract 
Since the advent of exporting oil in 1999, Sudan’s economy became more reliant on the 
proceeds of crude oil export. This situation exposed the economy to the negative effect 
of crude oil price shocks. In general, oil price increase positively impacts the economy 
of oil exporting countries, while oil importing economies suffer. That is, oil price 
increase boosts economic activities in oil exporting countries while it retards economic 
growth in oil importing countries. Unlike developed economies, there is a paucity of 
research in the relationship between oil Price shocks and the macroeconomy in 
developing countries. In this context, Sudan lacks appropriate fundamental economic 
knowledge and understanding of the complex relationship between its macroeconomy 
and oil price shocks. This research contributed towards filling this gap. To this end, the 
overall objective of this thesis was to examine the impact of crude oil price shocks on 
Sudan’s macroeconomy over the period 2000 – 2011. In doing so, this research 
answered the following question: what was the impact of oil price shocks on the public 
budget, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and unemployment rates, sectors’ 
growth rate and current account.  
The research employs the Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design, in which the 
Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model and Delphi method are used. The main findings 
show that negative real crude oil price shocks have a greater influence on the majority 
of the macroeconomic variables compared to positive shocks. Findings from the public 
budget VAR model suggests that real crude oil price shocks have asymmetric effect on 
the public budget. This is attributable to the use of a predetermined crude oil price in the 
annual public budget. This finding is consistent with those of Jbir and Zouri-Ghorbel 
(2009) and Ibrahim and Mohamed (2012) in the Tunisian and Iranian economies, 
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respectively. Therefore, adoption of a conservative approach in determining the 
benchmark price in the public budget is very crucial to avoid persistent withdrawals 
from the Central Bank. Results obtained from the current account VAR model indicate 
that negative and positive real oil price shocks have symmetrical effects on the trade and 
current account balances. This finding is in line with those of Le and Chang (2013) and 
Allegret et al (2014) in Malaysia and some African oil exporting countries, respectively. 
However, oil increase improves the trade and current account balance, but at the 
expense of the non-oil exports. Therefore, there is a need for export restructure, 
diversification and support for non-oil exports. Furthermore, the GDP growth and 
unemployment VAR model shows that real crude oil price shocks symmetrically affect 
the GDP growth rates.  Similar results of the negative effect on GDP growth is reported 
in Nigeria and Iran by Akin and Babajide (2011a) and Farzanegan and Markwardt 
(2009), respectively. However, negative real crude oil price significantly impacted the 
unemployment rate. Finally, the sectors’ growth VAR model shows that increase in 
crude oil price positively affected agricultural and service sector growth rates, while it 
negatively impacted industrial sector growth. Decrease in real crude oil price influenced 
agricultural sector to increase, whereas industrial and services sectors growth rates 
suffer. These findings are consistent with those obtained by Binuomote and Odeniyi 
(2013) and Ahmed and Wadud (2011) in the in Nigerian Malaysian economies, 
respectively. 
The significance of this research is its contribution to the existing body of knowledge on 
the relationship between crude oil price shocks and the macroeconomy in oil exporting 
developing countries, mainly Sudan, and the use of the mixed method approach in this 
research investigation.  This research addressed the dynamic interrelationship between 
the crude oil price shocks and the macroeconomy. The outcome of this research 
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provides key decision makers with the relevant information to design appropriate 
economic policies to mitigate the negative effects of crude oil price shocks. 
. 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
The impact of oil price shocks on economic activities has been extensively researched, 
since the crude oil shock of the 1970s.  Earlier studies have established the negative 
relationship between the oil price shocks and economic growth in the United States 
(Hamilton, 1983; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Darby, 1982, Mork and Hall, 1980, among 
others). Moreover, other researchers had documented the negative relationship between oil 
price shocks and the macroeconomy in other countries (Burbidge and Harrison, 1984). 
However, after 1985, it was observed that the linear relationship between oil price and the 
Gross National Product (GNP) in the United States started to lose its significance. That is, 
the effect of oil price decrease had shown smaller effect on economic activities (Lardic and 
Mignon, 2008). As a result of that, researchers started to consider the asymmetric effects of 
oil price shocks. Accordingly, a number of oil price specifications were proposed to assess 
the consequences of oil price going up and down (Hamilton, 1996, Mork, 1989, Lee et al., 
1995, Ferderer, 1996, Hamilton, 2003). In this regard, Hamilton (2011) confirmed the non-
linearity of the relationship between the United States GNP growth rate and oil prices. It is 
apparent that most of these studies were carried out in the economy of the United States, 
which is a net oil importer. One the other hand, there is a paucity of research in developing 
countries in general and in oil exporting countries in particular.  
From the literature, oil price boom has an adverse effect on the economies of oil importing 
countries, while it affects net oil exporting countries positively, the reverse is expected 
when oil prices plummet (Le and Chang, 2013; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). 
However, the generalization of the effect is misleading as some countries from oil 
importers group such as Japan exhibited a positive response to oil price shocks (Jimenez-
Rodriquez and Sanchez, 2005). In the same manner, few oil exporters are negatively 
affected by oil price increase (Lorde et al., 2009; Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2011a). This why 
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it is important to understand the structure of the economy and how monetary and fiscal 
policies react to oil price shocks. In this respect, Kilian (2009) emphasised the importance 
of understanding the source of oil price shock in order to design the appropriate counter 
policy. However, Segal (2011) criticized Kilian’s approach of differentiating between the 
sources of the oil price shocks and their impact, claiming that the supply shock and the 
demand shock are two facets of one coin.  
The relationship between oil price shocks and the macroeconomy gained momentum due 
to the importance of oil as a source of energy for a wide spectrum of economic activities. 
In this context, understanding the effect of oil price shocks on economic activities would 
help the government to adopt the appropriate economic policy to mitigate their adverse 
impacts. Although in some industries there are other energy alternatives that can substitute 
it, still some industries such as transport depend entirely on oil. To assess the impact of oil 
price shocks on the macroeconomy, researchers used various methods and techniques, for 
example, bivariate regression, production function (Cobweb production function), General 
Equilibrium model, VAR models (unrestricted Vector Regression model, Error Correction 
Model, Structural Vector Auto Regression model, etc.). 
In this respect, this thesis will investigate the impact of oil price shocks on the economy of 
Sudan, a small oil producer and exporter in Africa. It is worth noting that Sudan was a 
unified state during the period under study (2000:q1 – 2011:q2). Before the exploration of 
the crude oil in 1999, Sudan’s economy was dominated by agricultural activities. The 
agriculture sector employed approximately 80 per cent of the labour force and had a higher 
share in the Gross Domestic Product (BBC, 2013). However, the discovery of the crude oil 
and the advent of its exportation in the third quarter of 1999 caused a notable change in 
Sudan’s economic structure. Crude oil export earnings constituted over 90 per cent of the 
total export proceeds in 2008, leading to oil revenues contributing more than 50 per cent of 
the total government revenues (Abuldrahman, 2013; International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
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Since then, Sudan’s economy has depended on oil revenues to finance its budget and pay 
its import bill. This has led to a higher growth rate of the GDP, driven mainly by the oil 
sector (World Bank, 2009). Sudan’s proven oil reserve is estimated at 6.4 billion barrels 
(BP, 2011). Oil production was 15.9 million barrels per annum in 1999, however, it 
increased steadily to 176.3 million barrels/year in 2007 (Sudanese Petroleum Corporation, 
2013). It’s worth noting that Sudan during the period under investigation was a net crude 
oil exporter as its oil production surpassed its consumption. This situation puts Sudan at 
economic risk due to the fluctuation of crude oil prices in the international markets.  
Although the contribution of the oil sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is around 
12 per cent, it constitutes on average 65 per cent of the export proceeds. Having that in 
mind the government has established an Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund (ORSF) to cater 
for drop in crude oil prices. However, the amount of crude oil revenues available in ORSF 
has been poorly managed and fail to serve its intended purpose. Most of the resources of 
that fund are utilized in financing the growing government current expenditure 
(Abdulwahab, 2012). According to Omojolaibi and Egwaikhide (2014), different studies 
found that oil exporting countries increase public expenditure during the oil boom in non-
productive activities.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that Sudan has been heavily dependent on revenue 
revenues, this situation puts the economy at risk of crude oil price shocks as a considerable 
amount of the total revenues come from crude oil revenues. Furthermore, the continued 
interventions of the Central Bank of Sudan to stabilize the exchange rate in the foreign 
exchange market accelerated the depletion of the ORSF resources and foreign reserve in 
general. Despite the high dependency on crude oil revenues and given that Sudan is a price 
taker, as it cannot influence the crude oil prices in the global market, no effort was exerted 
to study the relationship between the movements of crude oil prices and the key 
macroeconomic variables. This showed a lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
4 
 
impact of global crude oil price shocks and its consequences on the macroeconomy. That 
is, the focus was on the oil revenue side rather than looking at the effect of instability in the 
global crude oil markets and how that could affect the economy and how the impact pass 
through to the economy. Therefore, this is the main motivating factor behind undertaking 
this piece of research to enable the government to clearly understand the effect on 
macroeconomic variables as a result of fluctuations of crude oil price in the global market. 
By so doing, the government will be in a better position to prudently adopt the appropriate 
economic policy response to further enhance the positive effects and to put in place 
precautionary measures to mitigate the negative effects of the crude oil price fluctuations. 
Hence for this reason it was pertinent to examine the effects of crude oil price shocks on 
Sudan which was a developing oil producing country over the period 2000: q1-2011: q2. 
1.1 Research questions 
This research attempted to answer how is crude oil price shocks transmitted to the 
Sudanese economy as measured by: 
a) The public budget? 
b) Key macroeconomic variables?  
c) The current account?  
d) Real GDP growth and unemployment rates? 
e) The growth rate of agricultural, industrial and services sectors? 
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
This research is aimed at assessing the impact of crude oil price shocks on eighteen 
selected macroeconomic variables in Sudan, during the period 2000: q1 – 2011: q2. To 
achieve this, aim the following objectives are fulfilled: 
1. The investigation of the effect of crude oil price shocks on the government public 
budget, key selected macroeconomic variables, current account, GDP growth and 
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unemployment rates, and growth rates of the agricultural, industrial and services 
sectors. 
2. A thorough review of relevant literature to deeply understand the body of 
knowledge in the area of oil price shocks macroeconomy nexus and to identify 
potential gap in the research methodologies and techniques. 
1.3 Research methodology: 
This research used the Convergent Parallel Mixed Method Design, in which quantitative 
and qualitative data were collected concurrently, analysed separately and then compared to 
each other (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The rationale of using the mixed methods 
approach was to corroborate and validate the findings of the research (Bryman, 2006). 
According to Gillham (2011), using more than one method creates more confidence of the 
research findings as each method has its own limitations. The quantitative data were 
collected from secondary sources and analysed using the VAR mode, while the qualitative 
data were collected directly from respondents (primary sources) using the Delphi method 
and then the descriptive statistical analysis was performed. 
1.4 Significance of the research: 
This thesis attempts to contribute to existing knowledge from different perspectives: 
exploring a research in new geographical area or a new setting, applying an existing 
technique in a new context, combining two techniques that have not been used together 
before and finally complement existing knowledge with regard to crude oil price shocks 
and macroeconomy relationship in developing economies. These elements of contribution 
to knowledge are explained as follows:  
1. Since the start of oil production and up to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, 
the government tended to deal with economic instabilities with discrete policies. Thus, 
no consideration was given for the dynamic effects of oil price shocks on other 
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macroeconomic variables within the economic system. This research has investigated 
thoroughly the impact of crude oil price shocks on Sudan’s economy over the period 
2000: q1 – 2011: q2. In doing so, five VAR models were developed to carefully assess 
the relationship between the crude oil price shocks and macroeconomic variables under 
the framework of the mixed methods. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
comprehensive empirical study to assess the entire period when Sudan was a net crude 
oil exporter. 
2. All previous studies conducted elsewhere have used quantitative methods only to 
assess the relationship between crude oil price shocks and macro-economic variables. 
This research, however employed the convergent parallel mixed method design 
(quantitative and qualitative approach) to investigate the research questions using the 
VAR model and Delphi method.  
3. This research also complemented and contributed to the expansion of the existing 
knowledge on the impact of crude oil price shocks on developing countries and 
specifically in crude oil producing and exporting countries. Generally speaking, there is 
a paucity of research in the relationship between crude oil price shocks and the 
macroeconomy in developing exporting countries compared to developed crude oil 
importing countries such as the US and OECD countries. 
1.5 Research organization 
The research is organized as follows: Chapter two discusses the literature in a manner that 
distinguished between the different characteristics of countries. Countries classified into 
developed and developing countries based on the IMF criteria (International Monetary 
Fund, 2014). These countries further sub-grouped into oil importing and oil exporting 
countries, in order to capture similarities and differences in their responses to oil shocks. 
Then, the pass through of oil price shocks to the economy discussed.  
7 
 
Chapter three provides background about the national economy and the evolution of the oil 
sector in Sudan. It discusses the management of oil sectors and stages of crude oil 
exploration is provided. Then, the chapter displays the crude oil types, crude oil production 
and consumption, distribution of oil fields and existing oil facilities and infrastructure. It 
also analyses the behaviour of the macroeconomy by discussing the GDP growth, 
performance of the public budget, balance of payments and its main components, and 
external debt position. Finally, the chapter ends with some reflections on the economic 
performance in post sample period, that is, the period after 2011.  
 
In chapter four begins with an overview of the world crude oil proven reserves by region 
over the last fifteen years. Then, a thorough discussion of peak oil theory is carried out to 
reflect the different views for and against the theory. The chapter then turns to the crude oil 
market by discussing the world crude oil supply and demand. Next, a brief glimpse of 
crude oil pricing mechanism is explained, followed by an elaboration of the main factors 
behind crude oil price fluctuations. Finally, a series of historical crude oil price shocks and 
the recent plunge in oil prices are reviewed and discussed.      
Chapter five discusses the philosophical framework of the mixed research methodology. It 
also presents the process of Delphi method, including the structure of the semi-structured 
questionnaire and criteria used in selecting the experts. The Vector Auto Regression 
(VAR) Model and its various tests were discussed as well as data definition and sources. 
The VAR adequacy tests and how to use the Delphi results for external validation were 
explained as well. 
Chapter six discusses the empirical findings of the impact of crude oil price shocks on 
macroeconomic variables, using five VAR models and Delphi method. The purpose of 
using mixed method was to corroborate and validate the findings of this research. The five 
VAR models are estimated using an ordinary least square method. The outcomes were 
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internally validated using serial correlation, normality, heteroscedasticity and stability 
tests. For external validation, the coefficients sign of the VAR models were compared to 
those obtained from the Delphi method before examining the relationship between oil price 
shocks and the macroeconomy using the Granger causality test, Impulse Response 
Functions and Variance decomposition analysis. There were some contradictions between 
the signs of the coefficients of the estimated VAR model and the Delphi method, therefore, 
a historical simulation method was applied and evaluated. 
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Chapter two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The oil price shocks and the macroeconomy relationship gained recognition from the early 
1970s, when the first oil price shock took place after the OPEC countries stopped 
supplying crude oil to the market as a punishment against western countries for supporting 
the Israeli army in its war against Egypt. Since then, a huge number of studies were carried 
out to understand the relationship between the oil shocks and the macroeconomy. In this 
chapter, the previous studies will be reviewed in a manner that distinguishes between the 
different economic characteristics of countries. Studies were classified as to whether they 
relate to developed or developing countries based on IMF criteria (International Monetary 
Fund, 2014). Studies were sub-grouped further into those relating to oil importing and oil 
exporting countries to capture similarities and differences in their responses to oil price 
shocks. The review also examines the pass-through of oil price shocks will be discussed.  
2.2 Developed countries 
2.2.1 Exporting countries  
Using a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model, Mork, et al. (1994) examined the effect of 
oil price shocks on the GDP growth rate in seven countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) during the period 1967: q3-1992: q4. 
They included increase and decrease in oil price as separate variables in the VAR model as 
proposed by Mork (1989). The lag length of the VAR model was five. Their findings 
revealed that the sign of the increase in oil price was negative for the first and second lags 
and statistically significant in the case of the United States. The summation of all 
coefficients of the oil increase variable was -0.54. That is, increase in oil prices cause 
Gross National Product (GNP) to retard in the United States. On the other hand, the third 
and fourth lags of price increase variable were positive and statistically significant. 
Likewise, the other six countries, excluding Norway, had shown somewhat similar patterns 
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of coefficients. For the case of Norway, the response of the GDP growth was positive for 
both increase and decrease in oil prices. This might be attributed to the large share of the 
oil sector in Norwegian economy. 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) employ the VAR model to explore the relationship 
between the oil price shock and the GDP growth in some OECD countries over the period 
1972: q3-2001: q4.  They report mixed results for oil exporting countries, namely Norway 
and the UK. They find that an increase in oil price has a significant positive impact on the 
GDP growth in Norway, while in UK its effect on the GDP growth is negative and 
statistically significant. This unexpected result is due to the appreciation of the UK 
exchange rate, which harms its exporting sector (Dutch disease effects). On the other hand, 
a decrease in oil price has positively affected the GDP growth in the UK and Norway. The 
positive result in the case of Norway is attributable to the prudent economic policy and 
management of the oil windfalls. They also report the effect of increase and decrease in oil 
price on the GDP growth in Canada. Their results show that the GDP growth response was 
negative in the two countries. The negative response in Canada may be due to the long 
sample period, where Canada was a net oil importer until 1980 and since then Canada 
became a net oil exporter. However, in another study that covers other European countries 
besides the United Kingdom, Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) examine the impact 
of oil price on real GDP and inflation using quarterly data from 1970:q3 to 2003:q4 and 
employing a VAR model with linear and non-linear oil price specification. They find that 
an increase in oil price has a positive effect on the real GDP in the UK. This study reported 
only results related to increase in oil price and kept silent about the effect of the decrease in 
oil price. 
Cologne and Manera (2008) studied the effect of the oil price shocks on economic 
activities in Canada and the UK using quarterly data during the period 1980: q1 to 2003: 
q4, by applying the structural co-integrated VAR model. In the case of Canada, the 
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findings from the impulse response function suggested that oil price shocks caused 
monetary stock, interest rate, the GDP growth, inflation rate to increase, with an 
appreciation in the exchange rate. On the other hand, for the UK, the oil price shock 
appeared to have a different effect, where the exchange and inflation rates reacted 
positively, while the remaining variables were impacted negatively. Although the UK was 
a net oil exporter during the study period, the effect on its economic activities seems to be 
quite odd, compared to Canada. Despite these facts, the researchers did not provide a 
justification for such unexpected findings on the impact of oil price shocks on net oil 
exporting countries. 
In an attempt to assess the impact of oil price shocks on the UK services and 
manufacturing sectors, Guidi (2009) used three sets of VAR models. Each model included 
seven quarterly variables, covering the period 1970: q1 to 2005: q4. These variables are the 
real oil price, consumer price index, real wages in sectors, index production of the 
manufacturing and services sector, long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, and the 
real effective exchange rate. He adopted different oil price specifications, namely linear 
approach, an asymmetric specification proposed by Mork (1989) and Net Oil Price 
Increase (NROI) specification introduced by Hamilton (1996). His results showed that, for 
the linear oil price specification, oil price shocks have a positive effect on all variables in 
the two sectors, but not the real wages. For the non-linear specification, an increase in oil 
prices caused a negative effect on manufacturing output, short-term and long-term interest 
rates, while triggering a positive impact on services output, real effective exchange rate, 
inflation rate and real wages. Decrease in oil price affected manufacturing output, services 
output, real effective exchange rate, inflation and real wages negatively, while impacting 
the short-term and long-term rates positively. Finally, the net oil price increase (NOPI) 
impacted the manufacturing output, real effective exchange rate, and inflation rate 
positively, but affected services output, short-term and long-term rates negatively. It was 
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clear from the analysis above that some differences may be attributed to the selection of 
the oil price specification. Therefore, selection of the right specification is very important 
to accurately estimate the effect of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic variables.  
In studying the impact of oil price shocks on the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
Canada, Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) employed simultaneous equations developed by 
Abeyysinghe (2001), and used quarterly data from 1995:q1 to 2006:q3. Their results 
suggested that Canada had experienced a positive effect on the GDP growth rate as a result 
of oil price increase. The impulse response function showed that the cumulative response 
of the real GDP growth rate to a 50 per cent increase in oil price is a 1.5 and 0.9 percentage 
points increase in the short and long terms, respectively. The result showed that the 
economy was less dependent on oil revenues.  
Bashar et al. (2013) examined the relationship between the oil price uncertainty and the 
macroeconomic variables in Canada using monthly data over the period January 1986 – 
April 2011. They used a seven-variable structural VAR model. The model included 
industrial production index as a proxy for the economic output, consumer price index, 
money stock, overnight market rate, nominal exchange rate, and the Federal Fund rate and 
oil price. They used two types of oil price specifications, the oil price level and oil price 
uncertainty. The oil price uncertainty was simply the standard deviation of the daily oil 
prices during a span of one month. According to their findings, oil price shock influenced 
general prices and the exchange rate significantly. Likewise, output and money stock were 
positively affected by the oil price shock, but the effect was insignificant.  On the other 
hand, they used oil price uncertainty instead of the oil price shock to investigate its effect 
on the same macroeconomic variables. Their findings suggested that the output and the 
general price level declined as a result of an increase in oil price uncertainty. The response 
of the interest rate appeared to be negative, whereas monetary stock increased 
significantly. Furthermore, the exchange rate depreciated significantly due to the increase 
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in oil price uncertainty. From the above-mentioned analysis, it seems that oil price 
uncertainty had a greater effect on the Canadian economy compared to the oil price shock; 
this might be attributed to its negative impact on the investment and monetary policy.  
2.2.2 Importing countries 
In a pioneering work, Hamilton (1983) studied the relation between the oil price shocks 
and the macroeconomic activities in the United States during the period 1948-1972, using 
VAR model of seven macroeconomic variables, namely real GNP, unemployment rate, the 
price deflator for nonfarm business income, import prices, money supply (M1), hourly 
compensation per worker and the nominal oil price. He explored the relationship between 
the oil price shock and the real GNP by testing three hypotheses, namely that oil increase 
preceded the US recession as a matter of coincidence, there were a set of third endogenous 
variables that were responsible for the recession, and finally, the recession was due to an 
exogenous factor which was the increase in oil price. Using linear oil price specification, 
he concluded that increase in oil price had negatively influenced the real GNP in the 
United States. However, Bernanke et al. (1997) claimed that the US recession in the 1970s 
was not due to the oil price shock, but to the response of the Federal Reserve by increasing 
the interest rate following the oil price spike. In return, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) 
criticised Bernanke et al. (1997) on the ground that the estimates of their VAR model were 
sensitive to the lag length used in the model. They claimed that econometric model favours 
longer lag length, similar to those used by other researchers.  When the simulation was 
carried out using the longer lag length, the monetary policy role proposed by Bernanke et 
al. (1997) showed no effect on the output recession. Furthermore, Kilian and Lewis (2011) 
re-estimated the Bernanke et al. (1997) model by changing the assumption of asymmetry to 
symmetry. Their results showed that monetary policy had no effect on the US recession of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. That is, their results supported those of Hamilton (1983) and 
Hamilton and Herrera (2004). 
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A similar study was carried out in the U.S. by Gisser and Goodwin (1986) using four 
quarterly macroeconomic variables, namely real GNP, inflation, unemployment and real 
investment in St. Louis-type equations over the period 1961: q1-1982: q4 to investigate 
their response to oil price shocks. Their findings showed that oil price had a significant 
positive impact on inflation and unemployment rate, while its effect on investment and real 
GNP was negative and statistically significant.  
In his research, Mork (1989) criticised Hamilton’s (1983) results regarding the negative 
correlation between the oil price changes and growth of the GNP in the US. He claimed 
that the oil price was on the upward trend during the period that had been studied by 
Hamilton. This situation had left the effect of the decline in oil prices untouched. Like 
Hamilton, Mork followed Sims (1980) VAR model, to investigate - after correcting the 
distortion on prices due to price control during 1970s - whether the findings obtained by 
Hamilton (1983) were valid when extending the sample period to encompass the new trend 
of the oil price changes after 1986. He found that the model did not maintain the same 
results as before. This had led Mork to think of the probability of asymmetrical effects of 
the oil price. The symmetric effect means increase in oil prices have significant impact on 
economic activities, while drop in oil prices have no significant effects. Therefore, he 
included increase and decrease in oil price as separate variables in the model to capture the 
presumed asymmetric effect of oil price movements. He studied the effect of the real oil 
price on six macroeconomic variables: GNP, inflation, Treasury bills, unemployment, 
wages, and import price during the period 1949: q1-1988: q2. Unlike Hamilton, Mork 
(1989) used refinery acquisition cost instead of producer price index. This index reflects 
the controlled prices of crude oil that was produced domestically during 1970s. He 
confirmed that all coefficients for oil price increase were negative and the sum of the four 
lags was around -0.144 and statistically significant. That is, negative correlation between 
the increase in oil prices and the GNP growth. On the other hand, the coefficients of the oil 
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price decrease were smaller and of different signs, with a sum slightly positive (0.017), but 
not significant. That is, no significant effect on the GNP growth was observed as a result of 
a decrease in oil price. Therefore, he concluded that the effect of oil decrease is different 
from oil price increase. A few years later, Mory, (1993) examined and confirmed the 
asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the aggregate activities in the US economy. In 
this regard, some researchers have claimed that the asymmetric effect can be attributed to 
the way the monetary authorities responded to oil price shocks, adjustment cost and the 
impact of uncertainty on the investment environment (Hamilton, 1988; Pindyck, 1991; 
Bernanke et. al., 1997; Ferderer, 1996, Hooker, 1999)  
Lee et al. (1995) employed eight macroeconomic variables in a VAR model, namely  the 
real GNP, GNP deflator, the unemployment rate, three months Treasury bill rate, import, 
price inflation and real wage inflation over the period 1950: q3-1992: q3, to estimate the 
effect of oil price on the U.S economy. They used the same variables as in the Mork (1989) 
model. They found that increase in real oil price had a significant negative effect on GNP 
during the period 1949: q1-1988: q2, consistent with the results of Mork (1989). However, 
when the sample period extended to the 1992: q3; the real oil price shock was found to be 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, they introduced a new oil price transformation, 
which was real oil price change normalized by their conditional standard deviation. Their 
results suggested that positive normalized oil price had a significant negative impact on the 
real GNP and significant positive effect on the unemployment. That is, they only reported 
the business cycle indicators. It is clear from the above studies that researchers have 
attempted to explore the relationship between the oil price shocks and the occurrence of 
series of economic recessions in the U.S. using different oil price specifications to establish 
stable relationship.  
Using monthly data for the period 1970:1-1990:12, Ferderer (1996) used an unrestricted 
VAR model to assess the effect of the real oil price (the monthly mean) and volatility of 
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real oil prices (the monthly standard deviation) on the industrial output growth, non-
borrowed reserves and the Federal Funds rate in the U.S (monetary policy indicators). 
Fereder used an oil price volatility specification, which was defined as the monthly 
standard deviation of the daily real oil prices. Unlike previous studies (such as Hamilton, 
1983; Mork, 1989; Lee et al., 1995) Ferderer used daily spot market bulk prices for the 
refined oil products that shipped from Rotterdam port in Netherland. He employed two 
VAR models, the first model included federal fund, both oil price specifications and 
output. In the second VAR model, he just replaced the Federal funds rate by non-borrowed 
reserves. His overall findings showed that the oil price shocks and monetary policy 
variable had impact on the industrial output. However, the novelty of his research was that 
oil price volatility had a significant negative effect on the industrial production growth 
while the real oil price showed a significant effect after 12 months. He further claimed that 
oil price variables had greater influence on the growth of the industrial production 
compared to the two monetary policy variables (non-borrowed reserves growth and 
Federal Fund rate). Moreover, he examined the existence of asymmetric effect by 
including increase and decrease in real oil price as separate variables in the VAR model. 
His results revealed that increase in real oil prices had a greater negative effect on the 
industrial production growth than the decrease in oil price. By this he confirmed the 
existence of asymmetric effects on the US economy.   
Hooker (1996a) used a VAR model with different oil price specifications to examine the 
relationship between the oil price shocks and the macroeconomic variables in the U.S. over 
the period 1948:q1-1994:q2. His findings showed that an increase in oil price had a 
significant negative effect on the GNP growth and unemployment rate in the early sub-
sample (1948: q1-1973: q3), while a decrease in oil price failed to reject the Granger 
causality null hypothesis. That is, the decrease in oil price had no significant effect on the 
GNP growth and the unemployment rates. However, in the late sub-sample, 1973: q4-
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1994: q2 and the full sample, 1948: q1-1994: q2, both the increase and decrease in oil 
prices showed no significant effects on the GDP growth and unemployment rates. In an 
attempt to find an explanation for the weak relationship between the oil price and the 
macroeconomic variables from the 1973 to 1994, he investigated the stability of the model, 
indigeneity of the oil price and the VAR misspecification. He tested these three 
hypotheses, but the results were insignificant. For the model stability, he found that there 
was a structural break around 1973 not captured by Hamilton (1983). Second, before 1973 
oil price was treated as exogenous variable in the model which is no longer true in the case 
of US economy. Finally, the misspecification issue was due to the assumption of 
symmetrical effects of changes in oil prices.   
Hamilton (1996) criticised the oil price specification used by Mork (1989), pointing out 
that an increase is just a correction of the decrease in oil price in the previous quarters. He 
claimed that oil price should be compared with previous year price instead of previous 
quarter as Mork (1989) did. Based on that argument, Hamilton introduced a new oil price 
measure called Net Oil Price Increase (NOPI), which was defined as the difference 
between the current level of oil price and the maximum value in the last year. If the 
difference was positive, the result was said to be a net oil price increase, otherwise oil price 
was considered to be zero. He used quarterly time series data over the period 1948: q1-
1994: q2 in the context of the VAR model to assess the impact of oil price shock on the 
U.S. He used a net oil price increase and compared his results with those obtained by 
Hooker (1996). He concluded that the net oil price increase Granger caused the GNP 
growth in the early sub-sample (1948: q1-1973: q3), late sub-sample and full sample 
(1948: q1-1994: q2), while Hooker results showed that the nominal oil price change 
Granger caused the GNP in the early sub-sample. In a reply to Hamilton’s outcomes, 
Hooker (1996b) claimed that NOPI fails to Granger cause other macroeconomic variables 
in the period 1973: q4-1994: q2. He further argued that the significant effect over the full 
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sample might be driven by the early sub-sample and not from the fluctuating data after 
1986. He also criticized the definition of the net oil price increase as an ad hoc and not 
based on any theoretical grounds. In the same line of critique, Kilian (2009) suggested that 
the oil price shock in 1973 was due to correction of the market disequilibrium, but not as a 
result of geopolitical events. He further criticized the notion of the net oil price increase 
proposed by Hamilton (1996) because it depended on the untested postulation that 
individual consumers and firms would actively respond to the oil price shock when the 
current oil price was greater than its maximum in the last four quarters. There is no 
scientific based behind this postulation, it is an attempt by Hamilton to re-establish the 
negative relationship between oil price shocks and the UN’ GNP as before 1984. 
Dayong (2008) examined the effect of oil price shocks on the GDP growth in Japan over 
the period 1975:q1 to 2006:q4, using regression model. According to his finding, which 
was based on different oil price specifications proposed by Hamilton (1996), Lee et al. 
(1995) and Mork (1989), negative oil price shock (increase) had a greater and significant 
impact on the GDP growth compared to positive oil price shock (decrease). This finding 
was in line with other researchers that confirmed the asymmetric effects of oil price 
shocks. However, the negative effect of oil price shocks on GDP contradicted the findings 
obtained by Blanchard and Gali (2007). 
In an investigation of the relationship between real oil price shocks in domestic currency 
and set of the output of selected manufacturing industries in Germany, France, Italy, 
United States, Spain and United Kingdom over the period 1975: 1 to 1998: 12, Jimenez-
Rodriguez (2008) used bivariate VAR model. However, the time series data for Spain and 
France started from 1980: 1. All countries are net-oil importers, except United Kingdom. 
The impulse response functions showed that the aggregate manufacturing output was 
negatively affected by oil price increase in all countries, including the United Kingdom. 
However, the magnitude of the effect was greater in the two Anglo-Saxon countries (US 
19 
 
and UK). Then, she examined the real oil price shocks at eight industrial manufacturing 
groups as follows: (food, beverage and tobacco), (textile, wearing apparel and leather), 
(wood and wood products), (paper and paper products), (chemical industry), (non-metallic 
mineral products), (basic metals), and (metal products, machinery and equipment). The 
overall response of these industries to oil price shocks was negative, but heterogeneity was 
observed in France, Spain, Germany and Italy (European Manufacturing Union countries). 
These disparities in the response of these countries might be attributed to the unique 
structure of each industry. Therefore, any future counter economic policy to mitigate the 
adverse effect of oil price shocks in the European Manufacturing Union countries must 
consider these differences to avoid any further adverse effects.  
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) examined the impact of oil price on the real GDP 
and inflation rate in the US, Italy, France, and Germany, in addition to the Eurozone 
economy in general. Using quarterly data from 1970: q3 to 2003: q4 and employing VAR 
model with linear and non-linear oil price specifications, they found that an increase in oil 
price has a negative impact on the real GDP growth and inflation rates. This study reported 
only the effect of the increase in oil price and left the effect of the decrease in oil price 
unexplained. 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) looked at the changing effects of oil price shocks on economic 
activities over the time. They assumed that four factors were behind the milder effects of 
oil price shocks in recent years. These are lower share of oil consumption and production, 
favourable conditions (no coincidence of adverse shocks), flexible or less rigidity in labour 
markets, and finally more credible and improved in monetary policy. They used structural 
VAR model and allowed to break in the sample in mid of 1980s. That is, the sample period 
was divided into two sub-sample: before and after 1984. The significant about this date is 
that oil price before 1984 was trending upward while beyond 1984 oil prices witnessed 
frequent fluctuations. The VAR model comprised of six variables, namely the consumer 
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price index, GDP deflator, GDP growth, employment, nominal oil price and wages. Six 
countries were studies based the six-variable VAR model, which were the United States, 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan.  In the United States, the impulse 
response functions in the pre-1984 period suggested that the response of Consumer price 
index, GDP deflator and wages were positive. However, GDP and employment responded 
negatively to oil price shocks. On the other hand, in the post-1984 period, the responses of 
the above-mentioned variables were similar to those in pre-1984 period (with exception of 
consumer price index), but somewhat milder. Thus, the analysis indicated weaker effects 
of oil price shocks on economic activities. For France and United Kingdom, the responses 
of the six variables to oil price shocks were almost similar to the results obtained in the 
United States. However, the for United Kingdom, the response of consumer price index 
was very mild. For Germany, the response of the consumer price index was similar in two 
periods. But, the influence of oil price shocks on employment and GDP were stronger in 
the pre-1984 period, which was consistent with conventional wisdom, while the response 
of GDP and employment post-1984 period was weaker. For Japan, the response of the six 
variables to oil price shocks showed odd results. For example, GDP increased in both 
periods, while the consumer price index was weaker in the both periods. They concluded 
that the response of the six variables to oil price shocks was in accord with conventional 
wisdom, with exception of Japan and to some extent Germany. That is, oil price increase 
resulted in increase of wages, inflation, and decreased GDP and employment. However, in 
all countries, the response of inflation and GDP was substantially weaker in the post-1984 
period. They also used the variance decomposition analysis to understand the importance 
of oil price shocks on the variations in the other variables in the United States. The 
variance decomposition results suggested that the explanatory power of oil price shocks 
declined over time. This finding reinforced the earlier impulse response function results. 
They further used bivariate model (in the United States), which included the oil price and 
one variable at a time. The dynamic responses of variable due to oil price shocks were 
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similar to the finding obtained from the multivariate model. Again, they developed a 
simple macroeconomic model to estimate the effect of oil price shocks in 1970s and 2000s. 
The two periods were selected based on the followings: First, in 1970s, labour unions were 
very influential and stronger compared to the situation 2000s. Second, the reaction of the 
central bank to oil shocks was on ad-hoc basis and there was a lack of experience to deal 
with oil shocks. However, in 2000s monetary policy was prudent and had greater 
credibility. Third, oil share in consumption and production was less in the 2000s compared 
to the situation in 1970s. They concluded that there were adverse events that was at work 
during the 1970s, for example increase in food commodity prices. Also, the oil shock 
effect became milder in the 2000s, especially in the consumer price index, wages, GDP 
and employment. The response of wages was smaller in the 2000s, due to weaker labour 
unions. Moreover, the increase in the monetary policy credibility in 2000s played 
significant role in lowering the effects of oil shocks on the inflation rate. Finally, there was 
a notable decline in oil consumption in 2000s. Despite these important results, the 
assumption of other adverse shocks in 1970 were not modelled and had been taken granted 
as key events. Also, the inflation variable was misleading in the analysis, as authors used 
consumer price index and GDP deflator to refer to inflation, but in the analysis they 
reported the effect on inflation only. Furthermore, the odd results obtained in Japan went 
without explaining the unexpected responses of the macroeconomic variables. In a similar 
study in the United States, Nordhaus (2007) attributed the weak response of the 
macroeconomic variables to oil price shocks during the period 2002 – 2006 for three 
reasons: first, the oil price shocks in the 2000s were different from the earlier episodes as 
they were less of a surprise and happened gradually. The second reason was that the pass 
through from oil price to GDP changed from negative to neutral during the last three 
decades. He claimed that the declining of macroeconomic sensitivity to oil price shocks 
was not fully understood. Finally, the other offsetting forces which aggravated the situation 
in the earlier episodes were almost neutral over the period 2002 – 2006.  
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Kilian (2009) suggested a new approach to assess the impact of oil price shocks on the 
U.S. economy. He split the oil price shocks into three components based on its source. 
These were crude oil supply shocks, global demand shocks for all industrial commodities 
(index of single-voyage freight rates), and specific demand shocks for crude oil in the 
global market (precautionary demand). Using the structured VAR model based on monthly 
data for the period 1973:1 – 2007:12, he claimed that crude oil supply shocks led to a 
decline in the US real GDP, while positive global demand shock boosted the economic 
activity. For the increase of precautionary demand shocks, a negative impact on GDP and 
consumer price index was observed. His approach has been criticised on the ground that 
demand and supply are two facets of the same coin. For example, if a country has 
increased its demand by 300,000 barrels/day, it has the same effect of the decrease in the 
aggregate supply of the same amount (Segal, 2011). Moreover, such decomposition of 
crude oil price shocks is over-simplification of reality in the crude oil markets. For 
example, there might be overlap between the three components, and they might occur 
concurrently, in this case, it will be difficult to distinguish the source of each shock. 
Therefore, the effect oil price shocks are said to be the same in general, irrespective of their 
sources. Furthermore, Hammels (2007) claimed that freight rates were significantly 
correlated to oil prices, thus the exogeneity of the aggregate demand was questionable. 
That is, oil price shocks affect and is affected by aggregate demand. 
Ozlale and Pekkurnaz (2010) examined the impact of oil price shocks on the current 
account balance in Turkish economy. They used monthly data covering the period 1999: 1 
– 2008: 9. In constructing the structural relationship between the oil current account 
balance and the oil price, they controlled the main determinants of the current account, 
which were output gap and exchange rate misalignment. The rational for selecting these 
variables was to capture their impacts on the current account balance as control variables. 
Moreover, to capture the other factors or variables that were not included in the model, 
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they added lagged value of the current account balance as independent or regressor 
variable. They further imposed the following restrictions: first, variable in the model does 
not affect oil prices. That is, oil price was exogenous variable. Second, exchange rate 
misalignment is affected only by the oil price shocks. Third, the output gap was assumed to 
be influenced by the oil price shocks and exchange rate misalignment. Fourth, all variables 
affected current account balance, whereas current account did not cause those variables. 
That is, current account represented the most endogenous variable in the model.  The 
impulse response functions findings suggested that current account balance responded 
negatively to oil price shocks in the short run. On the other hand, the variance 
decomposition analyses showed that most of the variations in the current account balance 
emanated from the shock to itself, while oil price shocks accounted for 9.8 per cent of 
current account balance variation. They also tested the relationship using simple linear 
regression. Using the ordinary least squares, the coefficient of the oil price shocks was 
negative and statistically significant. That is, oil price shock worsened the current account 
balance. The result was plausible as Turkey was a net oil importer. 
In assessing the impact of oil price shocks on Turkey’s economy, Erkan et al. (2010) 
employed four macroeconomic variables VAR model, using annual time series data from 
1991 to 2008. Their findings showed that increase in oil price had a significant negative 
effect on the unemployment and export-import ratio, but influenced inflation rate 
positively. However, the effect of increase in oil price on the economic output was 
moderate and statistically insignificant. The negative effect of oil price shock on the 
unemployment rate was confirmed by Dogrul and Ugur (2010). The latter scholars 
investigated the relation between crude oil price and the unemployment rate in Turkey over 
the period 2005:1 to 2008:8. They used monthly data and employed Toda Yamamato 
(1995) procedure in the context of the VAR model. They found that crude oil price shock 
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had a significant negative effect on the unemployment rate, while the effect on the interest 
rate was positive. 
Weiwen (2012) examined the relation between the oil price volatility and the Singaporean 
economy over the period 1983: q2 to 2009: q2, using six variables Vector Error Correction 
model, namely oil price volatility, real oil price, unemployment rate, gross fixed capital 
formation, consumer price index and real GDP growth. He used a realized oil price 
volatility proposed by Andersen et al. (2001, 2003). The realized volatility specification 
could be defined as the squared summation of the changes in daily oil prices over the 
quarter. His results showed that an increase in oil price volatility caused the real GDP to 
slow-down, investment to drop, the unemployment rate to increase and inflation to decline. 
The latter effect was explained by the fact that a surge in oil price volatility had increased 
uncertainty, which in turn led to a decline in the aggregate demand, thus resulting less 
pressure on the general level of prices. He also concluded that the impact of oil price 
volatility was not statistically significant, attributing that to the declining of the oil 
intensity in the Singaporean economy. 
Guney and Hasanov (2013) studied the impact of oil price changes as proposed by 
Hamilton (1996) on the GDP growth and inflation in Turkey, using monthly data spanning 
the period 1990:1 to 2012:3, and adopting regression equations and Granger causality test. 
Their results suggested that increase in oil price has a significant negative effect on the 
GDP growth and a significant positive effect on inflation. On the other hand, they found 
that decrease in oil price had no effect on the GDP growth and inflation. Their results 
confirmed the existence of the asymmetric effect of oil price shocks. It is worth noting that 
the authors used the oil price measure proposed by Mork (1989), but they referred to 
Hamilton (1996) oil price shock transformation, which was quite confusing. 
In assessing the impact of oil price shocks on the economic activities in the United States, 
Katayama (2013) used VAR model including seven quarterly macroeconomic variables, 
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namely, real GDP, real consumption, inflation rate, real investment, real wages, labour 
productivity and interest rate. He divided the sample period into two subsamples: the first 
sub-sample spanning from 1951: q1 to 1983: q4, while the second subsample covering the 
period 1984: q1 to 2007: q3. Two oil price shocks were used, namely net oil price increase, 
which had been proposed by Hamilton (2003) and exogenous shocks introduced by Kilian 
(2008). From the impulse response functions for the pre-1984 sub sample, 10% shock to 
the net real oil price had significantly decreased GDP, real consumption, real investment, 
labour productivity, with an exception of the real wage. However, inflation and interest 
rate were positively impacted. Looking at the post-1984 period, all variables had shown 
mild response to oil price shocks. He found that the response of the GDP in the pre-1984 to 
oil price shocks occurred in quarter five with a magnitude of 1.52%, while in post-1984 
trough of 0.38 was observed in quarter 2. These findings were consistent with those 
obtained by Hooker (1999), Blanchard and Gali (2007). From this result, he concluded that 
the effect of oil price shocks in terms of the persistence and the magnitude after 1984 was 
weakened. To check the robustness of his findings, he employed exogenous shocks in the 
world crude oil supply. His results revealed that the response in the two sub-sample were 
similar.  
In investigating the impact of oil price shocks on the trade balances and their oil and non-
oil components in three Asian countries, namely Japan (an oil importing country) Malaysia 
(an oil exporting countries) and Singapore (an oil refining country), Le and Chang (2013) 
used Granger causality approach in addition to generalized impulse response function.  
Their data covered the period January 1999 – November 2011. The results from the 
Granger causality test showed that oil price significantly caused trade balance and the oil 
trade balance in Malaysia. This result was expected as Malaysia was a major crude oil 
producer and exporter in the region. With regard to Japan, oil price shocks significantly 
Granger caused oil and non-oil components of its trade balance.  However, oil price did not 
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Granger cause the overall trade balance. They attributed that result to the difference in the 
sign of the oil trade balance and the non-oil trade balance. In Singapore, oil price shocks 
did not Granger cause the three overall trade balance and its components. This might be 
attributable to the unique case of Singapore as a crude oil importer and refined oil products 
exporter, thus in the long run negative and positive effects cancelled out each other. For the 
impulse response function results, oil and non-oil trade balances of Malaysia had 
significantly and positively responded to oil price shocks. For Singapore, oil price shocks 
negatively influenced the overall trade balance and their two components in the short run. 
With regard to Japan, non-oil trade responded positively to oil price shocks, which was in 
line with the results obtained from the Granger causality test.  However, the oil-trade 
balance negatively responded to oil price shocks. One the other hand, Le and Chang (2013) 
also checked the stability of the model and found a structural break in the time series data, 
therefore, they divided the entire sample into three sub-samples: first sub-sample (January 
1999 – December 2003), second sub-sample (January 2003 to July 2008), and last sub-
sample (August 2008 to November 2011). The break point of December 2002 was based 
on the aggregate demand pressure on 2002 and civil unrest and the Iraq War. The second 
break point of July 2008 was based on the speculative demand shocks. Then they retested 
the Granger causality test and impulse response functions for each sub-sample period. The 
Granger causality in the three sub-samples relatively shows slightly different results 
compared to those of the entire sample period. For the impulse response functions, the 
response of the overall trade balance and their oil and non-oil trade balances components in 
three sub-samples has different magnitudes. Thus, they attributed the difference in the 
results to sources of the oil shocks.   
Ratti and Vespignani (2013a) examined the relationship between the global money supply 
and crude oil prices. They used structural auto regression model with monthly data over 
the period 1970 – 2011. To calculate the global monetary supply, they aggregated the 
money supply in US dollars from China, United States, Japan and Euro zone. In addition to 
27 
 
the money supply, the model included real aggregate demand, real oil price, and the global 
oil production. The real aggregate demand was calculated as in Kilian (2009), which was 
based on the equal-weighted dry cargo freight rate. The accumulative impulse response 
functions showed that a shock to global oil production (oil supply) influenced real oil price 
positively, but insignificantly. On the other hand, the response of real oil price to real 
aggregate demand shock was significantly positive. In response to the real oil price shock, 
significant positive effects were observed on global oil production, aggregate demand, 
while money supply responded negatively and statistically significant. Furthermore, the 
response of real oil prices, global oil production and global real aggregate demand were 
positive and statistically significant. They concluded that money supply has influential 
impact on increasing real oil prices. Hence, they were in line with other researchers who 
claimed the importance of monetary policy in determining the oil price increase (Barskey 
and Kilian; Gillman and Nakov, 2009). In similar study, Ratti and Vespignani (2013b) 
investigated the impact of real money supply on crude oil prices, using money supply of 
China, US, Swiss, Euro zone and UK over the period 1996: 1 to 2011: 12. Their main 
finding suggested that increase in money supply of China influenced crude oil prices 
significantly compared to the effect of money supply of other countries in the sample.  
Brahmasrene et al. (2014) studied the relationship between the imported oil prices in the 
United States and the exchange rate. Monthly data from 1990: 1 to 2009: 12 were used. 
Granger causality test, impulse response functions and forecast error decomposition 
analysis were employed to understand the relationship under the framework of the VAR 
model. The Granger causality test finding suggested that the exchange rate Granger caused 
crude oil price in the short run, while crude oil price Granger caused the exchange rate in 
the long run. For the forecast error decomposition analysis, the exchange rate explained 
small portion of variation in the crude oil price in the short and long run, for example its 
contribution on average 4.2 per cent. This result contradicted their Granger causality test 
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findings. On the other hand, shock to crude oil price was responsible for more than 44 per 
cent of the variation in the exchange rate in the long run. Looking at the impulse response 
functions, the response of crude oil price to exchange rate shock was negative and 
statistically significant. However, the exchange rate responded positively to oil price 
shock, but it was not significant. They concluded that, in the short run, fluctuation in crude 
oil price generally appeared after fluctuation in the exchange rate, whereas changes in in 
the exchange rate followed crude oil price shocks in the long run. 
 
Lian et al. (2014) used quarterly data from 1959:q1 to 2006:q4 to assess the asymmetric 
effect of oil price shocks on the US macroeconomy following oil price specification of 
Hamilton (1996). They employed factor-augmented VAR model and included oil price as 
an exogenous independent variable in the VAR system. Their finding showed that increase 
in oil price had a negative effect on the output, saving, CPI and a positive effect on the Fed 
Fund rate. On the other hand, a decrease in oil price had a less significant effect on the 
macroeconomic variables. Their results confirmed the existence of the asymmetric effect 
of the oil price shock. 
Tantatape et al. (2014) examined the correlation between imported crude oil price and the 
exchange rate in the short and long terms in the US. They used monthly data over the 
period 1996 - 2009, employing impulse response function, Granger causality test and 
variance decomposition analysis, based on unrestricted VAR model. The Granger causality 
test suggested that exchange rate significantly caused crude oil price in the short term 
while oil price influenced the exchange rate in the long term. Results from the variance 
decomposition analysis showed that oil price was significantly responsible for variation in 
the exchange rate. Furthermore, the response of the exchange rate to oil price shock was 
negative during the first five months, but it was not statistically significant. However, the 
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response of oil price to exchange rate shock was significantly negative in the second 
month. This result support those obtained from Granger causality test. 
George and Ioannis (2014) examined the response of inflation rate and interest rate to oil 
price shocks, by using the impulse response function in the context of structural VAR 
model. The study covered nine industrialized countries; two are net oil exporters (Norway 
and Russia) and seven net oil importers (United Kingdom, Italy, Netherland, Germany, 
Portugal and Spain), using monthly data with different timeframes based on the availability 
of the data. Their findings suggested that inflation rate response in the two groups was 
positive. Their results were not consistent with other similar studies carried out by 
Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Lian et al. (2014). The latter studies claimed that the oil 
price shock had less inflationary effects. They also concluded that the response of interest 
rate to oil price shocks depends on the monetary policy in each country. 
2.3 Emerging and developing countries 
2.3.1 Exporting countries  
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001) examined the effect of oil price fluctuations on six 
macroeconomic variables in Kuwait, using quarterly time series data over the period 1984 - 
1998. They used VAR model and Vector Error Correction model (VECM) to investigate 
the effect of oil price fluctuations on the Kuwaiti economy. The selected seven key 
macroeconomic variables, namely, oil price of Kuwaiti blend crude, oil revenues, 
government expenditure, government development expenditure, consumer price index, 
money supply and value of imports of goods and services. For the VAR model, the 
variance decomposition analysis showed that variations in macroeconomic variables were 
substantially explained by the variables own shocks. Furthermore, oil price responsible for 
almost 45 per cent of the variance in oil revenue, government current and development 
expenditure. Turning to the impulse response function, shock to oil price had resulted in an 
increase in oil revenue, government development and expenditure over the first three 
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quarters; while money supply, value of imports and consumer price index exhibit negative 
response. The decrease in money supply and consumer price index was questionable as oil 
exporting country tends to increase their expenditure as a result of increase in oil revenue. 
With regard to the vector error correction model, the variance decomposition analysis 
suggested the same result obtained by the VAR model, but the significance was relatively 
higher.  The responses of the variables to the oil price shocks were similar to those 
obtained under the VAR model. They concluded that VECM demonstrated a higher 
significant impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic variables compared to the 
VAR model. Moreover, they emphasised that oil revenue was the main channel through 
which oil price shocks have impacted the economy. 
Employing the VAR model, Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) investigated the impact of 
oil price changes on some macroeconomic variables over the period 1975:q2 – 2006:q4, 
through three transmission mechanisms namely, supply side, demand side and terms of 
trade. They reported the effect of the oil price shocks during the period 1989:q1 – 2006:q4 
and compared the outcomes of their analysis to those of the period before 1989. They used 
asymmetric definition of the oil price as suggested by Mork (1989). They reported that real 
exchange rate, the real GDP per capita, inflation and real import had responded positively 
to the increase in oil price. However, the decrease in oil price had a negative impact on the 
real GDP per capita, real exchange rate, real import and real government expenditure. 
Interestingly, the inflation rate response was again positive, similar to the effect of positive 
oil price change. The latter effect on the inflation rate was attributed to the increase of the 
money supply to finance budget deficit when oil price drop. Accordingly, they confirmed 
that Iranian economy had been impacted through supply-side effect, demand side effect 
and terms of trade. 
Olusegun (2008) investigated the impact of oil price shocks in Nigeria over the period 
1970 – 2005, employing a VAR model. Seven macroeconomic variable were included in 
31 
 
the VAR model, namely, consumer price index (CPI), real government current 
expenditure, real government capital expenditure, gross domestic product (GDP), real 
money supply, real oil revenues and real oil price. The forecast error variance 
decomposition analysis showed that oil price shocks were significantly responsible for the 
variation in oil revenues and GDP. However, real oil price shocks accounted for minimal 
effects on the other variables. For example, the real oil price shock was, on average, 
responsible for 3.3 per cent, 1.9 per cent and 2.1 per cent of the variation in real money 
supply, consumer price index and government current expenditure, respectively. The 
impact of oil price shocks on oil revenue was in line with findings obtained in Kuwait by 
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001), but contradicted the findings related to the effect on real 
government current and development expenditure. 
Aliyu (2009) investigated the effect of oil price shocks on the GDP growth in Nigeria, 
using monthly data from January 1980 to December 2007. He employed the VAR model 
with linear and non-linear specifications of oil prices following Hamilton (1996), Lee et al. 
(1995) and Mork (1989) measures. The multivariate Granger causality test suggested that 
net oil price increase and asymmetric oil price decrease, but not the linear and the 
asymmetric oil price increase, had significantly impacted economic activities in Nigeria. 
Moreover, the accumulated impulse response functions for the linear specification showed 
that oil price shocks positively influenced real GDP growth. Furthermore, the response of 
real GDP growth rate to the net oil price specification was positive in the first eighteen 
months and became negative thereafter. The negative effect of Nigeria real GDP growth 
might be attributed to counter negative effect of increasing fuel import bill as the country 
suffered from low refining capacity that hinder it to meet the domestic fuel consumption. 
For the asymmetric specification, the accumulative response of the real GDP growth was 
positive for oil price increase, while it was negative for price decrease. He claimed that the 
increase in oil price affected real GDP growth positively, while a decrease affected it 
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negatively. However, the positive increase outweighed the negative effect of oil price drop. 
Interestingly, he found that oil price shock depreciated the exchange rate. This unexpected 
result explained by embarking of Nigeria in deregulating the foreign exchange market as 
part of its Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). On the other hand, the variance 
decomposition analysis showed that all oil price shocks, except the linear specification, 
was substantially responsible for the variation in real GDP growth. He concluded that the 
magnitude of the effect was greater in the case of an increase in oil price than that of 
decrease. Accordingly, he confirmed the existence of the asymmetric effect of oil price 
shocks on the real GDP growth rate. 
Gunu and Kilishi (2010) studied the impact of oil price shocks on the Nigerian economy, 
using four macroeconomic variables (real Gross Domestic Product, unemployment arte, 
consumer price index and money supply) under the VAR framework. They found that oil 
price shock Granger cause real GDP growth at 10 per cent level of significance. According 
to their VAR estimates oil price shock had a positive effect on real GDP growth and a 
negative impact on unemployment rate and money supply. Impulse response function 
showed that oil price shock negatively influenced money supply and unemployment rate. 
Impact on Consumer Price Index (CPI) was insignificant, claiming that oil price was not 
included in the calculation of the CPI in Nigeria. This study suffered from a technical 
shortfall. They used pairwise Granger causality test, which normally used in the bivariate 
models, but not in the multivariate models. Despite that, the influence of oil price on the 
money supply was contradicting other researchers’ findings in oil exporting developing 
countries, including previous studies carried out in this country itself (Mehrara and 
Mohaghegh, 2011; Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009; Olusegun, 2008) 
Lorde et al. (2009) examined the impact of oil price fluctuations on Trinidad and Tobago 
from 1966 to 2005 using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Their model 
comprised of the following variables: Gross Domestic Product, government revenue, 
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government consumption, gross investment, net exports and the level of prices. They 
employed linear and volatility oil price specifications. Based on the impulse response 
functions, oil price increase found to have a positive effect on the government revenue, 
gross investment, net export (for the first two years), government consumption and average 
prices, while the output response was negative only for the first two years. The negative 
response of the output was explained by the fears of investors from the uncertainty 
environment brought up by the sudden increase in oil price, which postponed their decision 
to invest. They explained the negative impact of net exports on the ground of appreciation 
of the exchange rate, which drive imports to increase and reduce non-oil exports. On the 
other hand, the response of the macroeconomic variables to the oil price volatility was 
smaller compared to increase in oil price. Their variance decomposition analysis confirmed 
the results of impulse response function. 
In studying the oil price and the macroeconomy relationship in Tunisia over the period 
1993: q1-2007: q3, Jbir and Zouri-Ghorbel (2009) employed the VAR model with six 
variables (real oil price, government expenditure, real effective exchange rate, inflation 
rate and industrial production index). Using linear and non-linear oil price specification, 
they found indirect effect of the oil price changes on the macroeconomic variables in 
general. However, they reported a significant impact on the government spending.  This 
mainly attributed to the subsidy policy adopted by the government during the period under 
study. On the other hand, they stated that the effect of all price specification was almost the 
same, thus they argued that the relationship between oil price and the macroeconomic 
variable was not asymmetric. 
Berument et al. (2010) examined the effect of oil price shocks on some of the Middle East 
and North Africa countries over the period 1952-2005 using SVAR model. They found that 
oil price shocks have a positive impact on GDP growth of the following countries: United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, Qatar, Oman, Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Algeria. They 
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also claimed that in oil exporting countries, output increase in association with the oil price 
shocks regardless of the source of the shocks, whether it is oil supply shock or oil demand 
shock. 
In an attempt to assess the impact of price shocks on some oil-exporting African countries, 
Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011a) examined the effects of oil price shocks on selected African 
oil exporting countries (Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria), using five variables VAR 
model, over the period 1970 to 2006. The five macroeconomic variables were consumer 
price index, inflation rate, gross domestic product deflator, real gross domestic product 
growth rate, industrial value added growth rate, and growth fixed capital formation growth 
rate. They used linear oil price specification proposed by Bachmeier (2008)1 in addition to 
three non-linear oil price specification proposed by Mork (1989) and oil volatility 
suggested by Lee et al. (1995). They further defined the oil price specification of Lee et al 
(1995) as follows: oil volatility for all oil shocks, negative volatility and positive volatility 
oil shocks. For Algeria, all oil price measures Granger caused the real gross domestic 
product growth rate, except negative oil shock of Mork (1989). The impulse response 
functions showed that the initial response of gross domestic product deflator and the 
consumer price index to oil price volatility, increase and decrease in oil price were 
positive. However, the initial response of the real gross domestic product growth rate and 
industrial value added were negative. For Egypt, all oil price measures did not Granger 
cause consumer price index, real gross domestic product growth rate and the industrial 
value added. On the other hand, the response function showed that all oil price shocks 
specifications had resulted in negative effects on consumer price index and real gross 
domestic product growth rate, with exception of negative volatility measure. With regard 
to Libya, oil price shocks Granger caused consumer price index in the short run, while 
other macroeconomic variables did not exhibit significant causality with oil price shocks.  
                                                          
1 Bachmeier (2008) defines linear specification as per centage change in the nominal crude oil price. 
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The impulse response functions depicted that real gross product growth rate responded 
positively to the two of the oil price specifications. Other variables showed a volatile 
response to oil price shocks. For Nigeria, oil price shock Granger cause consumer price 
index and gross domestic product deflator in the short run.  The impulse response function 
revealed that the initial response consumer price index and industrial value added to oil 
price volatility measures influence was positive. Surprisingly, the real gross domestic 
product growth rate response was negative to oil price increase and positive to decrease. 
They explained this counter intuitive behaviour of gross domestic product in oil producing 
country by the expansionary policy during oil price boom and contractionary fiscal policy 
during oil bust periods. These results on Nigeria and Libya seem to be contradicting the 
behaviour of the GDP response in oil producing countries. Although they came up with 
justification for that, this might be attributed to the high dependency on imports. That is, 
increases in oil price inflate the import bill, which in turn affect the GDP negatively 
through the trade balance (net exports).  Interestingly, in another similar study using the 
same approach to assess the impact of oil price shock on the macroeconomic variables in 
Nigeria, they reported that the oil price shock had no effects on the GDP growth and the 
real exchange rates (Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2011b). This could be attributed to the 
employment of different data frequency, time frame and oil price specifications. However, 
the impact on exchange rate was not in line with those results obtained by Olomola and 
Adejumo (2006), who studied the impact of oil price shocks on Nigerian economy over the 
period 1970 – 2003, using linear oil price specification.   
Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011b) examined the effect of oil price shocks on selected 
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria, using quarterly data from 1985:q1 to 2007:q4, 
employing a VAR model. They used three specifications, of the oil price shocks, namely, 
net oil price increase proposed by Hamilton (1996), positive and negative real oil price 
shocks introduced by Mork (1989), and oil price volatility proposed by Lee et al. (1995) to 
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test their effects on the real gross domestic product growth, real exchange rate, government 
expenditure, inflation rate, and net export. The unit root tests showed that the time series 
were integrated at different orders; therefore, he decided not to conduct an integration test. 
Furthermore, they used unrestricted VAR model at level following Hamilton (1994) and 
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009). Their results from Granger causality test showed 
insignificant effect of positive real oil price, net oil price increase and volatility measure on 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, government expenditure, the real 
exchange rate and inflation rate. However, they claimed that their results confirmed those 
of Hooker (1996) and Hamilton (1996) in the United States economy. They also found oil 
price shocks significantly Granger caused the net exports. On the other hand, negative oil 
price shocks Granger caused the real GDP growth rate and the real exchange rate. The 
impulse response functions of shock to the linear oil price measure showed a negative 
response of the real GDP growth rate. This result is not in line with similar studies carried 
out in oil producing countries (Ebrahim and Mohammad, 2012). For the real exchange rate, 
net export, inflation rate and government expenditure the initial response was positive and 
negative thereafter. They also observed that inflation was increased as a response to the 
decrease in oil price. With regard to one unit shock to the net oil price increase, real GDP 
growth retarded, inflation significantly declines, net exports significantly increased, and 
government exhibited positive response. Interestingly, the responses macroeconomic 
variables to the different asymmetric measure were to great extend similar. The response of 
the real GDP was negative, while others variable responded positively. On the other side of 
the coin, the variance decomposition analysis suggested that oil price shocks accounted for 
small portion of variations in macroeconomic variables. It is worth mentioning that the 
unexpected behaviour of the inflation rate when oil price decreases was explained by the 
higher dependency on the imported oil refined products in the Nigerian economy. 
According to Chuku, et al. (2011) Nigeria used to import more than 89 per cent of its 
refined oil product’s needs. 
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Employing a panel VAR model, Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011) studied macroeconomic 
dynamics in twenty oil exporting countries, twelve OPEC countries in addition to eight 
non-OPEC countries over the period 1985 to 2009. They tested four macroeconomic 
variables, namely oil price, money supply, consumer price index, and economic output, 
applying Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition Analysis. They claimed 
that oil price shock positively and significantly influences consumer price index. Likewise, 
shock to money supply resulted in a significant positive effect on consumer price index.  
Their variance composition confirmed importance of money supply in consumer price 
movements as it contributes by more than 38 per cent of the variations. The dynamic 
response functions depicted that oil price and monetary shock had appositive effect on real 
GDP growth. This research concluded that the oil price shocks affected economic output, 
money supply and consumer price index. However, they emphasised that the money supply 
had a greater influence on the other macroeconomic variables. In other words, oil price 
shocks transmitted to the economy through the money supply channel. 
Ahamed and Wadud (2011) examined the effect of oil price uncertainty on the Malaysian 
economy and monetary response over the period 1986-2009, using monthly data and 
employing structural VAR model. They used two oil price measures: conditional oil price 
volatility estimated by the Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity model introduced by Nelson (1991) and net oil price increase proposed 
by Hamilton (1996). The model included six variables, namely, three months Treasury bill 
rate, consumer price index, industrial production index, net oil price increase, oil price 
volatility, federal Fund rate, and the exchange rate (Malaysian currency against US dollar). 
The dynamic impulse response functions based on the shock to oil price volatility cause 
industrial output to decline for the first three months. They stated that uncertainty reduced 
investment and thus the aggregate output. This result was consistent with those of Ferderer 
(1996), who claimed that oil volatility, is more important than oil price changes in 
38 
 
explaining the relationship between oil price shocks and economic activities. Moreover, 
the response of the consumer price index to one standard shock to oil price volatility was 
significantly negative. Also, the monetary response opts to reduce the interest rate to avoid 
adverse effect on industrial production. On the other hand, one standard deviation shock to 
net oil price increase (Hamilton, 1996) resulted in an increase of industrial production for 
the three months. The monetary policy responded to shock in net oil price increase by 
increasing the Treasury bill to control inflationary effects on the economy. Further, the 
exchange rate responded positively to net oil price increase shock. Finally, the variance 
decomposition analysis suggested that oil price volatility was responsible of substantial 
variations in the macroeconomic variable compare to net oil price increase measure. To 
sum up, the findings of the oil price shocks based on the conditional volatility showed a 
significant negative response of industrial production and consumer price index, while no 
effect was observed on the interest and the exchange rates. On the other hand, the impact 
of oil price shocks based on the Hamilton (1996) revealed that industrial production, 
consumer price index, Treasury bill rate, and the exchange rate have increased. Despite the 
contradiction in the results obtained from using different oil price measures, the authors 
left them unexplained and without proposing policies that need to be put in place to waiver 
such negative effects. 
Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud (2012) examined the impact of oil price fluctuations on five 
macrocosmic variables in Algeria (real gross domestic product, unemployment rate, 
inflation rate, real exchange rate, money supply) for the period 1980 to 2011. The 
estimates of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) results depicted that the 
coefficients of oil showed significant positive impact on the inflation rate and significant 
negative effect on the real exchange rate. However, the coefficients of the oil price in the 
real GDP, unemployment and money equation were found to be positive but not 
significant. The variance decomposition analysis suggested that shock to oil price 
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responsible of significant variations in real GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, inflation 
rate and real exchange rate in the long run, but not the short run. However, oil price 
accounted for more the 61 per cent to changes in money supply from the first year.  
Turning to the impulse response functions, oil price shock positively affected money 
supply and real GDP growth rate, unemployment and inflation rate. The response of the 
real exchange rate to oil price shock was negative. They concluded that oil price shocks did 
not have significant impact on the majority of the macroeconomic variables in the short 
run. In the long-run oil price affected the real GDP and inflation rates positively. On the 
other hand, oil price shocks negatively impacted the real effective exchange rate. 
Interestingly, oil price shocks had no positive effect on the money supply, which was 
inconsistent with other results obtained from similar study in the oil exporting countries 
(Omojolaibi, 2013). They further proposed and emphasised the importance of diversifying 
the economy and using oil revenues to develop other economic sectors to minimize the 
over reliance on the oil sector and to cater for the negative impact of oil price shocks. 
Ebrahim and Mohammad (2012) studied the impact of oil price and oil revenues 
fluctuation on some macroeconomic variables in Iran, using quarterly data for the period 
1990:q2 to 2008:q3, employing a Structural VAR model. They used asymmetric price 
specification proposed by Lee et al. (1995). That is, differentiate between the positive and 
negative oil price and revenues shocks. Their results showed that increase in oil price 
influences the GDP growth, inflation rate, government capital expenditure and government 
current expenditure to increase. However, negative shock to oil prices and revenues 
showed to have shrunk the GDP growth, decreased inflation rate, and reduced both 
government capital expenditure and current expenditure. 
Omojolaibi (2013) investigated the effect of the oil price volatility on the macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria, using quarterly data over the period 1985: q1 to 2010: q4, 
employing four macroeconomic variables (oil price, money supply, real GDP growth rate, 
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consumer price index) structural VAR model. The accumulated Impulse Response 
functions depicted that consumer price index responded positively and significantly to 
money supply shocks. Similar to Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011), money supply found to 
have a greater influence in consumer price index, while oil shocks had a negligible effect 
on consumer price index. The response of real GDP growth and money supply to shock in 
oil price was positive. The variance decomposition analysis suggested that an increase in 
oil price had a significant positive impact on the GDP growth, money supply and 
insignificant effect on the CPI. He also found that the money supply was the main driving 
force of fluctuations in the other macroeconomic variables. He concluded that the money 
supply was the key channel through which oil price volatility affected the Nigerian 
economy. This result corroborated those obtained by Mehrara and Mohaghegh (2011). He 
further claimed that domestic monetary policy rather than the oil price shocks to be blamed 
for the increase in the level of prices in Nigeria. 
Oriakhi and Iyoha (2013) examined the impact of the oil price volatility on the Nigerian 
macroeconomy during the period 1970 to 2010. Using quarterly data and employing seven 
macroeconomic variables VAR model. They claimed that oil price volatility had a 
significant direct effect on the inflation, the real government expenditure and the real 
exchange rate, while influenced the real money supply, real import and the real GDP 
growth indirectly, notably through real government expenditure. 
Mehsen and Nooshin (2013) explored the response of some macroeconomic variables to 
oil price shocks in Iran. They employed structural VAR model, using monthly data over 
the period 2000-2011. Their findings were based on the impulse response and variance 
decomposition analysis. Their results suggested that an increase in oil price had a positive 
impact on the real GDP growth, consumer price index, real money supply, stock price, 
while negatively impacted the exchange rate on the short run rather than the long run. 
However, the response of the macroeconomic variables to the decrease in oil price was 
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mixed. The response of the Growth Domestic Product growth, exchange rate and stock 
price to decrease in oil price was negative and statistically significant. While the response 
of the consumer price index and the money supply to negative oil price shock was positive. 
This unexpected response was explained by the fact that during the oil price decrease, the 
government encountered huge deficit in the public budget. To finance this deficit, the 
government issued government bonds and borrowed from the central bank. In the two 
scenarios the money supply and the consumer price index had increased. The findings of 
this research were in line with those of Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009). One the other 
hand, the variance decomposition analysis showed that increase in oil prices responsible of 
substantial variations in the consumer price index and money supply, while decrease in oil 
prices accounted for significant variance of the stock price and Gross Domestic Product. 
Binuomote and Odeniyi (2013) investigated the impact of crude oil price on the 
agricultural productivity, using annual data over the period 1981-2010 in Nigeria, 
employing co-integration and error correction model. Their finding revealed that the oil 
price increase had a significant negative impact on the agricultural production. This result 
has been accounted for appreciation of the domestic currency in addition to increase in 
agricultural production inputs costs e.g. fertilizers. 
Abbas and Hassan (2013) examined the effect of oil price fluctuations on the inflation rate 
in Iran during the period 1960-2010. They used the annual data and employed Johansen 
cointegration test and error correction model. Their finding revealed that the oil price 
increase had a significant and long-lasting effect on the inflation rate compared to a 
decrease in oil price. Their result confirmed the asymmetric effect of oil price shocks on 
the macroeconomic variables. 
Ebaidalla (2014) attempted to examine the effect of the oil price volatility on the Sudanese 
economy, using the VAR model with quarterly five macroeconomic variables, namely the 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, government expenditure, real import, over 
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the period 1999: q4 – 2009. He applied unrestricted VAR model with linear and non-linear 
oil price specifications as proposed by Hamilton (1983) and Mork (1989), respectively. His 
findings suggested that oil price volatility had a significant effect on the GDP, inflation and 
exchange rate. This research suffered from different technical flaws. First, although the 
research aimed to examine the period 1999: q4 – 2009: q4, it actually used data for the 
period 2000-008. Second, the quarterly data of the GDP and government expenditure were 
automatically generated, using frequency adjustment tool available in the EViews 
software, which was by all means not similar to the real data. Including such automatically 
adjusted variables in a dynamic system of equations jeopardize the reliability and 
robustness of the model findings. Thirdly, the research used bivariate Granger causality 
test, which is not recommended in the multivariate VAR model, as it does not consider the 
effect of other variables in the model. Instead, the multivariate Granger causality test 
should be used. Also, Granger causality test should be employed on differenced data rather 
than on data at level, especially when data is not stationary at level (David and Kerstin, 
2013). 
In a recent research, Dizaji (2014) studied the impact of oil price shocks on some 
macroeconomic variables in Iran, using three different VAR models and two sets of time 
series data. He first analysed the effect of oil price shocks on the government revenues and 
expenditure over the period 1970-2008, using structural VAR model.  According to the 
variance decomposition analysis, shock in oil prices explained 15 per cent and 38 per cent 
of the variations in the government revenues in the short and the long terms, respectively. 
On the other hand, in order to avoid omitted variables bias, he used six variables namely, 
oil revenues (as a proxy for oil price), total government revenue, government current 
expenditure, government capital expenditure, money supply and consumer price index 
(CPI). Secondly, he used quarterly data over the period 1990: q2-2009: q1 and employed 
unrestricted VAR models and a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) as well. For the 
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findings of the unrestricted VAR model, in the long run, oil revenues accounted for almost 
40 per cent, 6.2 per cent, 1.6 per cent, 2.3 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the variations in the 
total government revenues, current expenditure, capital expenditure, money supply and 
CPI, respectively. The impulse response function findings suggested that oil revenues had 
significant positive impact on the total revenue. The effect on the other variables was 
marginally positive. On the other hand, the results from the VECM showed that the effect 
of oil revenues on the other macroeconomic variables had become more prominent in the 
long run. For example, oil revenues accounted for approximately 50 per cent, 8 per cent, 9 
per cent, 12 per cent and 9 per cent of the variation in the total revenues, government 
expenditure, capital expenditure, money supply and the consumer price index, respectively. 
His results were difficult to compare with those obtained by Farzanegan and Markwardt 
(2009) because of using different model specification, sample period and variables.  
Omojolaibi and Egwaikhide (2014) assessed the response of the economic activities in 
some African oil exporting countries (Angola, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria), 
employing a panel VAR model and using quarterly data for the period 1990: q1 to 2010: 
q4. Their model included four macroeconomic variables, namely, fiscal deficit, money 
supply, gross investment and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Based on the impulse 
response function, they found that oil price volatility significantly and positively influences 
the fiscal deficit, while significantly and negatively influences the money supply. 
However, the response of the other macroeconomic variables, the real GDP and gross 
investment, was insignificant. The Granger causality test results showed that increase in oil 
price volatility significantly causes fiscal deficit, gross investment and money supply to 
increase. That is to say, volatility in oil price is the main cause of increasing money supply, 
fiscal deficit and gross investment in the five selected African countries. The variance 
decomposition analysis suggested that shock to oil price volatility accounted for 31.5 and 
14.8 per cent of the variation in the real GDP growth in Angola and Nigeria, respectively. 
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Furthermore, oil price volatility responsible for 28.7 and 41.8 per cent of the variance of 
the fiscal deficit in Algeria and Libya, respectively. Furthermore, increase on oil volatility 
contributed by 19.3 per cent of the variation in the gross investment in Libya and 12 per 
cent of the variation in the money supply in Egypt. On the other hand, they reported that 
fiscal deficit seems to be the main channel through which oil price volatility influence 
Libya economies. However, Angola and Nigeria were influenced through the real GDP, 
while Egypt was influenced through the monetary supply channel.   
Benhabib et al. (2014) studied the relationship between the oil price shock and the nominal 
exchange rate in Algeria, using monthly data over the period 2003 to 2013 and applying 
the VAR model. Their impulse response function results showed that oil price increase had 
a negative impact on the nominal exchange rate, in other words, oil price increase lead to 
depreciation on Algerian exchange rate, which was not in line with the established 
evidences in other oil exporting countries (Adeniyi et al., 2012). 
Mendoza and Vera (2010) examined the response of the GDP growth to oil price shocks in 
Venezuela over the period 1984:1 to 2008:3, using different oil price specifications 
proposed by Hamilton (2003), Mork (19898) and Lee et al. (1995). Their results suggested 
that an increase in oil prices using the above mentioned three specifications had a 
significant positive effect on the GDP growth rate, while the decrease in oil prices had less 
effect on the GDP growth, which further confirmed the well-documented asymmetric 
effect of oil price shocks on the economic output. 
Allegret et al. (2014) examined the effect of oil price shock on the current account balance 
in twenty-seven oil exporting countries, covering the OPEC and non-OPEC countries, 
using annual data over the period 1980-2010. Based on their results that have been 
obtained from the estimating panel smooth transition regression model, the effect of oil 
price fluctuations on the current account balance of each oil-exporting country depended 
on the level of its financial deepness. They concluded that the effect of oil price fluctuation 
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was positive in oil exporting countries with more than 25 per cent financial deepening 
ratio. The financial deepening can be obtained by dividing the money supply over the 
GDP. They further classified the oil exporting countries to three groups based on the ratio 
of the financial deepening to assess the effect of oil price fluctuation on the current account 
balance. Accordingly, countries with financial deepening ratio of less than 25 per cent 
were sensitive to oil price changes, countries with the ratio from 23.3 per cent to 28.3 per 
cent have a weaker response to oil price, and finally, countries with financial deepening 
ratio above 43.85 encounter limited effects of the oil price changes on their current account 
balances. Sudan was classified as an oil exporting country with financial deepening ratio 
less than 25 per cent. 
Mehrara and Sarem (2009) investigated the response of the output growth rate to oil price 
shocks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia, using annual data from 1970 
to 2005, employing cointegration, error correction technique and Granger causality test in 
the context of the bivariate regression model. They used different oil price shock 
specifications, namely, log difference of the nominal oil price proposed by Hamilton 
(2003), increase and decrease in oil prices as introduced by Mork (1989), oil price 
volatility proposed by Lee et al. (1995) and net oil price increase introduced by Hamilton 
(1996). Their results showed that the decrease in oil price significantly affected output in 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The effect of the oil price shock was found to be symmetric, 
confirming the higher degree of dependency in oil exporting countries on oil and less 
diversified economic base. However, in the case of Indonesia, the effect of oil price shocks 
on output was neutral; this was attributable to the adoption of prudent macroeconomic 
management policies and diversification of its economic base. They concluded that the 
relationship between the macroeconomic variables and the oil price shocks depend on the 
economic policies that influence it.   
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Chuku (2012) examined the impact of oil price shocks on the Nigerian economy using 
quarterly data over the period 1970:q1- 2008:q4. He used linear and non-linear price 
measures in the context of the structural VAR model. He primarily focused on the effects 
of oil price shocks on the supply side (output), real balance (money supply) and inflation. 
Based on the linear oil price specification, the impulse response results showed that oil 
price shocks affect output and the money supply positively. On the other hand, interest rate 
showed positive response in the first ten periods and negative thereafter, while the response 
of the inflation was not clear as it evolved around the zero line. Turn to the results from 
using asymmetric oil price specification proposed by Mork (1989), the response as a result 
of oil price increase was similar to the results obtained from the linear model. Interestingly, 
the response of the output to oil price decrease was positive, while interest rate, inflation 
and money supply showed an insignificant response. He concluded by stating that these 
results could have been different if important fiscal variables were included in the model. 
This research suffered from having a hypothetical frequency of two variables, namely the 
output gap and the oil price. This was attributable to transforming the annual data to a 
quarterly frequency using a mathematical approach (cubic spline approach), which in 
reality the value of these data might be different. Therefore, the obtained results have to be 
verified.  
Katsuya (2012) studied the effect of oil price volatility on selected macroeconomic 
variables in Russia. He used quarterly three variables VEC model, covering the period 
1995: q1 – 2009: q3. His results showed that an increase in oil prices caused GDP growth 
and inflation rates to increase, and exchange rate to appreciate. However, decrease of oil 
price was found to have a negative impact on GDP growth rate, positive effect on the 
inflation rate and caused the exchange rate to depreciate.  
Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010) examined the effect of oil price shocks on the economic 
growth of oil exporting and oil importing countries, employing simultaneous equations 
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developed by Abeyysinghe (2001), and using quarterly data from 1995:q1 to 2006:q3. 
Their results suggested that Russia had experienced a positive effect on GDP growth rate 
as a result of oil price increase. The impulse response function showed that the cumulative 
response of real GDP growth rate to 50 per cent increase in oil price resulted in 6.8 and 6.0 
percentage points increase in the short and long terms, respectively. They also found that 
Russia had indirectly negatively affected as its trading partners suffered from the oil price 
increase. However, the indirect negative effects were smaller compared to the gain from 
the increase in oil prices. 
Almulali and Che Sab (2013) investigated the effect of oil revenues on the economic 
activities in the OPEC countries (United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Algeria, Angola, 
Bahrain, Ecuador, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia). They used panel model comprised of seven variables, namely GDP, 
domestic investment, gross domestic savings, government expenditure, consumer price 
index (CPI), real exchange rate, oil export value as a proxy of oil revenues, and current 
account balance. Their results showed that oil revenues had significant positive impact on 
the GDP, investment, government expenditure, exchange rate and current account balance, 
but had a significant negative effect on the consumer price index and domestic savings. 
Youngho et al. (2011) investigated the impact of oil price fluctuations on selected Asian 
countries. They adopted VEC model with quarterly data over the span of 1990: q1-2010: 
q3 and 1991: q1-2010: q2 for Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. Their results showed 
that increase in oil prices had a significant positive effect on the GDP growth in both 
countries. However, the impact on the inflation rate was somewhat marginal and 
statistically insignificant. The small effect on inflation rate was attributed to the domestic 
pricing policy, which aims at stabilizing the general price level in the economy. 
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4.3.2 Importing countries 
Dawson (2003) studied the impact of oil prices on the exchange rate of the Dominican 
Republic, applying multivariate regression model on monthly time series data covering the 
period August 1991 to October 2002. The main finding was that the increase in oil price 
caused the exchange rate to depreciate against the US dollar. This in turn worsened the 
trade balance as the Republic of Dominican was a net oil importer. 
Weiqi et al. (2010) examined the effect of oil price shocks on the Chinese economy during 
the period 1998 – 2008, using the SVAR model. They found net that the oil price increase 
had a negative effect on the output, investment and positive effects on the inflation rate and 
interest rate as well. Although the research aimed at examining the asymmetric effect 
following Hamilton (1996), it did not reflect the effects of oil price decrease on the 
Chinese economy. Likewise, Zhang (2011) investigated the effect of oil price fluctuation 
on four macroeconomic variables in the Chinese economy, using monthly data over the 
period 1999:10 - 2008:10. On the basis of the VECM, oil price increase had negatively 
affected the economic output and money supply, while positively influenced the consumer 
price index. 
 Prasad et al. (2007) employed a VAR model to study the effect of the oil price increase on 
the Fiji Islands. They found that the oil price increase positively affected the GDP growth 
rate. The result was inconsistent with the findings of similar studies in the oil-importing 
countries, which had experienced a negative effect on their GDP growth rate as a result of 
oil price increases. They justified their results on the grounds that the Fiji’s GDP did not 
reach its full potential output; therefore, it was growing despite the increase in oil prices. 
Sulaiman (2010) studied the effect of oil price volatility on the export earnings in Pakistani 
economy; using annual data cover the period 1975 to 2008 and employing the VECM. His 
research revealed that the oil price increase had a negative effect on the export earnings, 
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the balance of trade and inflation rate. Similar negative effect of oil price shocks on trade 
balance was observed in Singapore (Le and Chang, 2013).   
Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2005) investigated the relation between the oil price shocks 
and economic activities in six Asian countries during the period 1975:q1 to 2002:q2, 
employing cointegration and Granger causality test. They used different price 
specifications for both real prices in the US dollars and in local currency. Their findings 
showed that the impact is greater on the economic activities when domestic real oil price 
was used. They pointed out that oil price increase Granger cause the GDP growth in 
Thailand, South Korea and Japan, while the impact of oil price increase on inflation rate 
was significant in the six countries. They further emphasised that the asymmetric 
relationship between the oil price shock and inflation exist in Japan, Malaysia, South 
Korea and Thailand, while the asymmetric effect of the oil price shock on the GDP growth 
only found in the case of South Korea. 
Jimmy and Jan (2012) used VAR, VECM and panel regressive model to explore the 
impact of oil price shocks on the economic activities in some Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore). Their results suggested that the real GDP growth 
rate was not significantly affected by the oil price shocks in all countries under study, 
while the unemployment and consumer price index are significantly influenced. Their 
result regarding the effect of oil price shock on the real GDP was not in line with other 
studies findings that were carried out in importing countries. This result was quite 
sceptical, as unemployment was highly affected by the oil price shocks, which considered 
as a proxy indicator of output performance. The unexpected result might be attributed to 
applying pairwise Granger causality test to a multiple regression model.  
Roseline, Esman and Isaac (2013) examined the effect of oil price shocks on both overall 
inflation rate, and non-fuel non-food inflation rate in Kenya using quarterly data over the 
period 1996:q1- 2011:q4, employing Granger causality test and structural VAR model. 
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They found that the oil price shock had a significant impact on both measures of inflation 
rates. Moreover, they revealed that the oil price shock immediately depreciates the 
exchange rate. The results obtained from impulse response function confirm those of 
Granger test.  
Ahmad and Ali (2012) examined the effect of oil price shocks on four Asian oil importing 
economies (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan), using annual data from the period 
1985 to 2010 and applying linear regression model. Their results showed that oil price 
increase lead to a surge in the GDP growth rate, exchange rate and foreign direct 
investment in the countries under study. However, the inflation response to the oil price 
increase in India was found to be negative, while the response was positive in the other 
countries. These results seem to be unreliable as researchers use a very simple regression 
method which was unable to capture the dynamic relationship between the oil price 
changes and the macroeconomic variables. This was clear from having conflicting results 
that were not established in other oil-importing countries.   
Chen et al. (2016) investigated the impact of China’s crude oil imports, its share in the 
world crude oil consumption, supply from Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
and speculation on world crude oil prices. Similar to Kaufmann (2011), the crude oil 
inventory was used as a proxy indicator for speculation. They used SVAR model with 
monthly time series data covering the period 1997: 1 to 2012: 1. The empirical results 
suggested that the cumulated response of the world crude oil price to China’s crude oil 
consumption was insignificant. However, OPEC supply and speculation influenced world 
crude oil prices positively and statistically significant in the short run. For the robustness of 
the results, they tested the period 2003: 1 to 2008: 12 (world crude oil price crisis) and 
2009: 1 to 2012: 1 (post crisis period).  They found that there was no significant difference 
between the findings obtained from the entire sample period and the two sub-samples, with 
exception of the effect of china’s crude oil consumption became significant. They 
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concluded that speculation and OPEC supply were the main factors that caused world 
crude oil price to surge. 
2.4 Transmission channels of oil shocks 
Misati et al. (2013) identifys three transmission channels of the oil price shocks to the 
economic activity. These are supply side, demand side and terms of trade. The supply side 
effect could be explained by increasing the cost of production inputs, which in turn reduce 
output. The demand side effect works through decreasing the purchasing power of 
households, thus the aggregate demand falls. Finally, the terms of trade effect are 
manifested in an increase of the import cost, especially for the net oil importing economies. 
To explain the inverse response of the U.S. economic activity to the oil price shocks, 
number of channels were identified (Brown and Yucel, 2002). First, the classic supply-side 
effect, which increases production cost and accordingly retards output. Moreover, as 
productivity decreases, unemployment increase and inflation rate as well. Second, the 
income transfers and demand side effect channel. Through this channel money transfers 
from the oil importing countries to the oil exporting countries. The increase of foreign 
exchange resources in the oil exporting countries leads to an increase in consumer demand 
for goods and services, while in oil importing countries reduces their consuming spending 
and result in a slowdown of the economic growth. The net effect is that world supply 
savings increase and interest rate drop, which in turn stimulate investment. The investment 
offset the consumption reduction in oil importing countries leaving the aggregate demand 
unchanged. However, if the prices in oil importing countries is sticky downward, fall in 
consumption will be greater than increase in investment, thus the end result is slowdown of 
economic growth worldwide. In this respect, Horwich and Weimer (1984) claim that the 
net effect is mild as fiscal and monetary policies can stimulate the demand in the oil 
importing countries. The third channel is the real balance effect, which could be illustrated 
by the increase in money demand as oil price increase. Accordingly, the interest rate surges 
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to curtail the money supply in the economy. As a sequence of the interest increase, 
investment reduces and output declines as well.  Finally, the response of the monetary 
policies to price shocks, this channel shows how the monetary authority reacts to the oil 
price increase or decrease, if the monetary authority intends to maintain the nominal GDP 
growth rate, the inflation will be increased. However, if contractionary policy is adopted as 
a result of oil price increase, output will be reduced. In this respect, some researchers claim 
that contractionary monetary policy is responsible for retarding aggregate economic 
activities when oil prices go up (Bernanke et al., 1997; Bohi, 1991).  
Bataa (2010) highlight six transmission channels through which oil price shocks impact the 
macroeconomy. First, the supply shock which could be interpreted through the production 
function. If oil price increases, producers tend to reduce the utilization of oil, thus leading 
to negative short-term effect on the output. Second, the real balance effect, this channel is 
better explained through increasing of heating bills and goods that are produced using oil 
products. As oil price increases consumers seek to balance their budget by increasing 
demand for money, this in turn leads to an increase of interest rate, thus retards investment 
and the output. Third, monetary policy response, this simply reflects the response of the 
monetary authorities to an increase of oil price by boosting interest rate, which again slows 
down the economic performance. Fourth, income transfers from oil importers to oil 
exporters enhance and improve purchasing power and thus increase the aggregate demand. 
However, if the increase in oil price is persistent, it affects the aggregate demand in oil 
importing economies. Therefore, the net effect depends on the rate of recycling of the 
excess money received by the oil exporters in the global economy. Fifth, adjustment cost, 
it is generally high in the multi-sector economies to move capital and labour between 
sectors as a result of changing in the oil prices. Therefore, the capital and labour in the 
affected sector is most likely to be idle waiting conditions to recover instead of moving out 
of the sector. The ultimate effect is low output performance. Finally, uncertainty effect, 
this channel explains the behaviour of firms and individuals regarding their consumption 
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behaviour. When oil price increase consumers tend to postpone the investment decision, 
hence it holds back the economic output. Similar to this classification of transmission 
mechanisms have been suggested by Cologni and Manera (2008).  
According to Chuku (2010), oil price shock affects economic activities through six 
channels, four of them similar to those proposed by Brown and Yucel (2002). The six 
channels are supply-side effect, wealth transfer effect, monetary policy, real sector 
adjustment, real balance and finally the uncertainty effect. However, Chuku adds new 
transmission channels, which are real sector adjustment and uncertainty effect. An increase 
in oil price induces firms to change the combination of production inputs such as capital 
and labour. Shift from intensive energy machine to lesser consuming ones and moving of 
labours from the sector that have been affected by the oil price increase to other sectors or 
might enforce them to be unemployed for some time till conditions improve. This effect 
results in slowing down the output and increase the unemployment rates. Whereas, the 
uncertainty effect could be explained in terms of delaying spending by consumers or 
borrowing from the commercial banks to sustain the same level of consumption. 
Again, Weiqi et al. (2010) follow the same classification of Brown and Yucel (2002) to 
define the transmission channels of oil price shocks. However, there are some differences 
in the name of some transmission channels, for example, instead of uncertainty effect and 
income transfers; they used unexpected effect and wealth transfer effect, respectively. 
However, the interpretation of both channels is not changed. They also added inflation 
effect. According to them, the six transmission channels are supply-side effect, wealth 
transfer effect, inflation effects, real balance effect, sector adjustment and unexpected 
effect. 
According to Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) claim that the mechanisms of passing through 
the effect of oil price shocks into macroeconomic activities are classified into two demand 
and supply side effects. The demand side effect occurs as a result of the transfer of wealth 
from an oil importer to oil exporter countries, when the oil price goes up, and as a shift in 
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the terms of trade. On the supply side effect, an increase in oil prices invites firms to 
increase prices of their products to compensate losses in profits or reduces their production. 
They further suggest that oil price shocks have direct and indirect impacts. General prices 
increase immediately as a result of the surge in oil prices, then the second round effect 
occurs when labour ask for a wage increase to compensate the losses in their real wages. 
However, after 2000, the effects have been weakened due to the quality and credibility of 
the monetary policies, wages are no longer inflationary adjusted and finally the high 
competition between firms necessitate firms to minimize their profit rather than passing 
high energy prices to consumers. They claim that the main transmission channels whereby 
oil price shocks pass through to economic activities have been under investigation for quite 
a long period. Though there are substantial studies that are carried out to examine the 
mechanisms through which oil price shocks influence economic activities, but these are 
still far from reaching an agreement on them. This statement in not accurate because it is 
clear from above-mentioned studies that there is consensus on the mechanisms of passing 
through of the effect of oil shocks to the economic activities. However, the differences are 
confined to the interpretation and to a lesser extent, to the name of the transmission 
channels.  
2.5 General remarks on the literature 
The impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables are to a great extent 
established in the literature, especially in the developed economies. However, further 
research needs to be carried out to establish conclusive and clear cut relationships in the 
developing economies. From the above literature review, it is clear that there are some 
differences in the outcomes of those studies, which might be attributed to the following 
reasons: 
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1. Using stationary versus non-stationary data in the analysis: some researchers had 
run the VAR model with time series that are not stationary, while others used only 
time series that proved not to have a unit root. 
2. Reporting different type of analysis (Granger causality test, Impulse Response 
Functions and Forecasting variance decomposition analysis): some researchers used 
to compare findings of similar studies, but without considering the type of the test 
that was employed. 
3. Using different approaches: researchers had used different methods to analysis the 
relationship between oil shocks and macroeconomic variables. For instance, 
(Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH), linear 
regression, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE), structural VAR 
model, unrestricted VAR model, etc. The factors included in these approaches are 
certainly different, which raise questions of model identification and 
misspecification.  
4. Classification of countries (oil exporters and oil importers): this is very important 
as each category has economic characteristics, which do not exist in the other 
group. Therefore, reporting similarities in results between these different groups are 
not justifiable. 
5. Neglecting fiscal and monetary policies effects: the effect of oil price shocks on the 
different economic policy environment is misleading, as the counter monetary 
policies or fiscal policies (e.g. oil price subsidies, oil stabilization fund and rising 
interest rate) might alter the results. Therefore, giving no attention to these 
differences will result in meaningless comparisons. 
6. Developing and developed countries classification (economic structure): This 
classification is important as each group has a different level of economic activities. 
The structure of the economy itself is different in a manner that the composition of 
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the GDP is different, and pattern of energy consumption (energy intensity) is not 
similar as well.  
7. Using different time spans and frequencies: some researchers used different time 
frame, which gave unique results when compared to another study that covered 
longer or less period. Moreover, using different frequencies of the time series had 
their effect on the outcome of the study. For example, some studies use monthly 
time series data, while other studies use quarterly and annual time series data.  
8. Type of data used in the analysis (real, nominal and percentage change): using 
different forms of variables will give different findings. Thus, variables used in the 
model should be checked before making any comparison between studies.  
9. Classification of the country regarding oil production: some countries have a 
unique situation because they are an oil exporter and at the same time oil importer. 
This uniqueness exists in Nigeria due to its low refinery capacity to meet the 
domestic demand for oil refined products. 
10. Oil price specifications (volatility, net oil price, negative and positive prices, 
linear): before the 1980s, most of the studies used linear specification, however 
these oil price specifications failed to stablish the relationship between the oil price 
shocks and the GNP in the United States. In order to re-establish the relationship 
different oil price specifications were employed. Accordingly, a researcher has to 
consider these different specifications when comparing its results to other findings 
of the studies. 
11. The contradiction of terminologies (positive and negative oil price and its effects): 
some studies use positive oil price shock as an increase of oil price, while others 
define it as oil price decrease. Some studies report a positive impact on the real 
exchange rate as appreciation, while other reports it as depreciation. This might be 
attributed to the definition of real exchange rate by each researcher. Therefore, 
comparing the effect on real exchange rate should be done with this in mind. 
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2.6 Summary 
In a nut shell, the impact of the oil price shocks on the macroeconomic activities has been 
relatively well identified and explained in the literature. In general, net oil exporters were 
found to have positive effects on their economies when oil price went up, whereas net oil 
importers suffered. On the contrary, net oil importing countries benefitted from a drop in 
oil prices and their counterparts witnessed negative economic impact. These findings do 
not hold true all the time due to differences in the development stages, economic structure 
and counter monetary and fiscal policies to oil price shocks. In some cases, trading of other 
commodities between net oil exporters and importer relatively offset or mitigate the 
adverse effects of oil price shocks. However, some variations in the researchers’ findings 
might be attributed to numerous factors, among which oil price specifications, type of data 
and using different timeframes. Surprisingly, some researchers compared their results, 
which had been obtained from studies that were carried out in oil exporting developing 
countries with finding of similar studies conducted in oil importing developed countries. 
On the other hand, six transmission mechanisms of oil price shock to the economy have 
been identified in the literature with some differences in the name of the channel and minor 
variances with regard to their interpretation. However, in developing countries other 
channel were acknowledged such as money supply and government expenditure. From the 
above literature it turns out that Sudan has not been comprehensively studied. Also, all 
studies have used different types econometric models and no attempts were made to use 
mixed method design. Therefore, this research will attempt to contribute towards filling 
these gaps. 
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Chapter three: Overview of Sudan Oil Industry and Economy 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a historical background on the evolution of the oil sector and the associated 
oil production activities are thoroughly covered. It also gives an overview of the 
macroeconomic performance during the period 2000 - 2011. In doing so, it analyses the 
performance of the public budget, balance of payment, external debt position and the 
behaviour of selected macroeconomic variables. Finally, a brief review of the post sample 
period is highlighted, that is, the period after the secession of the South Sudan from Sudan 
in July 2011. 
3.2 General background  
Sudan is located in the northeast of Africa and occupies an area of 2.5 million square 
kilometres. It is bordered by Egypt and Libya to the north and northwest; the Republic of 
the Central Africa and Chad to the west; Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya 
to the south and south-west; finally, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east (Mohsin, 2002). Its 
geographic climate extends from arid desert in the north, with exceptions along the River 
Nile, to Savannah in the central regions and tropical woodlands in the south. The 
administrative structure of the country is composed of 25 states. Sudan witnessed one of 
the longest civil war in Africa, which lasted for almost 50 years, with some intermittent 
years of peace in between 1972 to 1983. In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) had been concluded and declaring a new era of peace and development in Sudan.  
According to the last national census, which was carried out in 2008, the total population 
was estimated at 39.2 million, with a growth rate of 3 per cent, of which approximately 
70 per cent live in rural areas, while the remainder lives in the urban areas (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Almost 46 per cent of the population live below the poverty 
line. Since the advent of oil exploration in the last quarter of 1999, Sudan has achieved 
remarkable growth in its GDP. The GDP increased from approximately US$ 10 billion in 
59 
 
1999 to almost US$ 53 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). The economic structure of the 
country has changed from being principally reliant on agricultural sector as the main 
driver of economic growth to the oil sector. However, the agricultural sector still 
accommodates the majority of the labour force. The service and industrial sectors have 
grown in tandem with the development of the oil sector. Although the infrastructure has 
been improved, it is not sufficient to serve such a large country and mitigate the sense of 
marginalisation among under-developed states.  
3.3 Oil sector 
3.3.1 Management of the oil Sector 
The Ministry of Petroleum in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy regulates the oil sector, primarily through the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation, 
which is a public government institution. There are also other government-owned 
companies working in the areas of oil exploration, production, distribution, refining and 
other oil related services (Energy Information Administration, 2014). The Ministry of 
Petroleum setup the general oil sector policies and gives licenses for exploration and 
production. It also oversees the implementation processes of the Exploration and 
Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs). These tasks are undertaken by a number of 
technical departments within the Ministry of Petroleum. In order to tackle the issue of 
environmental damage that is generally associated with oil production, the Ministry 
established a specialized department to set up the prerequisite measures for 
environmentally safe oil projects to mitigate any negative impacts on local people living 
around the oil fields or on the environment in general. The equity share of the government 
in all oil blocks is held by the National Petroleum Company (Sudapet), which is the 
technical arm of the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation. Sudapet owns shares in oil block 
licenses ranging from 5 per cent to 30 per cent (World Bank, 2009). It is worth noting that 
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the oil sector is dominated by the Asian companies, in addition to some companies from 
the region.  
3.3.1 Pricing of domestic crude oil and refined products 
With regard to pricing of domestic crude oil and refined products, the government 
(Ministry of Finance and National Economy) sells its share of the crude oil to the Sudanese 
Petroleum Corporation, as mentioned earlier a government owned institution, at a fixed 
price far lower than that of the world market. For example, Nile Blend crude oil, which is 
high quality crude oil is sold at U$$ 49, while a lower quality crude of Fulla Blend is sold 
at US$ 38 as at 2006. In turn, the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation refines the crude oil in 
Al-Jali Refinery at the capital, Khartoum, which is a joint venture project between the 
Chinese National Company and the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation.  Refined products 
are sold to local oil distributing companies (both private and public) at prices regulated by 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (Laura, 2014). It is clear that the 
government was heavily subsidizing the crude oil and its products. For instance, when the 
crude oil prices were above US$ 100 in 2008, its price in the domestic market was 50 per 
cent lower.  
3.3.2 Oil exploration 
The story of the oil exploration process goes back to 1959, when an Italian company AGIB 
and British company BP started their operation in the Red Sea area. In 1974, Chevron 
Company was awarded a license by the government for oil exploration in the Red Sea area. 
It carried out some studies such as aero-magnetic and gravity surveys. Its exploration was 
not successful and only resulted in a discovery of dry and condensate gas wells, which 
were not commercially viable to be extracted. In the same year, Chevron signed a 
Production Sharing Contract (PSC) to start oil exploration in the central and South Sudan 
(Muglad basin). Their exploration operations in these areas brought about the first 
discovery of oil in the country. Furthermore, in 1981 and 1982 Chevron claimed new 
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discoveries of oil fields in Adaryale and Heglig, which are located in the Upper Nile and 
South Kordofan States, respectively. As a result of the continued fighting in South Sudan, 
the company suspended all its operations in 1983. Later on, its concession area was divided 
by the government into smaller units. However, due to political reasons, Chevron sold out 
its rights in 1992 (European Coalition and Oil in Sudan, 2008).  From 1995 onwards Asian 
companies began to play an increasing pivotal role in the oil exploration operations in the 
country, especially after the US economic sanction which has been imposed in 1997.  
3.3.3 Oil reserves 
There were different estimates for Sudan’s oil reserve. For example, on January 2011, Oil 
and Gas Journal (OGL) estimated Sudan’s proved oil reserves at five billion barrels 
compared to a previous estimate of 563 million barrels in 2006 (Energy Information 
Administration, 2012). BP Statistical Review (2012) puts crude oil reserve estimates as 
high as 6.7 billion barrels as of the end of 2010 (BP, 2012). These two estimates show 
some degree of uncertainty of proved oil reserves. On the other hand, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010), Sudan’s proved crude oil reserves are limited 
and the government could continue to produce oil for 25-30 years in the future, based on 
the current rate of production (Ali et al., 2010). It is worth noting that the bulk of reserves 
is positioned in the Melut and Muglad basins (Energy Information Administration, 2014).  
3.3.4 Oil production  
As a result of civil war, oil exploration processes were limited to the western and south-
central parts of Sudan. The government has not used open bid-rounds in allocating 
petroleum licenses due to the difficulties caused by the conflict. As an alternative, the 
government directly negotiated with companies that were willing to undertake the work, 
and ready to operate in Sudan without constraints from US and its allies. Accordingly, 
companies have signed an Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with 
the government for oil blocks concession. The duration of the EPSA contract is 25 years 
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with eligibility for 5-year extension. According to EPSA the, companies receive up to 40% 
of the crude oil production to cover their exploration, development and production costs 
(cost oil), while the remaining 60% is shared between the government and companies 
based on the volume of the production of crude oil. For production to 25 thousand barrel a 
day, government and companies’ shares are 60 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. 
Between 25 and 50 thousand barrel a day, government and companies’ shares are 70 per 
cent and 30 per cent, respectively. Finally, for production greater than the 50 thousand 
barrels a day, government and companies’ shares 80 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively 
(Sidahmed, 2014).  
The geological data that have been left by Chevron helped the new international Asian 
companies to launch their drilling operations soon after signing their contracts. As a result 
of that Sudan started producing oil in early 1990s with modest rates of production, which 
gradually began to increase thereafter. The first oil shipment was exported in the third 
quarter of 1999, after construction of the export pipeline, which links oil producing fields 
to the Port of Sudan on the Red sea. As can be seen from Figure 1, the production reached 
its peak in 2007 at a production rate of 461 thousand barrels a day and then started to 
decline in subsequent years. In 2010, Sudan consumed approximately 98 thousand barrels 
a day and the remaining 367 thousand barrels a day was exported to Asian markets, 
especially to China, Malaysia, Japan and India  (Energy Information Administration, 2014; 
Sudanese Petroleum Corporation, 2013).  
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Figure 1. Oil production and consumption 
 
Source: Author’s own work adapted from Sudanese Petroleum Corporation statistics 
It is worth noting that crude oil is produced from two major oil blocks in addition to output 
from smaller ones. The major producing fields are in Blocks 1, 2, 4 and Blocks 3 & 7. 
While the smaller fields found on Block 6, Block 5a. Figure 3 shows the production of 
each block through the period 2000-2011 (Sudan Petroleum Corporation, 2013). The 
average block size is around 61,000 square kilometres (European Coalition on Oil in 
Sudan, 2010). It is worth noting that the number of the drilled oil wells reached 1369 by 
the end of 2010, but only 1156 wells were active at that time.  On the other hand, the oil 
sector created 4489 jobs, 90.8 per cent were Sudanese and the rest were foreigners 
(Sidahmed, 2014).  
The oil blocks and different consortia are discussed below. Also, Figure 2 shows the 
location of oil producing blocks, non-producing blocks along with pipeline routes. 
  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
 b
p
d
Consumption Production
64 
 
Figure 2. Oil blocks in Sudan 
 
 
Source: Global Witness Organization 
3.3.4.1 Blocks 1, 2 & 4  
Blocks 1, 2 and 4 are located in the Mujlad basin and cover an area of 48,000 square 
kilometres that overlaps the borders of South Kordofan, Unity States and Abyei Region. 
This area was in dispute for a long time and still the issue is not completely resolved. 
According to the resolution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, two 
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major oil fields are located in these blocks (namely Heglig and Bamboo) and considered to 
be part of the North, that is, out of the Abyei region. It is worth noting that Greater Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) operates blocks 1, 2, and 4. This consortium 
comprises of Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Malaysian Petronas, Indian 
Oil Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Sudapet with a share contribution of 40 per cent, 
30 per cent 25 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. By the year 1996, development 
processes of the two main fields (Heglig and Unity) were completed and production was 
started. Moreover, GNPOC has constructed 1000 mile pipeline linking oil producing fields 
to the Bashayer terminal, located 15 km south Port Sudan along the Red sea (Energy 
Information Administration, 2014). In September 1999, the first batch of the Sudanese 
crude oil exports was from this block (European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2010). On the 
other hand, the average production from Blocks 1, 2, and 4 during the period 2000-2011 
amounted to 218.9 thousand barrels a day. This block showed increasing production and 
reached its peak of 288.8 thousand barrels a day in 2004. After that it started to decline 
through the rest of the period and the decline expected to continue due to drop of crude oil 
production from Heglig and Unity fields (Figure 3). However, the production could be 
increased if the government adopts Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) technique to help 
extract the crude oil trapped in the rock pores. This block produces a crude oil type called 
Nile blend, which is of medium quality, sweet and with American Petroleum Institute 
(API) gravity of 34.5 degrees. The Nile blend crude oil type is generally traded at a 
discount rate of US$ 4 and US$ 1.5 compared to West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and UK 
Brent blend, respectively (Sidahmed, 2014). 
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Figure 3. Oil production by block 
 
 Source: Author’s own work adapted from SPC statistics 
3.3.4.2 Blocks 3 and 7 
These two blocks are located in the Upper Nile State in the South Sudan, in Melut Basin. 
Both blocks are operated by Petrodar consortium, which includes CNPC, Petronas, 
Sudapet, Sinopec and Tri-Ocean Energy of Kuwait with shares of 41 per cent, 40 per cent, 
8 per cent, 6 per cent, and 5 per cent, respectively (Sidahmed, 2014). The two main oil 
fields in these blocks are Adar Yale and Palogue. On the other hand, in November 2005, 
the CNPC constructed Petrodar pipeline, linking the oil producing fields in these blocks to 
the marine terminals in Port Sudan. The pipeline has a maximum capacity of 450 thousand 
barrels a day (Energy Information Administration, 2014). In 2006, the production from 
these two blocks was almost 66.6 thousand barrels a day of Dar blend crude oil. However, 
it approximately tripled in the second year and then continued to increase gradually in the 
subsequent years. As can be seen from Figure 3 the block reached its peak production of 
254 thousand barrels a day in 2010. The Dar blend crude oil type is heavy and highly 
acidic, with API gravity ranges between 28-30 degrees. As a result of the poor quality of 
crude oil from these blocks, it generally traded at a discount rate to other benchmark crude 
oil such as Indonesia Minas and UK Brent (Sidahmed, 2014).  
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3.3.4.3 Block 5a 
In April 2005, the government of Sudan contracted White Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (WNPOC) to develop oil production in this block. WNPOC is a consortium 
comprised of three companies Sudapet, Indian ONGC and Malaysian Petronas with equity 
shares of 8 per cent, 24 per cent and 68 per cent respectively (Sidahmed, 2014). In June 
2007, the block started its production with an initial rate of production of 11.9 thousand 
barrels a day. Although the full capacity of production was estimated at 60 thousand 
barrels a day, up to 2010 the field production was in the range of 20 to 30 thousand barrels 
a day (Figure 3). In this block there are two oil producing fields, which are Thar-Jath and 
Mala. The crude oil from these fields is transported through a 60 miles’ pipeline to an 
existing pump station at Heglig in the south Kordofan State and then from there it 
transported to the marine terminal in Port Sudan using the GNPOC pipeline. The type of 
the crude oil produced from this block is heavy with an API of 18-20 degrees (Energy 
Information Administration, 2014; World Bank, 2009).  
3.3.4.4 Block 6 
This block is located in the west Kordofan State. In 2004, Petro-energy succeeded to bring 
online Block 6 (Fula field) at a modest rate of production of 3.4 thousand barrels a day. 
Petro-energy is a mini consortium comprising two oil companies, CNPC and Sudapet with 
equity shares of 95 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. However, the oil production has 
steadily increased, reaching its peak of 53.9 thousand barrels per day in 2011 (Figure 3). 
This crude oil is of low quality with an API of 21.6 and it is highly acidic. The production 
from this block is more likely to increase slightly in the near future due drilling of more 
wells. The CNPC has constructed a pipeline to transport its crude oil from Fula field to 
Khartoum refinery for processing as this crude is entirely used for domestic consumption 
(Energy Information Administration, 2014; European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2010). 
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3.3.4.5 Other Blocks 
Block B: This block, spreads over three southern states, namely Warab, Unity and Jonglei. 
It was licensed to Total, which is a French company. The company has encountered some 
difficulties due to the continued fighting in the area and licensing problems. Also, 
exploration operations were suspended as a result of the pulling out of Marathon Oil 
company from the consortium due to the existing U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan, 
which were imposed in 1997 (European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2010).  
Block 5B: This block was initially under exploration by Petronas, ONGC, Sweden Lundin 
Company and Sudapet with equity shares of 39 per cent, 23.5 per cent, 24.5 per cent and 
13 per cent, respectively. It spreads over three states, which are Jonglei, Unity and Lakes. 
In early 2009, the two biggest shareholders, namely Lundin Company and Indian ONGC 
have pulled out of this block due to the initial negative drilling results. Nevertheless, in 
August 2009, the Moldovan Ascom group joined the existing consortium in block 5B 
(European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2010). 
Block Ea: This block is located in Warab state covering an area of 48 square kilometres 
and still under its exploration stage. Star Petroleum Company (Luxembourg) proclaimed in 
August 2010, that it has been awarded a concession to explore in this block. According, a 
Production sharing Agreement (PSA) for this block was signed. Star Petroleum has a 75 
per cent stake, Sudapet has 20 per cent, and finally 5 per cent is held by the Norwegian 
Hamla Company (European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2010). 
3.3.5 Oil infrastructure 
3.3.5.1 Refineries 
The infrastructure of the oil industry is located in the North, whereas most current proven 
reserves are located in the South. According to the Energy Information Administration 
(2014), Sudan has five refineries with a combined refining capacity of 143.7 thousand 
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barrels per day. The Khartoum refinery, which is a joint venture between the CNPC and 
the government of Sudan, was constructed in 2000 with designing refining capacity of 50 
thousand barrels per day. In 2006, its capacity was expanded to 100 thousand barrels per 
day. This new installed refining capacity allowed for processing of the two types of crude 
oil, which are the Nile and Fula blends for domestic use as well as export.  The 
construction of the new expansion has converted Sudan from being a net-oil importer to 
net-oil exporter including export of refined products to neighbouring countries. The second 
refinery, which was constructed in 1970s is located in Port Sudan, was designed to refine 
21.7 thousand barrels a day. This refinery is no longer operating. Also, there are three 
small refineries in Elobeid in Kordofan state, Shajara in Khartoum state and Abugabra in 
South Darfur with refining capacity of 10 thousand barrels per day, 10 thousand barrels per 
day and 2 thousand barrels per day, respectively (Energy Information Administration, 
2014). 
3.3.5.2 Pipelines 
PDOC Pipeline 
As can be seen from Table 1 there are four main pipelines namely PDOC, Petro-energy, 
WNPOC and GNPOC.  The length of PDOC pipeline is 850 miles with a diameter of 32 
inches. This pipeline transports the crude oil which produced from blocks 3 and 7, which 
are located in the Upper Nile states in the South Sudan, to Port Sudan on the Red sea. The 
total cost of its construction was US$ 1.2 billion. Likewise, the Petro-Energy pipeline 
transports the Fulla crude oil, produced from Block 6 in the west Kordofan state to the 
Khartoum refinery with a total length of 460 miles and a diameter of 24". The total cost of 
the construction was US$ 352 million. Furthermore, WNPOC pipeline length is 60 miles 
and it transports crude oil from Block 5a to an existing pump station at Heglig in the south 
Kordofan state. Finally, the length of the GNPOC pipeline is 1000 miles with 28 inches’ 
diameter. It transports Nile blend crude oil, produced from blocks 1, 2 and 4 in the South 
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and the West Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red sea. The pipeline's capacity is 450 thousand 
bpd (Energy Information Administration, 2014; Sudanese Petroleum Corporation, 2013). It 
is worth noting that the total storage capacity in Bashayer Terminal is approximately 2 
million barrels (Sidahmed, 2014). 
 Table 1. Pipeline information 
 
Operating 
companies 
Origin Destination Miles Cost 
PDOC Block 3 & 7 Bashayer Terminal 
2, Port-Sudan 
850 US$ 1.2 billion 
WNPOC Block 5a Heglig facilities 60 n.a 
Petro-Energy Block 6 Khartoum Refinery 460 US$ 352 million 
GNPOC Block 1, 2 & 4 Bashayer Terminal 
1, Port-Sudan 
1000 US$ 1.2 billion 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2014, European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2008. 
3.4 Macroeconomic stance 
3.4.1 Real GDP growth and unemployment rates 
The period 2000-2011 witnessed a remarkable increase in Sudan’s real economic growth 
rate, reaching a peak of 9.3 per cent in 2006 as shown in Figure 4. Throughout the period, 
2000 – 2006, a steady growth of the GDP was reported with a slight drop in 2003. The 
average real GDP growth rate during this period was approximately 8 per cent. From 2007 
and thereafter, the GDP growth started declining and reached its lowest rate in 2011. The 
increase of the real GDP growth rate was due to the advent of oil production and increase 
in foreign direct investment associated with oil sector activities. During this period, Sudan 
was classified among the fastest growing economies in the Sub-Saharan Africa (World 
Bank, 2009). From the economic theory point of view, unemployment moves in the 
opposite direction to GDP movement. That is, the surge in GDP growth rate reduces the 
unemployment rate as a better GDP performance creates more job opportunities thus 
shrinking the level of unemployment in the economy. Apparently from Figure 4, the 
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unemployment rate reached its lowest point in 2006, which in the same year the real GDP 
rate hit its peak point. However, the general trend of the unemployment rate is shown to be 
growing. This might be attributed to the characteristics of the oil industry, which is 
associated with capital intensive rather than labour intensive projects. It also reflects minor 
spill-over effects on other productive sectors, which in general are more capable of 
availing new jobs. The overall trend of the GDP growth rate showed that oil revenues 
received during the first seven years (2000 – 2006) had not been invested in non-oil sectors 
to sustain the economic growth during the period when prices went down. Also, this may 
be attributed to increase in current expenditure as a result of expanding government 
administrative machinery and fulfilling of peace obligations (Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, 2005). 
Figure 4. Real GDP growth and unemployment rate 
 
Source: Author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000 - 2011. 
 
On the flip side, the GDP per capita increased drastically in nominal and real terms. 
However, the nominal measure dropped in 2009 and 2011 due to the global financial crisis 
(Table 2). The average nominal and real GDP per capita through the period 2000-2011 
were US$ 1014.4 and US$ 533, respectively. Intuitively, the average GDP per capita over 
the period 2000-2006 (this period where still development of oil fields and associated 
facilities were undergoing) is lower than the average over the period 2008-2011 (this 
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period where all oil sector facilities were in place and functioning), which were US$ 501.4 
and US$ 699.4 respectively. This was due to the steady increase of GDP growth in the 
former period and decreasing in the latter. Although this showed an improvement in the 
general livelihood condition of the population, it did not tell much about the situation in 
reality due to uneven distribution of incomes. According to the national baseline household 
survey of 2009, the poverty rate in Sudan is approximately 56 per cent, that is, 56 per cent 
of the population living under the poverty line (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
Table 2. GDP per capita in US dollars 
Year Nominal Real (2000 constant) 
2000 444.8 444.8 
2001 467.8 461.8 
2002 513.9 476.0 
2003 599.3 498.9 
2004 712.8 513.0 
2005 861.8 533.5 
2006 1119.7 581.9 
2007 1423.4 630.3 
2008 1653.0 663.0 
2009 1596.7 691.3 
2010 1928.1 712.6 
2011 1866.4 730.7 
Source: World Bank databank, 2014 
3.3.2 GDP sectors composition 
During the period 2000-2011, the agriculture sector, which was once the cornerstone of 
Sudan’s economy started to retreat, while other sectors grew rapidly. Before the advent of 
oil production and exportation in 1999, the contribution of agriculture, service and 
industry sectors to the GDP were 49.8 per cent, 34.4 per cent, 15.8 per cent, respectively. 
With the start of the oil production, the performance of the economy changed 
dramatically. As shown in Table 3, the contribution of the agriculture sector to the GDP 
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declined to 31.5 per cent, services sector increased to 46.3 per cent and industrial sector 
increased to 22.2 per cent in 2011. The agricultural sector contribution to GDP started to 
decline from 2003 to the end of the period, a manifestation of the Dutch disease in the 
economy2. The increasing share of the industrial sector in the GDP was mainly driven by 
the increase in oil production and prices, but from 2008 its contribution shrank. The share 
of the services sector in the GDP was fluctuating, however, over the last three years it 
significantly contributed to the GDP. 
Table 3. Main sectors as percentage of the GDP 
 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
2000 42.0% 21.0% 37.0% 
2001 45.6% 16.6% 37.8% 
2002 46.6% 16.3% 37.1% 
2003 45.6% 24.1% 30.3% 
2004 44.5% 25.4% 30.1% 
2005 39.6% 28.3% 32.1% 
2006 39.2% 28.3% 34.5% 
2007 36.2% 33.0% 30.8% 
2008 35.9% 31.4% 32.7% 
2009 30.8% 24.8% 44.4% 
2010 31.3% 24.5% 44.2% 
2011 31.5% 22.2% 46.3% 
Source: author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.3.3 Inflation rates 
The government succeeded in curtailing the inflationary pressure on the economy by 
having an inflation target during the preparation of the annual public budget. It is clear 
from Figure 5 that the inflation rate was kept approximately in the range of 5-9 per cent 
                                                          
2 According Pegg (2010), the Dutch disease is an economic phrase coined by economists to refer to the 
negative impacts that North Sea oil and gas revenues had on the Dutch industrial production in late 1960s.  
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through 2000-2007. Then it increased in 2008 as a result of a surge in food and oil prices. 
In 2009, there was a drop in inflation rate due to the global financial crisis and decline of 
crude oil prices. Again the inflation rate started to climb up in 2010 and 2011, this was 
mainly attributed to the increase of taxes and increase of money supply in the economy as 
a result of substantial borrowings from the Central Bank to finance the fiscal deficit. 
Figure 5. Inflation rates 
 
Source: author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.3.4 Real exchange rate 
Interestingly, the exchange rate remained almost unchanged during the first five years 
2000-2004 as shown in Figure 6.  The government used huge foreign inflows to stabilize 
the exchange rate. By doing so, the foreign reserved was depleted due to the continuous 
intervention in the exchange market by the Central Bank to maintain the exchange rate 
around 2.5 Sudanese pounds (SDG) per United States dollar (US$). However, the 
exchange rate appreciated by 6 per cent, 12 per cent and 7 per cent in years 2005, 2006 and 
2007, respectively. For the rest of the period, the exchange rate showed an upward trend, 
that is, depreciation of the domestic currency against the US dollar. It is worth noting that 
the government has adopted a managed-float exchange rate regime since the year 1997 
(Khalid, 2012). Generally speaking, the depreciation of the exchange rate in developing 
countries is considered to be desirable as their exports can compete in the global markets, 
thus improve the trading account (Abeysinghe and Yeok, 1998). 
 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
In
fl
at
io
n
 r
at
e%
Years
75 
 
Figure 6. Real exchange rate 
 
Source: author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.3.5 Money supply 
Figure 7 shows that money supply steadily increased from approximately SDG 4 billion 
in 2000 to more than SDG 45 billion by the end of year 2011. The growth rate of the 
money supply, which can be read from the right vertical axis, was increasing at an 
accelerating rate during the period 2000-2005. However, through the period 2006-2007, 
the money growth was increasing at a diminishing rate. Again, the growth rate witnessed 
an upward trend over the period 2008-2010. The increase of money supply was attributed 
to the increase in government spending and borrowing from the Central Bank to finance 
the budget deficit. On the other hand, money supply as a percentage of the GDP increased 
rapidly from 10 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent by the end of year 2011. This increase of 
the money supply caused the inflation rate to soar as mentioned earlier. 
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Figure 7 Growth of money supply 
 
Source: author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.3.6 Murabaha profit margin rate 
Murabaha profit margin rate is a cost of finance used by Islamic financial institutions. The 
Monetary Authorities use Murabaha profit margin rate as a monetary instrument among 
others to manage the liquidity in the economy, similar to the traditional interest rate role. 
However, generally the Central Bank of Sudan announces Murabaha profit margin rate in 
its annual monetary policy as an indicative percentage and gives the commercial banks 
room to go over the declared rate. As can be seen from Figure 8, the Murabaha rate (profit 
margin) is trending downward. It dropped from 18.8 per cent in 2000 to 9.6 per cent in 
2011. This also is another evidence of increasing money supply in the economy during the 
entire period. The low Murabaha profit margin rate encourages borrowing rather than 
bolstering the saving behaviour of the consumers. However, through the periods 2001-
2003 and 2006-2008, it showed a slightly increasing trend.  
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Figure 8. Murabaha profit margin rate 
 
Source: author’s own work adapted from the Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.5 Public budget 
As shown in Table 4, the surge in oil price to over US$145 per barrel in July 2008, 
contributed to an increase in total government revenues from U$1.3 billion in 2000 to 
US$11.8 billion in 2008. The portion of oil revenues in the total revenues reached its peak 
of 65.7 per cent in 2008, with an overall average contribution of 48.6 per cent. In 2009, 
the total revenues plunged by almost 30 per cent, as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis. This situation led to a substantial increase in the contribution of the non-oil 
revenues from 43.3 per cent in 2008 to 51 per cent in 2009. On the other hand, the large 
increase in revenues coincided with a marked increase in the government expenditure. For 
example, the total expenditure rose from US$ 1.4 billion in 2000 to approximately US$ 
11.2 billion in 2011. It is quite clear that the public spending was biased towards the 
current expenditure. This was evident from the persistent growth of current expenditure 
compared to the development expenditure. The average amount of money allocated to the 
current expenditure was 81.3 per cent of the total public expenditure, while development 
spending received 18.7 per cent through the entire period. The largest fund allocated to 
the current and development expenditure was US$ 10.6 and 1.9, respectively. It is 
apparent that the government had used the revenues generated from the crude oil export 
proceeds to finance its public current expenditure rather than investing it in development 
projects (Almosharaf and Tian, 2014). The average fiscal deficit during the period 2000–
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2011 amounted to US$ 1.2 billion, which constituted 1.6 per cent of the GDP. The budget 
deficit jumped from 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 4.7 per cent in 2011. The fiscal stance 
worsened after 2008, as a result of a significant plunge in crude oil prices. It is worth 
noting that the government finances its budget deficit from domestic and foreign sources. 
On average the domestic finance sources constituted 58.7 per cent, while foreign sources 
(loans and grants) represented 41.3%. The finance from the domestic sources reached its 
peak at 78.4 per cent during the global financial crisis in 2009 (Central Bank of Sudan, 
2009). Also, the Ministry of Finance introduced new financial instruments such as 
Government Musharaka Certificate, treasury bonds, etc. in order to finance the deficit 
from real sources, whilst still borrowing from the Central Bank of Sudan. 
Table 4. Public budget by main components, 2000 - 2011 (in billion US$)3 
 
Year 
Total 
revenue 
Oil 
revenue 
Others 
Total 
public 
expenditure 
Recurrent 
exp. 
Development 
exp. 
Deficit 
2000 1.31 0.55 0.76 1.39 1.17 0.22 -0.08 
2001 1.35 0.48 0.87 1.56 1.30 0.26 -0.21 
2002 1.90 0.77 1.12 2.03 1.49 0.54 -0.13 
2003 2.72 1.47 1.25 2.26 1.69 0.57 0.46 
2004 3.61 1.60 2.01 4.21 3.25 0.96 -0.60 
2005 4.87 2.22 2.65 5.64 4.24 1.40 -0.77 
2006 7.09 3.42 3.67 7.88 6.02 1.86 -0.79 
2007 8.98 4.91 4.07 10.30 8.47 1.83 -1.32 
2008 11.81 7.76 4.05 11.83 10.05 1.78 -0.02 
2009 8.33 4.08 4.25 10.18 8.80 1.38 -1.85 
2010 10.19 5.23 4.96 11.98 10.56 1.42 -1.79 
2011 8.05 4.18 3.87 11.20 9.95 1.25 -3.15 
Source: Department of budget performance, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Budget 
Performance Annual reports, 2000-2011. 
 
                                                          
3 The original data was in Sudanese pound, the author converted them to US$ using the average annual 
exchange rate.  
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3.6 External sector 
3.6.1 Balance of payment 
Over the period 2000 – 2011, the overall balance of payments (BoP) was positive in 2000, 
2002-2005 and 2008, with an average surplus of US$ 0.6 billion as shown in Figure 9. 
This was mainly attributed to the increase of oil production, the surge in crude oil prices 
and increase in Foreign Direct Investment. Since Sudan started exporting its oil, the 
balance of payments did not suffer from a sharp deficit compared to the period before oil 
exploration. On the other hand, the trade balance improved and achieved a positive 
balance favouring Sudan with exceptional performance in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 
realizing US$1.2 billion, US$ 3.4 billion, US$ 2.6 billion and US$ 1.5 billion, 
respectively. The export proceeds have steadily increased throughout the period 2000-
2011, but dropped in 2009 as a result of global financial crisis, which caused oil price to 
plunge. The increase of oil export earnings is acknowledged by the simultaneous increase 
of import. This has led to a deficit in trade balance in 2002, 2005-2006 and 2009. With 
regard to the composition of export revenues, oil export contributed on an average 85.3 
per cent, reaching a peak of 95 per cent of the total export proceeds in 2008 as shown in 
Figure 10. Turning to the share of the non-oil exports in the total export proceeds, Figure 
10 shows a negative relationship with oil export, that is, an increase of oil export resulted 
in a decrease in non-oil export revenues. For example, in 2008, the non-oil exports 
reached its lowest point, while oil exports were at its peak. However, compared to 
previous years, the non-oil exports dropped drastically at the expense of the oil exports 
throughout the period of the oil production. This showed that the government was highly 
reliant on oil export revenues as a main source of foreign exchange. The over-reliance of 
exhaustible natural resources might result in a devastating negative impact on the entire 
economy. Therefore, the government needs to diversify its export portfolio and boost the 
non-oil exports to avoid any unexpected shocks on oil prices and to further enhance the 
long term economic growth. 
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Figure 9. Balance of payments and trade 
 
Source: Author’s own work adapted from Central Bank of Sudan annual reports (2000-2011) 
 
Figure 10. Composition of the export revenues 
 
Source: Department of Budget Performance, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Budget 
Performance Annual Reports, 2000-2011. 
3.6.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
As can be seen from Figure 11, Sudan received huge foreign exchanges in terms of foreign 
direct investment, which amounted to US$ 5.5 billion in 2006. The majority of the FDI is 
associated with implementation of oil projects, communication and banking sectors (World 
Bank, 2009). In 2006, the FDI reached its peak point, when most of the oil projects were 
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completed. From 2006 and thereafter, the general trend of the FDI was diminishing; 
exceptions were 2008 when crude oil prices reached its highest rate of US$ 145 and in 
2010 after the economic recovery from the financial crisis of 2009. The main sources of 
FDI were Chinese companies, Malaysian natural oil company PETRONAS, Indian Oil 
Natural Gas Corporation and some Arab companies. 
Figure 11. Foreign direct investment 
 
Source: Author’s own work adapted from Central Bank of Sudan, Annual Reports, 2000-2011 
3.6.3 External debt position 
Sudan’s external debt grew at an accelerating rate due to the accumulation of the arrears. 
Currently, Sudan is paying only the critical debt owed to some countries and financial 
institutions that are still providing loans to the government (for example, the Arab 
countries, China, India, Malaysia), in addition to token-payments to the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Arab Funds. Table 5 shows that the total external 
debt jumped by approximately 93.2% in 2011 compared to its value in 2000. This 
persistent increase was attributable to the accumulation of the penalty interest arrears as a 
result of not paying interest by its due date. The principal amount of the debt grew 
substantially, increasing from approximately US$ 10.8 billion in 2000 to US$ 16.3 billion 
in 2011, that is, an increase of 50.9%. The annual increase of the principal was due to new 
contracted loans. Although over the period 2000-2011 Sudan has received more than US$ 
11.9 billion in crude oil revenues, it continued to borrow from abroad using crude oil as 
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collateral for getting new loans. This situation aggravated the external debt position and 
jeopardized the economic stability. It is worth noting that on average 14 per cent, 37 per 
cent, 33 per cent, 13 per cent and 4 per cent of the total debt was owed to multilateral 
countries, non-Paris Club countries, Paris Club countries, commercial banks and foreign 
suppliers, respectively. According to the World Bank, the external debt position was 
unstainable as of the end of 2008. On the other hand, Sudan is eligible for the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative proposed by the international community to 
help low income countries to resolve their debt issues. Though Sudan is technically eligible 
for the HIPCs initiative, other political issues hindered the government from enjoying the 
benefits of this initiative. These political issues could be summarized as follows: (1) Sudan 
is still on the US list of states that sponsors terrorism (2) American economic sanctions (3) 
ongoing conflicts in Darfur region, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. 
Table 5 External debt during the period 2000-2011 (in billion US$) 
Particular 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Principal 10.8 10.7 11.9 12.4 12.6 12.5 12.8 13.9 14.5 15.4 15.8 16.3 
Interest 4.5 4.3 4.9 5.6 5.6 5.6 4.1 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.9 4.0 
Delay 
interest 
5.3 5.7 6.9 7.7 8.6 8.9 11.5 13.5 14.6 16.5 18.2 19.5 
Total 
obligation 
20.6 20.7 23.7 25.7 26.8 27.0 28.4 31.9 33.5 35.7 37.9 39.8 
Source: Central Bank of Sudan, External Debt Unit, 2000-2011) 
3.7 Economic performance post sample period (2012-2014) 
After the secession of South Sudan from Sudan, the GDP growth rate dropped to 1.4 per 
cent in 2012 due to the loss of almost more than 70 per cent of oil producing fields. 
However, the GDP started to recover gradually in 2013 and 2014, achieving 3.6 per cent 
and 4.4 per cent growth rates, respectively. This improvement was mainly due to an 
increase in non-oil exports and gold exports proceed, in addition to foreign inflows from 
the Transitional Financial Arrangements with the government of South Sudan (Eltahir et 
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al., 2014). In this regard, crude oil export still replenishes the country with foreign inflows. 
For example, during the period 2012 - 2014, total crude oil exports reached US$ 3.7 
billion. Furthermore, gold production partially compensated the loss of oil revenues. It 
increased from 44.5 tons in 2012 to 73.3 tons in 2014, with total gold export earnings of 
US$ 2.1 billion (Central Bank of Sudan, 2014).   According to the IMF (2013) crude oil 
production in Sudan stood at 133 thousand barrels per day as of 2012 and is expected to 
increase to 325 thousand barrels per day by 2017 as new concessions were signed, 
providing huge incentive to international oil companies for exploration in new areas. In 
fact, six agreements were signed in 2012 for the following blocks: 18, 15, 14, 12-B, 10, 9 
and 8 (Sidahmed, 2014). Due to these positive developments, the balance of payment 
improved slightly as the deficit shrank from US$ 24.2 million in 2012 to US$ 15.1 million 
in 2014, thanks to the increase in gold production, agricultural exports and inflows from 
the Transitional Financial Arrangement with the government of South Sudan (Central 
Bank of Sudan, 2013, 2014; Eltahir et al, 2014). In this context, an agreement between the 
Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan concluded in September 2012 
regarding crude oil transportation fees, using north facilities and compensating the 
government of Sudan for the loss in oil revenues. According to the agreement, the 
government of South Sudan pays US$ 1.6 as a processing fee for each barrel of crude oil, 
transportation fees of US$ 8.4 per barrel in GNPOC pipeline and US$ 6.5 in Petrodar 
pipeline, transit fees of US$ 1.0 per barrel, in addition to transfer of a sum of US$ 3.02 
billion to be paid to the Government of Sudan over three years and half (The Agreement, 
2012). 
With regard to the sectoral contribution to the GDP, the services sector on average 
contributed almost 48.8% over the period 2012 – 2014. The Industrial sector contribution 
to GDP increased from 20.4 per cent in 2012 to 24 per cent in 2014 due to the boom in the 
mining sector (e.g. gold mining).  
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The public budget has improved slightly, shrinking budget deficit from 6.4 billion 
Sudanese pounds in 2013 to nearly 4.4 billion in 2014. This resulted in a low rate of 
borrowing from the Central Bank. To this end, the growth of money supply contracted 
from 40.2 per cent in 2012 to 17.0 per cent in 2014. Accordingly, the inflation rate 
declined from 37.1 per cent in 2013 to 25 per cent by the end of 2014 due to fiscal 
consolidation and monetary disinflationary policies (Central Bank of Sudan, 2012, 2013, 
2014).  
3.8 Summary   
To conclude, oil exploration processes were limited to the western and south-central parts 
of Sudan due to civil war. Oil productions started in the early 1990s, but oil exports started 
in late 1999. Since then, oil production has shown an upward trend, reaching 
approximately 461 thousand barrels per day in 2007. This production is backed by well-
established oil infrastructure, including pipelines, central processing units, storage facilities 
and refineries, which are entirely located in the north. With regard to Sudan’s economy, it 
has witnessed a steady growth since the advent of oil production, thanks to an increase in 
crude oil production and the associated high oil prices up to mid-2008.  Sudan was 
amongst the fastest growing economies in the Sub-Saharan Africa, achieving GDP growth 
of 9% on average and ranking third in crude oil production in Sub-Saharan Africa after 
Nigeria and Angola. At the sectoral level, the contribution of the agriculture sector to the 
GDP declined, which indicates presence of Dutch disease in the economy. Nevertheless, 
industrial and services sectors had increased over the study period. The increasing share of 
the industrial sector in the GDP was driven mainly by the increase in oil production and 
prices. The inflation rate was relatively stable up to 2007 and then started its upward trend 
due to the increase of money supply. The exchange rate was relatively stable with an 
appreciation and depreciation in the few years of the sample period. Murabaha profit 
margin rate decreased over the sample period. Money supply has shown steady growth 
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during the study period. Also, total government revenues increased dramatically, thanks to 
crude oil revenues, which contributed on average 48.6% to the government total revenues 
annually. Likewise, the government spending and the budget deficit increased as well. The 
overall balance of payments performance has improved as a result of an increase in oil 
production, the surge in crude oil prices and an increase in FDI inflows. However, Sudan’s 
external debt grew at an accelerated rate due to the accumulation of arrears. The period 
after the secession of South Sudan from the Government of Sudan witnessed a slowdown 
in GDP growth, but from 2013, the economy started to recover and achieved a GDP 
growth of 3.6 per cent up from 1.6 per cent in 2012. Another leap of 4.4 per cent GDP 
growth rate was recorded in 2014. This improvement can be attributed to the increase in 
non-oil exports, gold exports proceeds and foreign inflows from the Transitional Financial 
Arrangements with the government of South Sudan. Some other macroeconomic indicators 
have also shown a slight improvement. 
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Chapter four: Anatomy of Crude Oil Price Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter two a brief description of Sudan’s economy was provided, including the 
evolution of the oil sector. This chapter begins with an overview of the world crude oil 
proven reserves by region over the last fifteen years. Then, a thorough discussion of peak 
oil theory will be carried out to reflect the different views about the viability of the theory. 
The chapter then turns to the crude oil market by discussing the world crude oil supply and 
demand. Next, a brief glimpse of crude oil pricing mechanism is explained, followed by an 
elaboration of the main factors behind crude oil price fluctuations. Finally, historical crude 
oil price shocks will be reviewed and discussed. This chapter intends to provide 
comprehensive overview of oil price changes to help understand the sources and factors 
that affecting it.   
4.2 World proven crude oil reserves 
The quantities of crude oil that can be recovered from a specific field depend on the 
estimated oil reserve. The recoverable oil refers to the quantity of crude oil that can be 
produced under the current operational and economic conditions. In general oil reserves 
are classified into three types. Proven reserve, which has a high certainty, ranging between 
90 – 95 per cent, that the quantity specified can be recovered. The other types are probable 
with greater than 50 per cent producible chance and possible reserve with very low 
certainty ranging between 10 – 20 per cent (Manescu and Nuno, 2015, Speight, 2012). 
It is clear from Table 6 that over the period 2000 – 2005, the world proven conventional 
crude oil reserves grew nearly 7.2 per cent, while in the last decade the proven crude oil 
growth rate was as high as 29.4 per cent. The greatest increase in the proven crude oil 
reserves was due to an increase in OPEC reserves. North America region witnessed 53 per 
cent increase in its conventional crude oil reserves. However, the share of this region in the 
world proven crude oil reserves was as low as 2.7 per cent. With regard to Latin America, 
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an outstanding growth in its proven crude oil reserves was achieved, almost 188.3 per cent 
contributing by 22.9 per cent in the world proven crude oil reserves. In the Middle East 
region, 8.1 per cent growth rate was observed over the last decade, contributing 53.7 per 
cent in the world proven oil reserves. Although Asia and Pacific region recorded 26 per 
cent increase during the last decade, its share of the world proven oil reserves is very small, 
almost 0.3 per cent. This was due to the continuous production and lack of new oil 
explorations. Finally, OPEC countries registered an increase of 30.5 per cent from 2005 to 
2014, but their share in the world proven oil reserves was as high as 81 per cent.  Figure 12 
shows that four OPEC countries (namely Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq) hold 
more than half of OPEC proven crude oil reserves and contribute 46.9 per cent of world 
proven oil reserves. 
Table 6. World proven crude oil reserves by region (billion barrels) 
Regions 2000 2005 2014 
North America* 30.5 26.6 40.7 
Latin America 123.1 118.7 342.2 
Eastern Europe 67.2 93.7 119.9 
Western Europe 21.1 17.0 11.6 
Middle East 694.6 742.7 802.5 
Africa 95.5 117.8 127.6 
Asia and Pacific 44.4 38.4 48.4 
Total world 1076.4 1154.0 1492.9 
Of which: 
OPEC 
 
904.3 
 
924.2 
 
1206.0 
Note: *nonconventional crude oil is not included. 
Sources:  OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins 2000, 2005 and 2015. 
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Figure 12. OPEC share in the world proven crude oil reserves as of the end of 2014 
 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2015. 
4.3 Peak oil theory    
Oil is the most essential input in modern life. Its importance is not confined to fuelling 
automobiles, heating our houses and providing energy to the industrial sectors, it also 
contributes to food security in terms of providing the necessary fertilizers for plants to 
grow. Having all these in mind and its exhaustibility, researchers started to think of how 
much of crude oil is left under the ground. In doing so, a geologist from Shell Oil 
Company, M. King Hubbert in 1956 introduced a theory that explained the trajectory of the 
exhaustibility of crude oil. This theory is known as “Peak oil theory” (Hubbert, 1956). The 
concept is that the rate of production in every field or region increases until it reaches the 
peak point (midpoint of depletion) and then it starts declining. Thus, Hubbert (1956) 
claimed that the oil production curve follows the bell shape. That is, the curve after the 
peak point is just a mirror image of the exponential growth before the peak point or the 
midpoint (Deffeyes, 2001). However, the bell shape has been rebutted by real observations 
as the peak point might be a plateau and the declining curve has shown gradual pace 
(Jackson, 2006). Figure 13 shows the hypothetical bell shape as described by Hubbert. The 
area under the curve reveals the cumulative production over time. Hubbert’s curve was 
based on two assumptions of potentially: 200 billion barrels and 150 billion barrels of 
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ultimate recoverable resources (Deffeyes, 2001). Although Hubbert succeeded in the 
prediction of the peak production in the United States, his model did not work well in other 
parts of the world.  
Figure 13. US ultimate crude oil production based on assumed initial 150 and 200 billion barrels 
 
Source: Hubbert, 1956. 
This theory has received numerous critiques, which can be summarized in the following 
points (Maugeri, 2004; Speight, 2012): 
1. The theory failed to capture the technological advancement that can further 
increase oil production. For example, using Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 
technique in existing oil fields, the rate of production might be increased by 30 per 
cent or even more. 
2. Negligence of geopolitical factors that could delay the peak oil. During the 
upheaval and instability in oil producing countries, the production of oil will be 
halted. 
3. Future oil demand was not considered, which affect the production and decision 
making in further investment or development of existing oil fields. 
4. New discoveries of oil resources have not been calculated in the formula of the 
peak oil theory. Still, some areas are not entirely explored as the initial estimated 
oil reserves tend to increase after the start of extraction operations. For instance, in 
an oil field in California, the oil reserve was estimated at around 54 million barrels, 
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but after almost 34 years, geologists found that the remaining oil was 54 million 
barrels, and a few years later the oil production reached 970 million barrels. 
Another example is the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan. The geologists estimated oil 
reserves to be in the range of 2 – 4 billion barrels, however, after drilling and 
appraisal of six wells the estimates were officially declared to be around 13 billion 
barrels. Other states like Iraq and Saudi Arabia have discovered more than 50 
fields, but due to fears of excess supply have opted to postpone production in those 
new oil fields.  
5. All data reported by the companies were not verified by an independent auditor. 
The accuracy of the size of oil reserves was difficult to assess as no third party 
verified those estimates (Tsoskounoghou, et. al., 2008) 
6. Non-conventional oil such as tar-sand in Canada, heavy oil in Russia and 
Venezuela and shale oil in the US were not included in the model. Furthermore, 
Russia intentionally does not report its proven oil reserves and consider it a State 
secret. This makes a forecast of peak production difficult and incorrect, especially 
when the fabricated oil reserves that have been reported by OPEC countries are 
considered as well (Chapman, 2012). 
7. Generally speaking, OPEC countries tend to increase their estimates to guarantee a 
high share in the OPEC quota system. That is, oil reserves estimates are inflated by 
OPEC countries. For example, OPEC members have increased their proved oil 
reserves by 360 billion barrels over the period 1984 – 2012 (Chapman, 2014). 
Given the fact that it possesses more than 40 per cent of the global proved oil, the 
forecast of the peak production is highly likely to be incorrect (Deffeyes, 2001: 
149).  
Furthermore, development of conventional and non-conventional oil supports the notion 
that oil production can be increased and the peak oil is not a single point, it is rather an 
undulating plateau, which might extend to decades before exhibiting a declining trend 
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(Jackson, 2006). In line with this notion, advanced technology had helped exploration 
operations in harsh areas such as ultra-deep water and the arctic region (Tsoskounoghou, 
et. al., 2008)  
On the other hand, Meng and Bentley (2008) have criticized Maugeri (2004) arguments of 
peak oil theory flaw. However, their critique is not convincing and contradicts the current 
situation in the oil industry. For example, some countries have discovered new oil fields, 
which had not been known in the past. Also, a number of peak production forecasts have 
failed to materialize and tend to be incorrect. In this regard, by reviewing the literature, it is 
clear that there is a lack of consensus among scholars regarding world oil reserves and 
timing of peak oil. Interestingly, in 1985, Hubbert claimed that world oil production will 
peak in 1995, but this has proved to be incorrect (Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008). At present, 
the exact quantity of remaining global oil reserves is unresolved, therefore estimation of 
peak oil is just a matter of mathematical calculation rather than a reflection of the true 
situation. This statement is supported by a number of predictions carried out by various 
institutions and scholars. For example, pessimistic views claimed that the world had 
reached or will reach its peak production during the period 2005 -2015 (Deffeyes, 2010; 
Shell, 2008; Simons, 2006; Campbell, 2005; Bakhtiari, 2004). On the flip side, optimistic 
views projected peak production sometime in the far future and even some scholars think 
there is no visible peak (Shell, 2013; Maugeri, 2012; IEA, 2010; Jackson, 2006). It is clear 
that early peak oil supporters tend to use under-estimated data with regard to oil reserves, 
while late peak oil supporters rely more on over-estimated data. The conclusion that one 
can understand from the above discussion is that crude oil reserves data is not accurate to 
help precisely predict the world peak production. Although it is important to know when 
peak oil will take place in order to help countries to think ahead in a strategic manner for 
other potential economical alternatives or at least to work together for efficient use of the 
remaining oil resources, the inconsistency in crude oil reserve information and secrecy in 
production capacity will make this objective hard to achieve. 
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4.4 World crude oil market 
4.4.1 Oil production  
There are numerous factors that have a pivotal role in determining the exact amount of 
crude oil to be produced every single day. These factors are of physical, geopolitical, 
technical and economic nature. Physical factors are related to property of natural resources 
and its availability and accessibility. The geopolitical factors influence the oil production 
through either damage of oil facilities or an intentional suspension of pumping of oil to the 
market, similar to OPEC embargo and the Iraq - Iran War in 1973 and 1990, respectively. 
There are also technical factors such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which is a 
technique of injecting gas, heated steam and chemical injection to stimulate the oil flow to 
increase production. This technique has succeeded in increasing oil production in the 
United States by 30-50 per cent. However, the technique is costly (Speight, 2012).  The 
economic factors are related to the cost of production, using highly advanced technology 
and the difficulty to get credit to invest in high risk remote areas. For example, shale oil 
and ultra-deep-water exploration are associated with high capital investment costs. 
Figure 14 shows that world crude oil supply steadily increased through the period 2000 – 
2009, but witnessed a drop by nearly 4.9 per cent in 2009. This drop is attributed to cut in 
crude oil production by OPEC countries, crude oil price crash and economic recession 
following credit crunch. OPEC reduced its production from 36.5 million barrels a day in 
2008 to 33 million barrels a day in 2009, a 7.7 per cent reduction. Within OPEC members, 
Saudi Arabia is playing the role of swing producer due to its huge production capacity. 
With regard to non-OPEC countries, the general trend of crude oil production has been 
increasing. However, in the year 2005 a slight drop occurred due to decline of oil 
production in China and North America, while the drop of 2008 was attributed to decline 
of oil production in Western Europe and North America (OPEC, 2005; OPEC, 2008). 
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Figure 14. World oil production (million barrels a day) 
 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins 2003, 2004, 2008, 2010 and 2014. 
4.4.2 World Oil demand 
It is important for the oil companies to estimate the demand for crude oil to prudently 
manage their production operations. Pumping more oil than that demanded will cause oil 
prices to go down, thus discouraging further investment in the oil industry.  However, 
crude oil demand estimation is not an easy task; since various factors influence it, for 
instance, geographical location, refining capacity, seasonal swings, population, economic 
activities, transportation, alternative fuels, among others. Despite that the most accurate 
estimates of crude oil demand are based on the following criteria (Speight, 2012): 
1. Refinery output. 
2. Refinery throughput. 
3. Imported oil product. 
4. Changes in oil inventory.  
It is worth noting that industrial developed countries (namely OECD countries) accounted 
for more than 60 per cent of world crude oil consumption in 2000 (Table 7). Therefore, 
these countries are severely affected during the era of high oil prices or when there is a 
shortage of oil supply due to geopolitical reasons in oil producing countries. These 
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countries generally show signs of slowdown in economic growth and in energy-intensive 
sectors as well. Although there are some endeavours to switch from oil to other renewable 
energy sources demand remain high, with the transport sector alone accounting for nearly 
49 per cent of the world oil consumption in 2005 (Speight, 2012). 
Table 7. World oil demand (million barrels a day) 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
World demand 76.2 77 82.28 84.9 85.62 86.7 89 91.3 
Of which: 
        China 4.8 5.3 6.7 7.4 7.9 9.3 10.2 11.1 
Japan 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.7 4.3 
India 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.8 
Russia 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 
Brazil 2.1 2 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.2 
BRIC 17.1 17.6 19.4 20.1 21.2 22.6 24.6 25.6 
OECD 47.8 47.8 48.6 49.6 47.6 46.1 45.9 45.8 
Others 11.3 11.6 14.28 15.2 16.82 18 18.5 19.9 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins 2003, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2014 and BP Statistical Review, 2015. 
 
The average growth of the world crude oil demand during the last fifteen years was 2.6 per 
cent. The increase in world demand is driven by developing and emerging countries (Table 
7). Brazil, India, China and Russia (BRIC countries) have increased their oil consumption 
by almost 49.7 per cent over the period 2000 – 2014, with a remarkable demand growth in 
China. However, developed countries in general have shown a declining trajectory in oil 
consumption. This might be attributed to efficiency in using energy by way of employing 
advanced, efficient, low energy consumption technology. For example, oil demand 
declined from 49.6 million barrels a day in 2006 to 45.8 million barrels a day in 2014, 
approximately 7.7 per cent drop. However, developed countries’ share of the world oil 
demand has dropped dramatically from more than 60 per cent in 2000 to 50.2 per cent in 
2014. In contrast, developing countries’ oil demand rose steadily from 11.3 million barrels 
a day in 2000 to nearly 20 million barrels a day in 2014, with an average growth rate of 5.4 
per cent. It is observed that some OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia have witnessed a 
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remarkable demand growth. This might be attributed to low domestic oil prices, which are 
generally lower than the international oil prices.    
4.4.3 Pricing of crude oil 
In the early years of oil exploration, pricing of crude oil was based on the market 
fundamentals. However, in 1882, the three major international oil companies - Royal 
Dutch Shell, Standard Oil Company and Anglo-Persian Oil Company – signed an 
agreement between them to control the crude oil market, avoid collusion, competition and 
to get the maximum profit from selling out their crude oil. Later, other major oil companies 
joined the plot, namely Mobil, Chevron, Exxon and Gulf Oil Company (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2007: 76-77). Since then, the seven major companies have become known as 
the Seven Sisters, which was a kind of oligopoly in the crude oil market. Accordingly, 
pricing of crude oil before the 1970s was under the control of the seven multinational oil 
companies (Fattouh, 2007). The Seven Sisters’ phrase was coined by Italian scholar Enrico 
Mattei to refer to the largest seven oil companies in the world at that time4 (Sampson, 
1975). The seven sisters succeeded in stabilizing oil prices and supply because they held 
concession covering various areas while paying very low royalty to host producing 
countries. During their era, all crude oil processes from the upstream to downstream were 
carried out by their affiliates. This situation helped them to keep internal payment transfers 
low, which led to lower tax intake by the hosting countries. However, this situation was 
later used against the Seven Sisters by the oil producing countries to force new 
arrangements to be put in place (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007: 76-77).  
Around this time internal pricing system of the international oil companies coupled with 
low demand for oil due to recession in Europe and an increase in crude oil production 
resulted in shrinking the tax revenues received by the oil producing countries. Against 
these backgrounds and in an endeavour to gain more profit from their resources, the oil 
                                                          
4 The seven sisters were the Dutch (Shell), the British (BP), the American group (Exxon, Chevron, Texaco, 
and Mobil) and Gulf. 
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producing countries thought of forming a cartel. With five states namely, Kuwait, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Iraq, the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
founded5 in September 1960 (Jones, 1988: 222; Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007: 76-77).  
Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Indonesia, Libya and Nigeria had joined the cartel 
within a few years later (Speight, 2012). Also, during that period, OPEC governments 
decided to shift from granting concession to the international oil companies towards 
claiming equity participation, while some members opted right away for nationalization 
such as Libya, Iraq and Algeria (Fattouh, 2007). In this regard, Yan (2012) claimed that the 
Seven Sister lost their power in determining the crude oil prices after the oil producing 
countries started the nationalization campaigns and the establishment of their own national 
oil companies. In the 1970s a significant change took place when the power of oil pricing 
came under the control of OPEC. This transformation came as a result of an increase world 
crude oil demand, which has been mainly met by OPEC countries.  
Since the launch of nationalization campaigns of the international companies in the host oil 
producing countries, government and national companies become key players in the crude 
oil market. During the period 1970 – 1985, OPEC dominated the crude oil market and had 
a greater influence in determining oil prices through managing their production. That is, 
cutting crude oil production when the market was over-supplied through the quota system 
that has been established within the cartel. Saudi Arabia was playing the role of swing 
producer within OPEC because of its huge spare capacity. In other words, the OPEC 
production was based on the market’s call on its supply. The market’s call is the difference 
between the world crude oil demand and the non-OPEC production. After calculating the 
market’s call, OPEC sets production quotas for its members (Fattouh, 2007). However, this 
system collapsed in 1986, when OPEC members did not commit to the agreed quota. At 
this stage in time, a price war started and crude oil prices dropped to $12 per barrel 
                                                          
5 OPEC established in September 24, 1960 with objectives of coordinating and unifying petroleum policies in 
a way that guarantee their interest. Also, is to working together for stabilizing prices in the global oil markets 
and minimizing harmful fluctuations. 
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(Speight, 2012). In addition, in the early 1980s, OPEC oil pricing power was weakened by 
the increase of oil production from non-OPEC countries, namely the Soviet Union, Mexico 
and the North Sea (Fattouh, 2007). After 1985, the futures market emerged as a new 
mechanism in oil pricing. This development in the crude oil market was justified in the fact 
that it was more transparent and less vulnerable to distortions. Since then, crude oil has 
begun to trade on commodity markets and the price was determined by supply and demand 
(Fattouh, 2007). In 1986, the pricing power of the OPEC collapsed mainly as a result of the 
shift in marketing behaviour of Saudi Arabia from being a swing producer to a new policy 
that focused on maintaining its market share (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007: 76-77). 
For the purpose of pricing a barrel of crude oil, its properties were taken into consideration. 
That is, crude oil with high gravity and lower sulphur content is expensive, but it is 
desirable because it is easy to refine and it produces high quality petroleum products. On 
the other hand, lower gravity and higher sulphur content crude oil is cheaper, but more 
expensive to refine. As there are different varieties of crude oil, buyers and sellers found it 
of help to have a reference or benchmark crude oil for pricing. Due to the emergence of 
wide spectrum varieties of crude oil, a new system of pricing was introduced in 1980, in 
which oil prices were determined as a differential to certain benchmark or reference price 
(Fattouh, 2007). The main four benchmarks crude oil are: 
1. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) which is used as a benchmark for crude oil 
produced in the United Sates. It is light crude oil with American Petroleum Institute 
(API) gravity of 39.6 degrees and 0.24 per cent sulphur content, which makes it 
lighter and sweeter than Brent blend. It is generally priced at about $2 and $6 per 
barrel premium to Brent blend and the OPEC basket price, respectively. 
2. Brent blend crude oil, which is light and sweet (but not as much as WTI). It is a 
blend of crude oil from different oil fields in the North Sea (United Kingdom and 
Norway). It has an API gravity of 38.3 degree and sulphur content of 0.37 per cent 
by weight. 
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3. Dubai crude oil is a benchmark for oil prices in the Persian Gulf. It is medium to 
heavy crude with low sulphur contents. It is generally sold out at a discount to 
Brent blend and West Texas Intermediate. 
4. The OPEC basket crude oil, which is a weighted average of oil prices obtained 
from different oil producing countries. However, in 2005, the pricing mechanism 
had changed and the benchmark became a weighted average of crude oil produced 
by OPEC members.  
It is worth noting that due to the decline of light crude oil production in the North Sea and 
United States, and at the same time increase of heavy crude production from Russia and 
the Middle East, oil companies started to make their oil exploration, production and 
development decisions based on heavy crude oil prices. Accordingly, Uras crude oil in 
Europe and Mars crude oil in the United Sates emerged as potential benchmarks in place of 
Brent blend and West Texas Intermediate, respectively. And, Dubai-Oman blend crude oil, 
which is heavy and sour, is set as a benchmark in the Middle East (Speight, 2012). 
4.4.4 Factors affecting crude oil prices 
In general, commodity prices are determined through demand and supply theory. Although 
crude oil prices are to a great extent determined by demand and supply, other factors have 
great influence on crude oil prices as well. That is, there are many other drivers of oil price 
fluctuations in the world market (Beirne et al., 2013; Fan and Xu, 2011, Nkomo, 2006). In 
this regard, Yan (2012) suggested a number of factors that could cause crude oil price to 
fluctuate through the time. These are proven reserves, increase of crude oil consumption 
within OPEC countries, changes of crude oil inventories, the influence of the US dollar 
exchange rate, opportunistic practices in the crude oil market, and geopolitical instability. 
In this regard, Yousefi and Wirjanto (2003) claim that the OPEC countries tend to adjust 
their oil price in line with movements of the US dollar exchange rate to maintain the real 
value of the oil price. For instance, a depreciation of the US dollar exchange rate by 10 per 
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cent results in almost 8.5 - 19 per cent increase in oil prices. On the other hand, Beirne et 
al. (2013) pointed out twelve factors that cause crude oil prices to surge. The factors are 
strong economic growth, rising seasonal demand, limited OPEC storage capacity, 
production capacity, China’s increasing demand, infrastructure limitations, risks to supply, 
the OPEC conservative management style, exploration and development costs, investors, 
speculation, and the weak US dollar. Although they came up with twelve factors that cause 
oil prices to surge, no explanation was provided of how these factors contribute to pushing 
oil prices up. 
Furthermore, Speight (2012) suggested that the factors that have affected oil price 
movements were: 
1. The world trade centre attack in September 11, 2001. 
2. Second Gulf War in early 2003. 
3. Instability of Iraq during the period 2003 – 2008. 
4. Iranian nuclear reactor issue, which began in 2005. 
5. Hurricane of 2004 in the United Sates. 
6. Hurricane Rita and Katrina of 2005. 
7. Accelerating crude oil demand in a manner that surpassed supply 
Each of the above factors had played a role in determining the direction of the crude oil 
price movement. For example, after September 11, 2001 attack a remarkable decline in oil 
price was witnessed due to decline of crude oil demand. Moreover, following the second 
Gulf War and instability in Iraq, supply of Iraqi crude oil was halted, which led to a 
shortage in world production and consequently pushed oil prices up to US$43 a barrel in 
the third quarter of 2005. Likewise, the hurricanes that struck the Gulf coast of the United 
Sates (Katrina and Rita) resulted in an increase of oil price to US$60 a barrel in late 
summer of 2005. 
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In this regard, Tsoskounoghou et al. (2008) agreed with Hamilton (2013a) and Speight 
(2012) that the root causes of oil hikes were due to geopolitical events and natural 
catastrophes. However, they further gave attention to other factors such as the volume of 
oil demand, reserve production capacity, potential new discovery, global economic growth, 
willingness of global financial systems to finance investment in risky, remote areas and 
unstable countries, increase of world population, and the depreciation of the United States 
dollar exchange rate. Furthermore, Fan and Xu (2011) suggested that six main factors 
influence oil prices. These are supply-demand power, stock market, the US dollar 
exchange rate, speculation, gold market and geopolitics. In the short term, oil supply and 
demand oscillation is the key factor affecting oil price movement, but not in the long run. 
Also, the performance of the stock market has strong links with crude oil market 
behaviour, for example, investors in stock markets withdraw their fund when it is 
depressed and re-invest in the crude oil market, which in turn increases oil demand and oil 
prices go up. Moreover, all trades in the world crude oil market are settled in US dollar; 
therefore, any changes in the US dollar exchange rate will affect prices of crude oil. Since 
2000, speculation has become an influential factor in oil price fluctuations in the world 
market. The increase of speculation operations was due to low interest rate policy in the 
world central banks, which in turn resulted in an increase of credit facilities. Accordingly, 
a number of speculative funds were invested in the oil futures market. These speculative 
funds have led to upward pressure on crude oil demand and hence increased oil prices. 
Finally, because crude oil is a strategic commodity for economic development and growth, 
it is generally affected by international politics. It is well known that political events 
disrupt oil supply in oil producing countries (Fan and Xu, 2011). Because crude oil prices 
are influenced by numerous factors, it is most likely that oil prices exhibit volatility 
behaviour. This explains why most of the oil price predictions appeared to be unrealistic 
(Yan, 2012).  According to Jones (1988: 317) “indeed the only certainty about the oil 
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market is uncertainty itself”. Considering the above mentioned discussion, Figure 15 is an 
attempt to summarize the factors behind crude oil price fluctuations in the global markets.  
Figure 15. Factors influencing crude oil prices 
 
 
Source: Author’s work adapted from Yan (2012) and Beirne et al. (2013) 
4.5 Historical crude oil price shocks   
 
Since the commencement of exploration and production of crude oil in August 27, 1859 by 
Edwin Drake in Titusville, Pennsylvania State in the US, crude oil price has witnessed 
numerous shocks (Jones, 1988: 3). Most of the early shocks were confined to the US as 
other countries had not started of crude oil explorations. This section is based on the most 
influential work by Hamilton (2013a) in which the oil industry was surveyed and the 
associated events were documented. 
4.5.1 Early crude oil shocks: 1860 – 1953 
 
The first crude oil shock took place between the 1862 -1864, during the American Civil 
War between the seven Southern States and the Northern States. During this period crude 
oil prices had risen dramatically due to drop in supply and increase in demand. Another 
factor that contributed to crude oil demand increase was the introduction of tax on alcohol 
from 20 cents per gallon to US$ 2, while oil was taxed at 10 cents per gallon. This in turn 
made alcohol less competitive to oil and people started demanding more crude oil. After 
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the civil war, the oil industry witnessed a great increase in crude oil production. 
Conversely, oil prices climbed up in 1895 due to loss of oil supplies from Russia as a result 
of the outbreak of cholera in Baku. Again considerable drop in oil price took place due to 
the occurrence of the great depression in 1929 and discoveries of huge oil resources in East 
Texas. 
4.5.2 Suez crises: 1956 – 1957 
 
On July 26, 1965 the Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nassir announced the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal Company, which has been jointly operated by France and Britain since 
its inception in 1869. Although the Egyptian president promised to compensate France and 
Britain governments, both states rejected the offer and invaded Egypt along with Israeli 
military forces. As a consequence of this war, 40 ships were sunk and the canal was 
blocked. At that time, around 1.2 million barrels of oil per day used to be transported 
through the Suez Canal. However, half a million barrels per day were moved out of the 
market due to the bombing of the pipeline that transport crude oil from Iraq to ports in the 
eastern Mediterranean. The total loss in oil supply was estimated at 10.1 per cent of the 
total world output. The result was that crude oil prices increased. The most affected region 
was Europe as it had been depending on crude oil coming from the Middle East (Hamilton, 
2013a). 
4.5.3 OPEC embargo 1973 – 1974 
 
In an endeavour to take back the occupied areas that were seized by the Israeli militants in 
1967, Egypt and Syria jointly launched an attack on Israel on the 6th of October 1973. And 
to punish countries which had supported Israel during the war, the Arab members of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) declared an embargo of crude 
oil exports to those countries. Accordingly, almost 4.4 million barrels per day moved out 
of the market, which constituted approximately 7.5 per cent of the world output. As a result 
of the OPEC embargo, crude oil price doubled by January 1974 (Hamilton, 1983a). 
103 
 
However, Barky and Killian (2001) claimed that economic factors were behind the 
increase of oil price rather than the embargo. In a response to that Hamilton (2003) 
emphasised the importance of economic context, but the timing, size and the way the 
supply cutbacks were carried out were no doubts of a geopolitical nature. In contrast, other 
scholars stated that the OPEC embargo had resulted in an economic recession in Western 
countries such as the United Sates, some European countries and Japan (Yan, 2012; Darby, 
1982). This conclusion was further supported by Weiwen (2012). 
4.5.4 Iranian revolution: 1978 – 1979 
 
During the Arab-Israeli war, which was known as Yom Kippur or Ramadan war in 1973, 
Iran tried to increase its production to offset the cutbacks in production by Arab members 
of the OPEC. This later led to a public protest in 1978, followed by a strike in the oil 
sector, which resulted in a cutback in Iranian production by 4.8 million barrels per day, 
approximately equivalent to 7 per cent of global crude oil production at that time. Upon the 
return of Ayatollah Khomeini from his exile in January 1979, Shah Iran departed the 
country and Khomeini took power in Iran on February 1979. To bridge the gap made by 
the cutback of oil production in Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries increased their 
production to compensate for the loss of production in the global market. During that 
period oil prices spiked and severe crude oil shortage was witnessed in the US (Hamilton, 
2013a, 2013b). 
4.5.5 Iran-Iraq War: 1980 – 1981 
 
In September 1980, Iraq launched a war against Iran in a dispute over Small Island in the 
Arab Gulf. This war led to the cutback of crude oil production in the two countries by 
almost 6 per cent of the global production. The war lasted through 1978 – 1981 and 
resulted in a 100 per cent increase in crude oil price (Hamilton, 2013a). 
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4.5.6 The great price collapse: 1981 – 1986 
 
The series of increases of oil price during the previous years had resulted in contraction of 
crude oil demand from importing countries. Accordingly, the volume of world crude oil 
consumption dropped substantially during the first half of the 1980s. To sustain the oil 
price at a favourable level of oil producers, Saudi Arabia took the first step by cutting back 
its production by approximately 75 per cent over the period 1981 – 1985. However, its 
endeavour did not succeed in preventing the decline of crude oil price, which dropped by 
25 per cent. However, due to this unsuccessful attempt to curtail oil price from decline, 
Saudi Arabia resumed its production as usual in 1986, which aggravated the situation and 
pushed oil price down from US$27 per barrel in 1985 to US$12 per barrel in 1986. This 
was mainly due to the competition among the OPEC members to maximize their income 
and the shrinking demand for crude oil (Speight, 2012: 161). OPEC members had held a 
series of meetings through February and April 1986 in an attempt to determine its market 
share, but the outcomes were disappointing with no agreements reached. Subsequently, the 
oil price dropped to US$ 8 per barrel by the end of April 1986 (Jones, 1988: 309). 
According to Jones the disagreement between the thirteen OPEC member countries was 
due to two reasons (1988: 311): 
1. Iraq wanted higher quota in order to meet the cost of the war against Iran. 
Likewise, Iran requested an increase of its quota. 
2. Other countries demanded higher quotas to sustain their revenue levels. 
4.5.7 The first Persian Gulf War: 1990 – 1991 
 
At the end of the Iran- Iraq war in August 1988, Iraq returned to business as usual and its 
production level was similar to that in the 1970s. However, upon the invasion of Kuwait by 
Iraqi troops in August 1990, world crude oil production dropped by nearly 9 per cent, as a 
result of the disruption of oil supply from these two countries (Hamilton, 2003).  
Consequently, crude oil price doubled within eight weeks. Price per barrel of crude oil rose 
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from US$ 14 to 40, almost tripling (Hamilton, 2011). To compensate for the loss of 
production from the Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil fields, Saudi Arabia made use of its spare 
capacity to increase crude oil production in order to bring back the global production to its 
level before the aggression against Kuwait. This shock did not last long and crude oil price 
went down again to US$ 20 a barrel (Yan, 2012). 
4.5.8 East Asian crisis: 1997 – 1998 
  
Although the oil consumption in what was known as the “Asian tigers” was modest, their 
economic growth if continued could have triggered crude oil price to increase according to 
Hotelling’s rule6. In 1997 Thailand devalued its currency as a result of a huge flight of 
foreign exchange in its attempt to support its currency exchange rate. However, its 
borrowing and foreign debt aggravated the situation and led to a currency collapse. The 
financial crisis soon spread to the Southeast Asian countries. This created a turmoil in the 
financial system of most of the Asian countries and to a lesser extent on other stock 
markets. During this period crude oil price dropped to US$ 10 per barrel (Yan, 2012). 
Likewise, Weiwen (2012) argued that the coincidence of the Asian financial crisis and the 
increase of crude oil production by Iraq were the main causes of the drop in crude oil 
prices. In this regard, Speight (2012: 162) suggested the five reasons that were responsible 
for crude oil drop in late 1997, as follows: 
1. Slowdown of Asian economies due to the financial crises. 
2. Misreading of the global oil market trend by OPEC members had resulted in 
pumping more oil in the market. 
3. Unlike previous years, the North Hemisphere witnessed mild winter, which led to 
lower demand for crude oil and its products. 
4. Russia had increased crude oil exports to boost its economic growth and to improve 
its income balance. 
                                                          
6 Hotelling (1931) claimed that in a competitive market non-renewable resources price would grow at a rate 
equivalent to the discount rate (interest rate).  
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5. Lack of adherence to the quota system among the OPEC members as well as the 
competition between Venezuela and Saudi Arabia to increase their share in the 
market ended in a high volume of crude oil exports, and subsequently crude oil 
supply outweighed its demand. 
4.5.9 The Venezuelan turmoil and the second Persian Gulf War: 2002 - 2003 
 
During the period December 2002 to January 2003 a general strike took place in 
Venezuela, which led to a removal of 2.1 million barrels a day from the world crude oil 
market. Immediately after this event, 2.2 million barrels a day from the Iraqi oil fields was 
removed as well due to the launch of military operations by the US forces and its allies 
against Iraq (Le and Chang, 2013). However, in terms of the share of global crude oil 
production, the 4.3 million barrels were smaller compared to what had happened in the 
previous events. This might be attributed to the overall increase of oil production from the 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Despite this fact crude oil price rose slightly and for a 
shorter period of time. However, Speight (2012: 145) attributed the increase of crude oil 
price to cold weather in the winter of 2003. 
4.5.10 Oil demand pressure: 2007 – 2008 
 
This period had witnessed global economic growth and associated with an increase of 
crude oil demand by 5 million barrels a day. It was widely acknowledged that the strong 
demand was the main cause of the continuous upward trend of oil price during the period 
2007 - 2008. The strong economic growth, increased oil consumption by emerging 
economies such as China and speculative activities had resulted in an increase of crude oil 
price to a record high by July 2008 (Hamilton, 2013a; Kilian and Morphy, 2014). For 
example, West Texas Intermediate crude oil exceeded US$ 145 (Speight, 2012: 138). 
Unlike the previous periods, there were no geopolitical events associated with the increase 
of oil price this time. Some assumptions were made to explain why production was not 
increased to bring prices down. One explanation was that the ongoing instability in Iraq 
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and Nigeria at the time played a contributing factor. Some key oil fields reached their peak 
and entered the declining stage, such as oil production from North Sea fields which 
declined by more than 2 million barrels a day by the end of 2007. Also, the Mexican major 
field “Cantarell” had shown a decline of oil production by nearly 1 million barrels a day 
over the period 2002 - 2008. Interestingly, in 2007 production from Saudi fields declined 
by 850,000 barrels a day compared to its production in 2005. This unexpected decline of 
the Saudi oil fields was explained by the maturity of its largest oil field “Ghawar”, which 
had been in production for more than 50 years (Simmons, 2005). However, Gately (2001) 
suggests that it was not in the interest of OPEC to increase crude oil production at that 
time.  This claim was supported by Speight (2012) who observed that the withholding of 
oil supply by OPEC countries, speculation in future markets and the profiteering of oil 
companies were major issues. Likewise, Bhar and Malliaris (2011) claimed that Saudi 
Arabia had deliberately kept its oil production rate unchanged to stabilize oil prices. They 
also emphasised the role of market fundamentals and the US dollar depreciation in the oil 
price hike. On the other hand, Speight (2012: 137) claimed that geopolitical concerns over 
Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela had contributed to oil price fluctuation during the period 2007 
– 2008. Furthermore, Kaufmann (2011) stated that increase of crude oil prices in mid-2008 
were due to supply shock and speculation rather than demand shock. Although Kaufmann 
(2011) claimed that it is hard to measure speculation, three indicators suggested that 
changes in oil prices were partially due to speculation. These indicators were: 
1. Increasing crude oil inventories by the private sector. 
2. Breakdown of the co-integration between crude oil prices in spot and futures 
market. 
3. Failure of the econometric models to forecast crude oil prices, according to supply- 
demand theory. 
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However, there was no clear evidence that supports the role played by speculation in the 
2008 oil price hike, but failure of market fundamentals to justify the oil price increase led 
to an assumption of other factors. Tsoskounoglou et al. (2008) and Yan (2012) attributed 
the oil price hike in 2008 to the increase of demand in OECD countries and high level of 
demand in emerging countries such as China and India. However, due to occurrence of 
financial crisis in the last two quarters of 2008, crude oil prices plummeted dramatically to 
US$ 40 a barrel by the end of 2008, a 262 per cent drop. 
4.5.11 Recent oil price drop: 2014-2015  
 
In the last few months of 2014/15, crude oil price has plunged to a record low after four 
years of relative oil price stability at approximately US$ 105 a barrel. The drop of crude oil 
to just above US$ 40, which started in June 2014, was not an unprecedented one; there are 
five episodes of crude oil price plunge that have occurred in the last three decades (Baffes 
et al., 2015, Tokic, 2015). The first episode of oil price drop was in 1985-86, when OPEC 
countries abandoned OPEC’s oil price targeting policy and continued increasing 
production, which then resulted in a rapid growth in oil supply. The end result was that 
crude oil price dropped from US$27 to US$12 barrel (Speight, 2012: 161). The second oil 
drop was in 1990-91, which was mainly attributed to the weakening of global demand. 
Crude oil price went down from US$ 40 to US$ 20 a barrel. The third plunge took place in 
1997-98 as a result of the Asian crisis as mentioned earlier. During this period the barrel 
oil price dropped to US$10 (Yan, 2012). The fourth decline of crude oil occurred in 2001, 
due to the contraction of the global demand after the September 11 attack. Finally, the 
crude oil price drop of 2008–09 was a consequence of global financial crisis. The crude oil 
price dropped from its historical peak of US$ 145 to nearly US$ 30 per barrel (Speight, 
2012: 138; Tokic, 2015). The recent plunge of crude oil price has been attributed to a 
number of factors (Baffes et al., 2015). Firstly, slowdown in the global demand for crude 
oil, especially that of the emerging countries. Secondly, the shift of OPEC policy from a 
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price targeting policy to that one aims at maintaining its market share in the global crude 
oil market. This has resulted in oversupply of crude oil, which put more downward 
pressure on oil prices (Bentley and Bentley, 2015; Manescu and Nuno, 2015). Thirdly, the 
remarkable increase of nonconventional crude oil production, e.g. US shale oil and 
Canadian oil sand. Fourthly, appreciation of the US dollar exchange against other 
currencies by about 10 per cent. Since the US dollar is the denominator currency for 
pricing crude oil, its volatility affects crude oil prices. Fifthly, receding of the geopolitical 
risks, which have appeared to be less prominent than expected. Libya, for example, has 
increased its oil production by 0.5 million barrels per day and also Iraq succeeded in 
stabilizing its production at 3.3 million barrels per day despite existing conflicts. This 
argument is consistent with those of Manescu and Nuno (2015). The current crude oil price 
drop would benefit oil importing countries to push inflation rate downwards. However, oil 
exporting countries will suffer from low oil revenues and worsening of their fiscal stance. 
Likewise, the nonconventional oil producers will also suffer if the existing price continues 
for quite a long time as their break-even point is relatively higher compared to those of 
conventional crude oil producers.  On the other hand, despite the wide acknowledgement 
in the financial media of the glut in oil production, slowdown of China’s demand and 
increase of the US shale oil production as contributing factors to the 2014 plunge, Tokic 
(2015) suggested that the main cause of the 2014 oil bust was due to the appreciation of the 
US dollar against the Euro. 
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The oil price shocks event could be presented in a single graph as shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 16. Major crude oil events 
            
 
 
           
            
     
 
      
            
            
      
 
     
    
 
       
     
 
      
   
 
        
     
 
      
            
 
 
     
 
    
            
            
            
      
 
     
            
            
            
            
            
             
 
4.6 Summary      
This chapter has provided an overview of the quantity of world proven crude oil, global 
crude oil demand and supply, peak oil theory, how crude oil is priced, factors that affect its 
movement, historical crude oil price shocks and the recent plunge in crude oil prices.   The 
world proven oil reserve has shown an increase of 29.4 per cent over the last decade. In 
this context, the peak theory introduced by M. King Hubbert in 1956 has been refuted by a 
number of scholars.  The world crude oil supply steadily increased through the period 2000 
– 2008, but witnessed a drop by nearly 4.9 per cent in 2009. This drop was attributed to a 
cut in crude oil production from OPEC countries.  In contrast, the average growth rate of 
the world crude oil demand during the last fifteen years was 2.6 per cent. The increase of 
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crude oil demand in the world was driven mainly by both developing and emerging 
countries. The pricing mechanism of the crude oil has witnessed significant changes 
through history. Before the 1970s, the Seven Sister companies were the major determinants 
of crude oil prices, then followed by the OPEC era. Since the early 1980s, a new system of 
pricing was introduced, in which prices were determined as a differential to certain 
benchmark or reference price (e.g. Brent, WTI and Dubai). Although crude oil prices are 
generally determined by the demand and supply, other factors have played influential role 
in the crude oil prices. For example, the geopolitical events, speculation, environmental 
conditions and the US dollar exchange rate.    These factors had led to a series of oil price 
shocks in the past. Recently, the plunge of crude oil was attributed to a number of factors, 
similar to those that occurred in earlier times. However, the most significant new factor is 
the increase of crude oil from non-conventional sources.                                                                                                                                                                                      
112 
 
Chapter five: Research framework and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the philosophical framework of the mixed research methodology. It 
also presents the process of the Delphi method including the designing of the semi-
structured questionnaire and selection criteria adopted in selecting the experts. The VAR 
model will be explained, as well as data definition and sources. Then, the specification, 
estimation and adequacy test of the VAR will be expounded. Subsequently, Granger 
causality test, impulse response function and forecast error variance decomposition 
analysis are articulated. Finally, the process of comparing the outcomes of the Delphi 
method with the signs of the VAR model coefficients as external validation is explained.   
5.2 Philosophical framework 
Before the 1980s there were two philosophical paradigms. The positivist paradigm 
supports or associates with what is known as quantitative approach. In this paradigm, the 
researcher makes assumption of knowledge through cause and effect, measuring variables 
and examining theories. On the other hand, the constructivist paradigm supports qualitative 
approach and according to this philosophy researcher understand the problem through 
subjective opinions of participants. Positivists view reality as singular, while 
constructivists view reality as multiple. A debate between these two paradigms continued 
for quite a long time (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998: 3-4; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). 
During the 1980s and early 1990s the debate between the two paradigms became 
unproductive. In an attempt to make peace between the two paradigms, a new paradigm 
was proposed that supported the compatibility of using both methods in a research. This 
paradigm is called pragmatism. The new paradigm refers to what is called ‘mixed 
methods’ or mixed methodology, which encompasses both qualitative and quantitative 
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approaches in one study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998: 5). Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011:41) have explained the pragmatism paradigm as follow:  
Pragmatism is typically associated with mixed methods research. The focus is on the 
consequences of the research, on the primary importance of the question asked rather than 
the methods, and on the use of multiple methods of data collection to inform the problem 
under study. Thus it is pluralistic and oriented toward “what works” and practice. 
The mixed method came into existence in late 1980s after a number of researchers from 
different disciplines produced various publications in which they discussed and established 
solid foundations of the mixed methods, for example, Brewer and Hunter, 1991; Fielding 
and Fielding, 1989; Greene et al., 1989; Bryman, 1988; Morse, 1991; Creswell, 1994 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). The mixed methods have gone through different names 
before researchers agree on the current name ‘mixed method research’. For instance, it has 
been given the following names: ‘combined or integrated research’, ‘quantitative and 
qualitative methods’, ‘hybrid research’, and finally ‘methodological triangulation’ 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 22). There is a growing interest in using mixed methods 
in research, for example, in the last five years 1460 PhD students employed mixed methods 
in their theses as the main research methodology (ETHOS, 2013). 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003a), pragmatism is identified as the best 
philosophical base for mixed method research. Pragmatists support using multiple 
paradigms to address the research problem. A mixed methodology study refers to a single 
study or multi-phased study that uses qualitative and quantitative approaches into its 
research methodology of (ibid: 17). 
There are four major mixed methodology designs. These are the explanatory sequential 
design, the convergent parallel design, the exploratory sequential design and embedded 
design (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 71). In convergent design the researcher 
implements both quantitative and qualitative methods at the same time and mix their 
results at the interpretation point.  The explanatory sequential design is in two phases, 
114 
 
quantitative data will be collected and analysed first, then followed by qualitative phase to 
further explain the quantitative results. The exploratory design is just the reverse of the 
explanatory design, starts with qualitative phase, and then followed by quantitative phase 
to examine or generalize the qualitative findings. Finally, the embedded design refers to 
the implementation of both qualitative and quantitative methods within the traditional 
qualitative or quantitative design. 
One of the main principles in designing a mixed methods research is to clearly set off the 
reasons for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 
61). Greene et al. (1989) identified five reasons for mixing methods in research. These are  
1. Triangulation or convergence of results. 
2. Complementarity: study different aspects of a phenomenon. 
3. Initiation: exploring contradictions or new perspectives. 
4. Development: using methods sequentially in a way that findings from the first 
method feed into the second method for more investigation. 
5.  Expansion: combined method adds more breadth and widening project scope. 
Furthermore, Venkatesh et al. (2013) stated seven purposes of using mixed methods: 
complementarity, completeness, development, expansion, corroboration/confirmation, 
compensation and diversification. However, detailed reasons have been specified by 
Bryman (2006). He identified sixteen reasons as follows: triangulation or greater 
validation, completeness, off-setting, process, answering different questions, unexpected 
results, explanation, instrument, development, sampling, credibility, context, illustration, 
utility or improving the usefulness of findings, confirm and discover, diversity of views, 
and enhancement or building among qualitative and quantitative findings.  
The three challenges in employing the mixed methodology are: first, the researcher has to 
have previous experience and skill in using quantitative and qualitative methods 
individually before conducting mixed methods in a study. Secondly, mixed method 
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research entails extensive time, resource and efforts from the researcher. Finally, the issue 
of convincing others with mixed methodology, as it is relatively new compared to the 
traditional methodologies (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 13). 
This research used the Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design, in which qualitative 
and quantitative data was collected concurrently, analysed separately and then the results 
compared to each other (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). This research used mixed 
methods for corroboration and validation purposes. According to Bill (2011), a 
questionnaire is considered to be of high value specially when used with other methods. He 
further emphasised that using multi-methods approach to investigate a phenomenon is 
critical as each single method has its limitations. Moreover, if the findings of the different 
methods fit together, it gives more confidence on the results (Bill, 2011: 2).  
The diagram below portrays the procedural processes of implementing the convergent 
parallel mixed method design:  
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Figure 17. The procedural process of implementing convergent parallel mixed methods design 
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When a disagreement between the two methods took place, a researcher has the flexibility 
to assess the credibility of results according to appropriate criteria such as whether the 
relationship between variables is theoretically and conceptually sound and acceptable and 
consistency of results with previous findings in the literature (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2011: 69-71). Another way to do that is to use the estimated econometric model to simulate 
the historical variable time series data and compare the simulated values with the actual 
time series data. Then, five simulation evaluating measures will be used to evaluate the 
accuracy of the simulation. These measures are Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Theil 
inequality coefficient, bias proportion, variance proportion and covariance proportion 
(Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
5.3 The qualitative approach: Delphi Method 
Delphi method was developed mainly for forecasting of future events according to the 
knowledge of a panel of experts. However, in the last five decades, this method has been 
applied for different purposes, such as policy analysis, planning and long term prediction 
(Pickard, 2012). In this research, Delphi method aimed at obtaining a general consensus of 
the views of the experts about the impact of oil price shocks on Sudan’s macroeconomy. 
Traditionally, an open-ended questionnaire was used in the Delphi method; however 
structured questionnaire can be accepted in the modified Delphi format, especially when a 
thorough revision of the literature review has been undertaken (Hsu and Sandford, 2007). 
Delphi has been used in this research for the following reasons: first, the response of the 
macroeconomic variables to fluctuations of oil prices in the world markets is somewhat 
complex, which requires solid experience and knowledge in this area. Secondly, it does not 
necessitate experts to meet physically. Thirdly, the number of the experts is small, between 
10 to 18 experts, so it is easy to administer the questionnaire. Fourthly, it is flexible and 
can be followed up by interview for further information, if necessary (Chitu et al., 2004). It 
is worth noting that the Delphi method has been used as secondary and main methodology 
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in other fields of research in almost 2247 published articles and 1668 dissertations and 
theses (Jon, 2006). 
The following steps have been adopted in using the Delphi method: 
1. An overview of the relevant literature (article, studies and reports) with regard to 
the oil price shocks and the macroeconomy nexus was carried out. 
2. Purposive sampling was used to select the experts’ panel. That is to say, specific 
experts who have knowledge, experience and core concepts of the case were 
intentionally recruited (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011: 173). A purposive 
sampling is used when the researcher knows who provides the most beneficial 
information to the research questions. This type of sampling is generally used in 
qualitative research (Kumar, 2011:  207). Accordingly, the experts have been 
identified, contacted and informed about the purpose and objectives of the research. 
Fifteen experts were selected to form the panel representing the following 
institutions and organizations: World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Ministry of Finance and National Economy, African Development Bank 
Group, Central Bank of Sudan, the Council of Ministers, and expatriate national 
expert from the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The 
selection has been guided by the following criteria: He/she must have gotten at 
least a master degree in economics or related discipline, minimum working 
experience of 14 years, occupying a senior post in his/her institution or 
organization, and has a good background on the relationship between oil prices and 
macroeconomic activities. Three of the experts were occupying higher political 
posts, that is, State Minister of Finance, senior economic advisor for the Council of 
Ministers and Advisor for the State Minister of Finance and National Economy 
(Appendix 1). 
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3. The following steps were undertaken in designing the semi structured questionnaire 
and implementing the Delphi method (Appendix 2): 
 Various questions have been developed to obtain the required information. 
 Potential questions have been reviewed and prioritized. 
 Each question has been scrutinized using the following criteria: clarity, non-
leading questions, no ambiguity and simplicity. 
 The wording in each question has been checked carefully. 
 The semi-structure questionnaire was organized into six sections, each 
section intended to answer a specific research question, as follows: 
 The first section was to collect data with respect to the effect of 
crude oil price shocks on the Murabaha profit margin rate, money 
supply, real exchange rate and inflation rate. 
 The second section dealt with the effect of crude oil price shocks on 
the public budget variables, specifically total revenues, tax revenues, 
development expenditure, current expenditure and budget deficit. 
 Section three assessed the correlation between the crude oil price 
shocks, the GDP growth and the unemployment rate. 
 The impact of crude oil price shocks on the main sectors growth rate 
was calibrated in section four, namely agricultural, industrial and 
services sectors growth rates. 
 Section five identifies the impact of crude oil price shocks on the 
current account balance, trade balance, non-oil exports and imports. 
 Section six dealt with confirming the selection of the appropriate 
macroeconomic variables that would be included in the VAR model. 
 A pilot phase was carried out to evaluate the questionnaire. 
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 Some questions were amended based on the received feedback during the 
piloting phase. 
4. The distribution of the questionnaire to the experts’ panel was either through their 
email addresses or in person (Round 1). 
5. In round 2, all feedback from the experts in round 1 were analysed, summarised 
and included in the questionnaire as multiple answers to each question, with 
percentage of agreement to each answer. These were then sent back to the experts 
for reviewing and articulating whether they agree or disagree with them.  
The research has strictly followed the rules of the Delphi method, which are summarised as 
follows: 
1. Only knowledgeable and experienced individuals were chosen to participate 
in the panel of the experts. 
2. All information had been gathered in writing. 
3. A consensus of the views of the expert was systematically targeted, but that 
did not mean there were manipulations of the data to achieve that. This was 
attained through two rounds of Delphi method, experts review and consider 
the views of other experts till a general consensus was reached. 
4. The identity of experts in the panel were not revealed or disclosed. 
However, Turoff and Hiltz suggested that it is of benefit to let the experts 
know each other to encourage them take the process seriously and honesty 
as their answer would be seen by other experts (1997). 
5. The minimum number of the Delphi rounds to reach a consensus among the 
experts is two rounds. However, in some studies, general consensus was 
reached in the first round. This study reached a consensus among the 
experts in the second round. 
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It is worth noting that the general consensus was considered to be reached when 60 per 
cent or more of the views of experts showed the same answer to each single question. 
However, in some studies the cut-off rate of the consensus was less than 60 per cent 
(Rayens and Hahn, 2000). 
5.4 The quantitative approach: Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) Model 
This research used the VAR model in analysing the quantitative data. The VAR model was 
widely used in numerous empirical studies that examined the impact of oil price shocks on 
macroeconomic variables (Hamilton, 1983; Mork, 1989; Stock and Watson, 2001; 
Jimenez-Rodriguez; 2005, Zhang, 2011).  According to Stock and Watson (2001), “in data 
description and forecasting, VARs have been proven to be powerful and reliable tools that 
are now, rightly, in everyday use”. The VAR model came into existence in 
macroeconomics due to the unsatisfactory results of the large scale simultaneous structural 
equation models in the 1950s and 1960s. Researchers have found that using the VAR 
model in assessing and tracing the effect of external shocks on economic activities was 
better than the large-scale structural equation systems (Sims, 1980). Basically, the VAR 
has been used in the macroeconomy for forecasting, in addition to testing the Granger 
causality between variables and in examining the impact of policies by employing the 
Impulse Response Function (Greene, 2008: 695). In general, a VAR model comprises of a 
set of variables regressed on their own past values and lagged values of other variables as 
well (Guidi, 2009, Stock and Watson, 2001, Holden, 1995, Gujarati, 2003, Lutkephohl, 
1993). It treats all variables in the model as endogenous and does not require a priori 
structural identification for selecting the variables in the model (Sims, 1980). 
Generally speaking, VAR model has a number of upsides compared to the simultaneous 
equation structural models and univariate time series models. All variables are supposed to 
be endogenous, that is, no need for specifying whether variables are endogenous or 
exogenous.  Because of its inclusion of lag values of variables, VAR model provides a 
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quite a rich structure that captures more properties of the data. VAR model was found to 
provide better forecast results compared to the traditional structural Models (Brooks, 2002; 
Mark and Watson, 2001). Also, because the VAR model includes the same variables in 
each equation on the right hand side and there is no feedback from the Left Hand Side 
(LHS) variables to the Right Hand Side (RHS) variables, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is a 
valid estimation method to be used in each single equation (Holden, 1995). On the 
downside, VAR has large numbers of coefficients/parameters to estimate and there is a 
difficulty to interpret them. The number of the parameters can be calculated using the 
following formula: K2 L + K; where K is number of variables and L denotes lag length. For 
example, if a VAR model includes 6 variables with 4 lags, this will result in 150 unknown 
parameters including intercepts (Stock and Watson, 2001). However, Sims (1980) claims 
that the intention is to study the relationship between variables not to estimate the 
coefficients. Moreover, credible scholars such as Hamilton (1983), Gisser and Goodwin 
(1986), Mork (1989), Mork et al. (1994), Lee et al. (1995) and Chuku (2012), Gunu and 
Kilishi (2010), used the sign of the VAR model coefficients to explain the direction and the 
effect of the explanatory variables on the dependant variables. The general form of the 
VAR model is as follows: 
Yt = c + 𝚽1yt-1 + 𝚽2yt-2+……….+ 𝚽p yt-p +𝛜t  (1) 
Where yt is (n ×1) vector of variables; c is (n ×1) vector of constant; 𝚽j is (n × n) matrix of 
coefficients for j = 1, 2, …, p where p is the lag length; and 𝛜t is (n ×1) vector of white 
noise term (Hamilton, 1994: 257). Generally speaking, researchers use the VAR model to 
analyse Granger causality, impulse responses and variance decomposition. These tests are 
computed using different econometric software such as EViews. As a result of the dynamic 
nature of the VAR model these tests give plausible information compared to the estimated 
VAR parameters. This is why VAR regression parameters go unreported by researchers 
(Stock and Watson, 2001; Guidi, 2009). However, Hamilton (1983), Gisser and Goodwin 
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(1986), Mork (1989), Mork et al. (1994), Lee et al. (1995) and Chuku (2012) used the sign 
of the coefficient to explain the direction of its effect on dependent variables. 
It is worth noting that every VAR model has a Moving Average representation (MA).  The 
vector MA model describes the relation between the current value of endogenous variable 
and the current and past values of the error terms in the VAR system. This relationship 
helps in tracing out the response of the endogenous variable over time to unit shock to an 
error term in each equation separately. Therefore, the MA representation is used to obtain 
the impulse response function and also to analyse the unexpected movement in the 
indigenous variable as a result of shock to itself and to the other variables in the VAR 
model as well. However, this process requires that error terms should be uncorrelated. To 
avoid that error terms, should be orthogonalized using Cholesky decomposition in order to 
make the covariance matrix diagonal. The general MA (q) takes the following form 
(Hamilton, 1994: 50) 
y𝑡 = μ + 𝜀𝑡 +  𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1 + ⋯ +  𝜃𝑞𝜀𝑡−𝑞   (2) 
Where μ is (n x 1) vector of the mean of y𝑡, while  𝜃  is (n x n) matrix of MA coefficients 
and 𝜀 is a vector of white noise. 
The five VAR models used to investigate the impact of real oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomy are: 
1. Public budget model. This VAR model contains seven variables: positive and 
negative real crude oil price shocks, total revenues, development expenditure, 
current spending, tax revenues and budget deficit. 
2. Selected macroeconomic variables model. This VAR model contains six 
macroeconomic variables: positive and negative real crude oil price shocks, money 
supply, real exchange rate, Murabaha profit margin rate and inflation rate.  
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3. Current account model. This VAR model includes six variables: positive and 
negative real crude oil price shocks, non-oil exports, import, current account 
balance and trade balance. 
4. GDP growth model. This VAR model includes four variables: positive and negative 
real crude oil price shocks, real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate. 
5. Sectors growth rate model: this VAR model includes five variables: positive and 
negative real crude oil price shocks, agricultural sector growth rate, industrial 
sector growth rate and services sector growth rate. 
These VAR models were analysed using the EViews econometric software package. Also, 
the VAR models were estimated and examined using different tests. The following steps 
were adopted in developing the VAR models: 
1. Selection of the variables 
2. Checking the properties of the time series data. 
3. Selecting the optimal lag length for the model. 
4. Estimating the model 
5. Checking the adequacy of the model using four diagnostic tests. 
6. Employing Granger causality test. 
7. Performing Impulse Response Function. 
8. Performing Variance Decomposition Analysis. 
These steps are sketched out in Figure 17. 
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Figure 18. VAR analysis process 
 
Source: adapted from Lütkepohl, 2011. 
5.4.1 Data definition and sources 
A total of twenty macroeconomic variables were used in this research. The selection of the 
variables in the five VAR models were based on similar empirical research studies and 
further confirmed by the experts who took part in the Delphi method. The notations of 
these are shown as follows: 
  
Model 
specification 
Model 
estimation 
Impulse 
Response 
Functions 
Forecast error 
decomposition 
analysis 
Granger 
causality test 
Model rejected 
1. Autocorrelation test. 
2. Normality test. 
3. Heteroskedasticity 
test. 
4. Stability test. 
1. Variables selection. 
2. Stationary test. 
3. Optimal lag length. 
Model 
Adequacy 
Model accepted 
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Table 8. Variables notation 
Variables Notations 
Positive Real Oil Price (oil price increase) PROILP 
Negative Real Oil Price (oil price decrease) NROILP 
Inflation rate (%) INF 
Money Supply growth (%) M2 
Unemployment rate (%) UNE 
Murabaha profit margin rate (%) MUR 
Non-oil Exports (as % of GDP) NOEX 
Imports (as % of GDP) IMP 
Current account balance (as % of GDP) CAB 
Trade Balance (as % of GDP) TB 
Real exchange rate RER 
Real Gross Domestic Product growth rate (%) RGDPG 
Total Revenues (as % of GDP) REV 
Development Expenditure (as % of GDP) DEVEXP 
Current expenditure (as % of GDP) CUREXP 
Tax Revenues (as % of GDP) TAX 
Budget Deficit (as % of GDP) DEFICIT 
Agricultural sector growth rate  AGRICULTURE 
Industrial sector growth rate INDUSTRY 
Services sector growth rate SERVICES 
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In the following section, the definition and sources of time series data are explained: 
 The real world oil price used in this research is denominated in US dollars. To calculate 
the real oil price, the nominal oil price was divided by the US Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). West Texas Intermediate oil price was used in this research as benchmark for 
global oil prices. However, if the research used other benchmark oil price such as UK 
Brent or Dubai, it would not affect the outcomes of the analysis as crude oil prices 
were empirically found to be moving in tandem across the three benchmarks (Weiwen, 
2012). The real oil price was considered to be exogenous variable as Sudan has no 
influence on oil prices in the global markets. That is, Sudan is entirely a price taker. In 
this research oil price specification proposed by Mork (1989) was used. Chuku (2012) 
explained that in a very simple mathematical form as follows: 
Positive real oil price (PROILP) = {
𝑂𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡 > 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}               (3) 
Negative real oil price (NROILP) = {
𝑂𝑡  𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡 < 0
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}    (4) 
Where Ot denotes the rate of change in real oil price from year t to year t+1. 
 Inflation rate refers to the percentage change in the general level of prices (O’Sullivan 
et al. 2005: 134). In other words, inflation is the percentage change in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) over a given period. 
  Money supply (M2) is composed of money circulated in the economy plus the demand 
deposits. The volume of money in the economy will help forecast the inflation. The 
monetary authority uses money supply as a tool for monetary policy to control inflation 
and stimulate the economy. 
 Unemployment reflects the percentage of unemployed individuals of the total labour 
force that are willing to work at the current wages (OECD, 2013). A decrease in the 
unemployment rate is a good sign for economic growth and vice versa. 
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 Murabaha profit margin rate is the cost of finance used by the Islamic banking systems 
based on the Islamic Sharia Laws. Generally, the Central Bank of Sudan determines an 
indicative Murabaha profit margin rate for commercial banks to follow. The Murabaha 
profit margin rate is equivalent to the interest rate in the traditional banking system. 
However, the difference is on the procedure and the implementation processes. 
 Non-oil exports proceeds include export of all goods and services, excluding crude oil 
earnings. It is expressed as a percentage of the GDP. Increasing non-oil export earnings 
show an improvement in diversifying Sudan exports base. It also lessens the high 
dependency on the oil sector. 
 Imports refer to the good and services produced in other countries and purchased by 
residents of the home country (O’Sullivan et al. 2005: 106). The value of imports is 
expressed as a percentage of the GDP. Generally speaking, increasing imports worsen 
the trade balance. 
 Current account balance is one component of the balance of payments. It includes 
balance of trade, net income from abroad and net current transfer. A current account 
balance shows whether a country is a net borrower from the rest of the world or a net 
receiver of foreign exchange. The current account balance is expressed as a percentage 
of the GDP. A positive current account balance is a good sign of healthy country’s 
external sector. 
 Trade balance refers to the difference in monetary value between a country’s exports 
and imports over a specific period of time. When the value of exports exceeds imports, 
the trade balance is said to be in surplus. On the contrary, if the value of imports is 
greater than the value of exports, the trade balance is said to be in deficit. The trade 
balance is expressed as a percentage of GDP. Positive trade balance shows inflows of 
foreign exchange earnings and vice versa. 
 The exchange rate is defined as the value of a country's currency (domestic currency) 
versus the currency of another country (foreign currency). For example, the value of 
129 
 
Sudanese pound versus one US dollar. The appreciation of the local currency has 
negative impact on the country’s export competitiveness, as its exports become 
expensive in the world market and vice versa. 
 GDP refers to the total value of the output in a country in one year (O’Sullivan et al. 
2005: 103). The GDP growth shows the change in GDP as a result of increasing the 
market value of the output of an economy over specific time. The real GDP will be 
used in this research to reflect the value of the output calculated using prices of specific 
year (based year).  
 Total government revenue includes taxes and non-tax sources (e.g. Oil and non-oil 
export proceeds) in addition to grants. It is expressed as a percentage of the GDP. 
 Current expenditure refers to the government spending on non-capital items such as 
wages and salaries, while development expenditure refers to spending on assets that 
last for more than one year such as building, equipment and construction of roads. Both 
variables are in percentage of the GDP. 
 Tax revenues are the total amount of money paid by companies and workers for the 
government in term of personal income tax and business profit tax. It is expressed as 
percentage of GDP. 
 Budget deficit refers to the situation where the total government expenditure outstrips 
the total government revenues in a given fiscal year (O’Sullivan et al., 2005:220). 
Similar to other budget variables it is expressed as percentage of the GDP. 
 Agricultural sector growth rate refers to the percentage change of the value of 
agricultural sector outputs in one year. It is expressed as percentage of growth. 
 Industrial sector growth rate refers to the percentage change of the value of all 
industrial sector products in one year. It is expressed as percentage of growth. 
 Services sector growth rate refers to the percentage change of the value of services 
activities in one year. It is expressed as percentage of growth. 
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A quarterly data for the period 2000:q1 – 2011:q2 were collected from the following 
sources: Ministry of Finance and National Economy (General Directorate for Public 
Budget), Central Bank of Sudan and US Energy Information Administration. However, the 
real GDP growth data and the unemployment rate data were available only on annual base.  
5.4.2 Unit root and stationary tests 
Generally speaking, the time series variable is said to be stationary if the mean is zero and 
variance does not change over the time. Variables should be stationary in order to give a 
meaningful estimation. If non-stationary variables are regressed on each other, they can 
lead to the so-called “spurious regression”. This simply means that the results are different 
to what they are assumed to be (Halcoussis, 2005). Each set of the time series data has to 
be checked for a unit root using Phillips-Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
tests. Both tests are based on the null hypothesis of a unit root.  The latter test, have been 
criticized for being of low power when the process is stationary, but with root almost equal 
to 1, for example, 0.95. In order to confirm the result from ADF and PP tests, another 
stationary test proposed by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shine (KPSS) is employed. 
The KPSS is based on the null hypothesis that time series is stationary. Using the 
stationarity and unit root tests together is known as “confirmatory data analysis” (Brooks, 
2002).  The above-mentioned tests were carried out for the 20 variables included in the five 
models.  If the probability value (p) is found to be less than 5 per cent or the t statistics is 
greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis would be rejected, otherwise the 
alternative hypothesis will be accepted (Brooks, 2002: 379-381). Most of the modern 
software packages provide p-value to test the hypotheses. This helped researchers to make 
their decision regarding rejection or non-rejection of the null hypothesis without referring 
to the appropriate critical values (Verbeek, 2000: 30). In case some variables are found to 
be non-stationary, then a differencing procedure should be adopted until the variables 
become stationary. For example, variable Y will be ΔY which equals to Yt – Yt-1 
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(Halcoussis, 2005). In the latter case, the variable would be integrated of order (d), which 
denoted by I (d), depend on the number of differencing.  According to Engle and Granger 
(1987), if the time series are found to be stationary after taking differencing, cointegration 
test which was proposed by Johansen (1991) would be employed to check whether the time 
series is cointegrated or not. In case time series is found to be cointegrated, the VAR model 
should be estimated with error correction terms to deter variables bias as a result of 
throwing away some variables during the differencing procedure. That is to say, Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) would be used instead of VAR model. On the other hand, 
if there is no proof of the existence of cointegration or the series are integrated of different 
orders, the standard/unrestricted VAR model will be estimated (Ewing and Thompson, 
2008; Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2011). 
Although all variables of the VAR model should be stationary before testing hypotheses, 
some scholars claimed that using differencing technique to make the variables stationary 
should be avoided, as it results in losing some information, which would be of beneficial 
for the long run relationship between time series variables (Sims, 1980, Brooks, 2008: 
240). Also, Halcoussis (2005: 242) reported two problems related to the differencing 
procedure. The first problem is that the mean of the variable is no longer the same as 
before taking the difference. Instead of having variable Y, now the VAR model includes 
only the difference of Y. This situation makes interpretation of the result somehow 
difficult. Second, it results in losing information regarding the movement of the variables 
over time. Furthermore, Hamilton (1994) pointed out three alternatives to deal with the 
issue of non-stationarity in time series data. The first alternative is to neglect the non-
stationarity in time series and estimate the VAR model in levels, using T and F 
distributions for testing hypotheses. The second alternative is to difference the variables 
that seem to be non-stationary before estimating the VAR model and then estimate the 
VAR model. If the actual process is a VAR in differences, this will result in improving 
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estimates of the model. However, if some of the variables are stationary, a VAR in 
differenced form is considered to be misspecified. The third alternative is to examine each 
variable carefully for nonstationarity and cointegration among the series. Based on the 
results of this investigation the model can be estimated. It is worth noting that the simplest 
non-stationary process is the random walk as follow: 
𝑋𝑡 = ∅𝑋𝑡−1 + ϵ𝑡      (5) 
Where ϵ𝑡 refers to the white noise which is identically and independently distributed with 0 
mean and 𝜎2 variance. The process is said to be stationary if ∅ is in the range of less than 1 
and greater than -1, that is, -1 < ∅ < 1. And if ∅ is not less than 1 or greater than -1 or equal 
to 1 then the process is said to be non-stationary. 
5.4.3 VAR lag length 
Selection of the optimal lag length of variables in test regression is very important in order 
to remove any existence of autocorrelation. Few lags will not completely remove 
autocorrelation and more than appropriate will increase the coefficient standard errors. The 
end result of not selecting the optimal lag length is that the value of test statistics will be 
reduced; hence, the null hypothesis of the unit root will most likely not be rejected. In this 
research, the most common used methods will be employed, which is the information 
criteria (Guidi, 2009). Therefore, three multivariate types of the information criteria will be 
used to determine the VAR order. These are Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQIC), Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (SBIC). These criteria 
could be mathematically stated as follows (Brooks, 2002: 334):  
HQIC = Log\Ê \ + (kʹ/T) log (T)    (6) 
AIC = Log\Ê \ + 2kʹ/T     (7) 
SBIC = Log\Ê \ + (2kʹ/T) log (log (T))   (8) 
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Where Ê refers to variance covariance matrix of residuals, kʹ denotes to total number of 
repressors in all equations and T refers to the number of observations. The number of lag 
that minimizes the value of each of the above three criteria will be chosen as the 
appropriate VAR order.  
Alternatively, researchers can use another way to determine the optimal lag length, which 
depends on the use of the frequency of the time series data. For instance, if the time series 
is on an annual base, use of one lag, if a time series is on quarterly base, use of 4 lags, if 
time series on a monthly base, use 12 lags and so on (Brooks, 2002). 
5.4.4 VAR estimation and testing  
Estimating the VAR model using the ordinary least square is the most important step in 
analysing the dynamic relationships among variables. Based on the outcomes of the above 
mentioned tests, the VAR model will be estimated and the VAR coefficients will be 
obtained. The signs of these coefficients will be compared later, after checking the 
adequacy of the VAR model, with the expected relationship between the real oil price 
shocks and macroeconomic variables that have been reported by the experts who 
participated in the Delphi method. 
 5.4.5 Diagnostic tests 
It is important to have the VAR model checked for its adequacy to ensure that it represents 
the data generation process adequately before using it for a specific purpose (Lutkepohl, 
2011). Four regression model adequacy tests will be conducted to make sure that the VAR 
model is valid for further analysis. These are autocorrelation/serial correlation, normality, 
heteroscedasticity and stability tests. If the outcomes of the four tests confirmed the good 
adequacy of the VAR model, then the model will be accepted and ready for further 
analysis. On the other hand, if the model failed to pass the adequacy test, then it will be 
rejected and further improvement will be considered.  
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Serial autocorrelation/serial correlation refers to a situation where the error terms 
(residuals) in one period are correlated with error terms in the following period. This 
problem affects the efficiency of the OLS regression estimators (Seddighi, 2012: 72). In 
order to detect serial correlation, Portmanteau test which is widely used by practitioners 
will be employed. The null hypothesis is set to no serial correlation between residuals.  
That is, all residuals auto-covariance are zero, while the alternative hypothesis is that at 
least one auto-covariance (one auto-correlation) in not zero (Lutkepohl, 2011). If the result 
shows that p-value is greater the 5 per cent, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
For normality, as one of the assumptions of the regression model is that error terms are 
normally distributed, Jargu-Bera test will be used to confirm that the assumption of normal 
distribution is true (Seddighi, 2012: 85). The null hypothesis is that residuals are normally 
distributed. If the p-value is found to be greater than 5 per cent, the null hypothesis which 
residuals are normally distributed cannot be rejected and in case p-value is less than 5 per 
cent the alternative hypothesis will be accepted. It is worth mentioning here that Jargu-
Bera is sensitive to outlier observations as it results in large residuals, therefore the 
rejection of normal distribution might be due to the presence of outliers. Furthermore, the 
Jarque - Bera test suffer from low power when used for small sampling (Thadewald and 
Buning, 2004). Moreover, the normality of the residuals is not a necessary condition for 
validation of most of the VAR model statistical tests (Lütkepohl, 2009). In line with above 
two mentioned statements, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998: 146) claim that the violation of 
the assumption of normality is not serious and the estimated coefficient will remain 
unchanged, however the intercept will pick up the effect. 
Heteroscedasticity refers to the violation of the assumption of constant variance of the 
distribution of the residuals in the regressive model. The existence of heteroscedasticity in 
the repressive model will result in biased or unreliable estimators (Seddighi, 2012: 83). To 
detect heteroscedasticity, the White test (1980) will be used. The null hypothesis is that 
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residuals are homoscedastic, if the p-value is found to be more than 5 per cent, then the 
rule is that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and accordingly the model is said to be 
homoscedastic, which is desirable. 
Finally, to determine whether the VAR model is stable or oscillatory, the characteristic 
equation of the VAR model should be derived. For the smaller model it is easy to derive 
the characteristic equation, however in larger model this need to be derived and solved 
using an econometric package such as EViews. To this end, if the modulus of each 
characteristic root of the model is found to be less than 1, thus the model is said to be 
stable, as it satisfied the stability condition (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998: 420). 
5.4.6 Granger causality test 
As VAR model have various lags of variables and large numbers of coefficients, it is 
difficult to identify which variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable. 
To address this problem, the Granger causality test will be employed. In this test, zero 
restriction will be imposed to all lags of a particular variable. Then, the null hypothesis is 
set to no causality between variables, if the p-value is found to be less than 5 per cent, then 
the null hypothesis will be rejected. That is, there is causality running from that variable to 
another.  For example, if Y can cause X, then we can say Y Granger cause X. Moreover, 
bidirectional Granger causality might exist between two variables, that is, Y causes X and 
X Granger causes Y variable as well (Brooks, 2002: 298). 
5.4.7 Impulse Response Function (IRF) 
The Granger causality test shows the impact of a variable on the future values of other 
variables in the VAR model. However, it neither tells the direction of the impact nor how 
long the effect would be work through the VAR system. To know these effects, the 
impulse response function will be employed. By imposing one unit shock to specific 
indigenous variable, real oil price in this case, the IRF traces out the effect on other 
dependent variables in the model over time. In case the error terms are not correlated with 
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each other; the process is straightforward, but if they are correlated, it is difficult to 
identify shock with specific variable, as error term has a common component that affects 
more than one variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998: 432). In order to single out the 
effect of individual shock, residuals have to be orthogonalised using Cholesky 
decomposition (Enders, 1995: 307). Furthermore, if the time series is stationary, the shock 
fades away gradually after some periods (Brooks, 2002: 299).    
5.4.8 Forecast error variance decomposition analysis 
This analysis is a little bit different, however, to some extent gives similar results to the 
impulse response. The variance decomposition explains the proportion of the movement or 
variation in the dependent variables that attributable to its own shocks and shocks to the 
other variables in the VAR system (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998: 433). As a result of the 
dynamic structure of the VAR model, the shock will be transmitted to all other variables in 
the system. Similar to the impulse response function, ordering of the variables is very 
important. Therefore, it is important to seek economic theories to suggest the order of the 
variables or refer to similar empirical studies. However, if the error terms are uncorrelated, 
ordering has no significant importance (Brooks, 2002: 301).  
5.5 Comparing Delphi results with VAR models  
As mentioned earlier that the convergent parallel mixed methods designed approach is 
used for the purpose of corroboration and validation. Accordingly, the estimated 
coefficients of the five VAR models: budget model, selected macroeconomic variables 
model, current account model, GDP growth and unemployment model, and sectors growth 
rates model will be compared with those findings obtained from the Delphi method. That is 
to say, the results obtained from the estimation of the five VAR models will be compared 
with the experts’ responses to the impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy. 
Following Hamilton (1983), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Mork (1989), Mork et al. (1994), 
Lee et al. (1995) and Chuku (2012), the coefficient sign of the oil price shocks in the VAR 
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model shows the direction of the effect on macroeconomic variables. To this end, oil price 
coefficient with a plus sign refers to positive effect or an increase in the dependent 
variable, while a negative sign reflects a negative effect or a decrease. In case conflicting 
results are reported when comparing the findings obtained from both methods, the 
estimated VAR model will be used to simulate the historical series of the variable in 
question and compare it with the actual time series data. If the simulated variable series are 
found to have a good fit with the actual data, then the VAR model coefficients signs are 
correct. To do so, a historical simulation of the variable data, also called Ex-post 
simulation will be carried out over the period 2000: q1 – 2011: q2. Furthermore, to confirm 
whether the simulated variables were well tracked by the actual values or not, the 
outcomes of the simulation process will be graphically plotted and assessed using 
simulation evaluation techniques, namely Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Theil 
inequality coefficient (U). Furthermore, the Theil inequality coefficient will be 
decomposed into three useful measures, namely bias proportion (Um), variance proportion 
(Us) and covariance proportion (Uc) (Kaplan, 1998). According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998: 383-285), a comparison of simulated time series data for each endogenous variable 
is a useful test for the validation of the model in case the model is developed to apply 
hypothesis tests, while ex-post forecasting is generally performed on forecast models to 
test their forecasting accuracy.  The mathematical forms and the explanation of the 
simulation evaluation techniques are as follows: 
 RMSE measures the deviation of simulated variable from the actual value of the 
time series data. The lower the RMSE values, the better the simulated series. Also, 
the RMSE can be compared to the standard deviation of the data series. The low 
value of the RMSE is only one desirable measure of the simulation fit (Kaplan, 
1998). 
RMSE = √
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑌𝑡
𝑠 −  𝑌𝑡
𝑎)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
     (9).  
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Where 𝑌𝑡
𝑠 is simulated value of Yt, 𝑌𝑡
𝑎 is actual value and T is the number of 
periods. 
 Theil inequality coefficient is another measure to evaluate the goodness of the 
simulation. It values fall between 0 and 1, where 0 values mean perfect fit, while 1 
means poor simulative performance of the model. 
U = 
√1
𝑇
∑ (𝑌𝑡
𝑠− 𝑌𝑡
𝑎)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
√1
𝑇
∑ (𝑌𝑡
𝑠)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
+ √
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑌𝑡
𝑎)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
    (10) 
 The bias proportion (Um) shows the existence of systematic error, as it measures the 
difference between the means of the actual and simulated series. Smaller values of 
bias proportion are a good indicator of simulated series, however the optimal value 
of the Um ranges between 0.0 - 0.2. 
Um = 
(?̅?𝑠 − ?̅?𝑎)2
1
𝑇⁄ ∑(𝑌𝑡
𝑠− 𝑌𝑡
𝑎)2
      (11) 
where ?̅?𝑠 , ?̅?𝑎 are the means of the series 𝑌𝑡𝑠 , 𝑌𝑡𝑎, respectively. 
 
 The variance proportion (Us) shows the ability of the model to capture the 
variability of the variable in question. A large value of Us means that the simulated 
data show considerable volatility, while the actual data show less volatility, or vice 
versa. 
Us = 
(𝜎𝑠 − 𝜎𝑎 )
2 
1
𝑇⁄ ∑(𝑌𝑡
𝑠− 𝑌𝑡
𝑎)2
      (12) 
where 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜎𝑎 are the standard deviations of series 𝑌𝑡
𝑠, 𝑌𝑡
𝑎, respectively. 
 Finally, the covariance proportion (Uc) measures the unsystematic error. In other 
words, it measures the remaining error after considering the systematic error. 
Because the simulation is not expected to be perfectly fit with the actual data, this 
measure is less worrisome compared to the bias and variance proportions. 
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Uc = 
2 (1− 𝜌)𝜎𝑠 − 𝜎𝑎  
1
𝑇⁄ ∑(𝑌𝑡
𝑠− 𝑌𝑡
𝑎)2
      (13) 
where 𝜌 is the correlation coefficient. 
5.6 Summary 
The research methodology was formulated under the philosophical framework of the 
pragmatic paradigm. Accordingly, the Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design, in 
which quantitative and qualitative data were collected concurrently, analysed separately 
and then compared with each other (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). This research used the 
mixed methods for corroboration and validation. The quantitative data was analysed using 
five VAR models. Specification test was performed for each VAR model, checking the 
stationarity of time series through the most common tests (ADF, PP and KPSS) and 
selecting the optimal lag length. Then the VAR model estimated using the OLS method, 
followed by adequacy tests for internal validation. Whereas, the qualitative data was 
collected through a semi-structured questionnaire and was analysed using descriptive 
statistics under the Delphi method. The results of the Delphi method were compared to 
those of the estimated VAR model for corroboration and validation, before using the five 
VAR models for further analysis. After the external validation using the Delphi method 
results and the historical simulation technique, three tests, namely, Granger causality, 
Impulse Response Function and Error Variance Decomposition analysis were conducted to 
investigate the effect of real oil price shocks on the macroeconomy. 
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Chapter six: Empirical findings, analysis and discussion 
Chapter five provided the research framework and the processes that was followed to 
assess the impact of real oil price shocks on Sudan’s macroeconomy. It also discussed the 
data sources and definitions. In this chapter, the impact of oil price shock on the 
macroeconomy was analysed and discussed using five VAR models and Delphi method 
under the framework of the Convergent Parallel Mixed Methods Design. The purpose of 
using mixed method was to corroborate and validate the findings of the VAR model 
outcomes. Each VAR model was estimated using ordinary least squares, then a set of 
adequacy tests of the model were performed, namely, autocorrelation, normality, 
heteroscedasticity and stability. Next, the results obtained from estimation of the VAR 
model were compared with the experts responds to validate the sign of the VAR model 
estimates. After the validation of the estimated VAR model, Granger causality test, the 
Impulse Response Functions and variance decomposition analysis were performed to 
assess the impact of oil price shocks on Sudan’s macroeconomy.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics of the data  
6.1.1 Public budget VAR model variables 
This model analyses the impact of oil price shocks on the public budget variables. The 
model includes the following variables: total government revenues (REV), tax revenues 
(TAX), current expenditure (CUREXP), development expenditure (DEVEXP), the deficit 
(DEFICIT), positive real oil price (PROILP) and negative real oil price (NROILP). Table 9 
shows the descriptive statistics of the VAR model variables over the period 2000: q1 – 
2011: q2. It shows the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and the number of 
the observation. It is apparent that all variables have a low standard deviation, which shows 
that there are no outliers in the times series data. The standard deviation measures the 
dispersion of each set of data from its mean.   
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics for the budget variables 
Statistics PROILP NROILP TAX REV CUREXP DEVEXP DEFICIT 
 Mean  0.080  -0.039  0.013  0.032  0.029  0.006  0.004 
 Maximum  0.4130  0.000  0.017  0.049  0.043  0.011  0.011 
 Minimum  0.000  -0.526  0.010  0.019  0.018  0.003  0.000 
 Std. Dev.  0.090  0.095  0.001  0.007  0.007  0.002  0.002 
 Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46  46 
 
6.1.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model variables 
The selected macroeconomic variables model includes Money supply (M2), inflation rate 
(INF), real exchange rate (RER), Murabaha7 profit margin as a proxy for interest rate 
(MUR), positive real oil price (PROILP) and negative real oil price (NROILP). The 
descriptive statistics of these variables over the period 2000: q1 – 2011: q2 is presented in 
Table 10. The standard deviation of the series is very small, which shows low dispersion. 
That is, there is no extreme outlier in the series. 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables 
Statistics PROILP NROILP M2 INF RER MUR 
 Mean  0.080  -0.039  0.0602  0.098  1.320  0.130 
 Maximum  0.413  0.000  0.1650  0.206  2.416  0.242 
 Minimum  0.000  -0.526  0.0110  0.018  1.015  0.093 
 Std. Dev.  0.090  0.095  0.036  0.043  0.331  0.034 
 Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46 
 
6.1.3 Current account VAR model variables 
This model includes non-oil exports (NOEX), imports (IMP), trade balance (TB), current 
account balance (CAB), positive real oil price (PROILP) and negative real oil price 
(NROILP). The descriptive statistics of these variables over the period 2000: q1 – 2011: q2 
are presented in Table 11. The standard deviation of the series is so small, ranges from 
                                                          
7 Murabaha profit margin rate is a cost of finance used by Islamic financial institutions 
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0.002 to 0.0959, which presents low dispersion among series. That is, there is no extreme 
outlier in the series. 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics of the current account variables 
 PROILP NROILP NOEX IMP TB CAB 
 Mean  0.080  -0.039  0.006  0.039  0.001 -0.014 
 Maximum  0.413  0.000  0.011  0.072  0.033  0.022 
 Minimum  0.000  -0.526  0.002  0.024 -0.027 -0.045 
 Std. Dev.  0.090  0.095  0.002  0.009  0.012  0.013729 
 Observations  46  46  46  46  46  46 
 
6.1.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
This model includes the growth rate of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (RGDPG), 
unemployment rate (UNEM), positive real oil price (PROILP) and negative real oil price 
(NROILP). The descriptive statistics of these variables over the period 2000– 2011 is 
presented in Table 12. The standard deviation of the series was small, ranging from 0.022 
to 0.160, which presents low dispersion among the series.  The increase in the standard 
deviation for both oil price series was attributed to the unexpected increase and decrease in 
2008 and 2009. 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics of the GDP growth and unemployment rates 
 PROILP NROILP RGDPG UNEM 
 Mean 0.209167 -0.046667  0.072833  0.155083 
Median 0.209000 0.000000 0.079500 0.155083 
 Maximum 0.550000 0.000000  0.102000  0.175000 
 Minimum 0.000000 -0.330000  0.019000  0.120000 
 Std. Dev.  0.160763  0.111056  0.023335  0.015078 
 Observations 12 12 12 12 
 
6.1.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model variables 
This model includes agricultural sector growth rate (AGRICULTURE), industrial sector 
growth rate (INDUSTRY), services sector growth rate (SERVICES), positive real oil price 
(PROILP) and negative real oil price (NROILP). The descriptive statistics of these 
variables over the period 2000– 2011 is presented in Table 13. The standard deviation of 
the series was small, ranging from 0.034 to 0.160, which presented low dispersion among 
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series.  The increase in the standard deviation for both oil price series was attributed to the 
unexpected increase and decrease in 2008 and 2009. An outlier value was found in the 
agricultural sector growth and had been amended. The outlier was truncated and recorded 
to the lowest reasonable value (Osborne and Amy, 2004). 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics of the sectors’ growth rates  
 PROILP NROILP AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES 
 Mean  0.209  -0.046  0.052  0.152  0.055 
 Median  0.215  0.000  0.070  0.120  0.070 
 Maximum  0.550  0.000  0.080  0.470  0.210 
 Minimum  0.000  -0.330 0.030  0.000 -0.250 
 Std. Dev.  0.160  0.111  0.034  0.132  0.109 
 Observations 12  12 12 12  12 
 
6.2 Unit root and stationary tests 
Since macroeconomic time series data is characterized by non-stationarity, unit test is 
employed using Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) and 
cross-checked by Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin (1992). The former two tests 
based on the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, while the latter based on the hypothesis of 
stationary. Using of the stationarity and unit root tests together is known as “confirmatory 
data analysis” (Brooks, 2002: 379-381).  If the probability value (p) is found to be less than 
5 per cent or the t statistics is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis would be 
rejected; otherwise the alternative hypothesis will be accepted. Instead of testing the three 
equations for stationarity (with constant, constant and trend and no constant and no trend), 
the time series data was graphically plotted. Then, the right equations that would be tested 
were visually selected (see Appendix 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15). However, when there was 
uncertainty between two equations, the test was run for more than one equation.  
6.2.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
Table 14 shows the results of the three stationary tests. As can be seen from Table 10, the 
total revenues, development expenditure, current expenditure and budget deficit exhibit 
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non-stationary at level, while becoming stationary after taking the first difference.  
Negative and positive real oil prices and tax revenues variables are stationary at level.  
Table 14. Budget VAR model: Unit and stationary test results 
Variables ADF PP KPSS 
 Level 1st. differ. Level 1st. differ. Level 1st. differ. 
PROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.3512* - 
NROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.0582* - 
TAX 0.2513 - 0.0268* - 0.5306* - 
REV 0.2349 0.5382 0.1120 0.0000* 0.5266* 0.3048* 
DEVEXP 0.3380 0.1906 0.0203* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.2936* 
CUREXP 0.1881 0.0000* 0.1916 0.0000* 0.12998* 0.5000* 
DEFICIT 0.1469 0.0000* 0.1496 0.0000* 0.0689* 0.6002* 
       *indicate significance at 5%. 
6.2.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
Table 15 shows the result of stationary and unit root tests. It is clear that PROILP, 
NROILP, M2, INF and MUR are stationary at level, while RER is stationary at first 
difference. That is, the latter variable is not stationary at level and becomes stationary after 
taking the first difference. 
Table 15. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model: stationary tests 
Variables ADF PP KPSS 
 Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
PROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.3512* - 
NROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.0582* - 
M2 0.0001* - 0.0001* -  0.2909*  - 
INF 0.0219 -  0.0243 -  0.7984 - 
RER 1.0000 0.0000* 0.9929 0.0000*  0.1744* 0.156992* 
MUR 0.0212* - 0.0243* - 0.1780* - 
       *indicate significance at 5%. 
6.2.3 Current account VAR model 
Table 16 shows the results of the ADF, PP and KPSS tests. Current account balance, 
imports, non-oil exports and trade balance variables exhibit non-stationary at level, while 
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becoming stationary after taking the first difference.  Negative and positive real oil price 
variables are stationary at level.  
Table 16. Current account VAR model: results of the unit and stationary tests 
Variables ADF PP KPSS 
 Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
PROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.3512* - 
NROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.0582* - 
CAB 0.1127 0.0000* 0.1318  0.0000* 0.2448* 0.2443* 
IMP 0.2003 0.0000* 0.0046* 0.0000* 0.2435* 0.1448* 
NOEX 0.0920 0.0000* 0.0920 0.0000* 0.4693* 0.2685* 
TB 0.1437 0.0000* 0.1181 0.0000* 0.2892 0.2924* 
       *indicate significance at 5%. 
6.2.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
Table 17 shows the result of the stationary and unit root tests. It is apparent that negative 
real oil price (NROILP) and positive real oil price (PROILP) rejected the null hypothesis 
of non-stationary using ADF and PP tests and failed to reject the stationary null hypothesis 
of the KPSS test. Accordingly, NROILP and PROILP are stationary at level. However, 
Real GDP growth (RGDPG) failed to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary using 
ADF and PP tests and also failed to reject the stationary null hypothesis of the KPSS test. 
Therefore, real GDP growth is said to be non-stationary at level. But it became stationary 
after taking the first difference. Finally, the unemployment rate (UEM) exhibited non-
stationary at level using ADF and PP, but became stationary after taking the second 
difference. As the sample period was short and the number of observations was relatively 
small, all variable was used at level in the VAR model. Some scholars claim that using 
differencing technique to make the variables stationary should be avoided, as it results in 
losing of some information, which is of benefit for the long run relationship between time 
series variables (Sims, 1980; Hamilton, 1994; Enders, 1995: 301; Halcoussis, 2005; 
Brooks, 2008). It is worth mentioning that the small size of the sample or fewer number of 
the observation was not an issue as long as the model can be validated (Harrel, 2011: 66). 
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Table 17. GDP and unemployment VAR model: unit and stationary test results 
Variables ADF PP KPSS 
 Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
PROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.3512* - 
NROILP 0.0000* - 0.0000* - 0.0582* - 
RGDPG 0.5202 0.0000* 0.4557  0.0000* 0.2006 0.1013* 
UEM** 0.2869 0.4079 0.7423 0.4079 0.1822 0.2918 
    *indicate significance at 5% 
    **became stationary after taking the second difference 
6.5.2 Sector growth rates VAR model 
Table 18 shows the result of stationary and unit root tests. It is clear that negative real oil 
price (NROILP) and positive real oil price (PROILP) rejected the null hypothesis of none 
stationary using ADF and PP tests and failed to reject the stationary null hypothesis of the 
KPSS test. Accordingly, NROILP and PROILP were stationary at level. Likewise, 
agricultural sector growth and the industrial sector growth rejected the null hypothesis of 
non-stationary at level using ADF and PP, and failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
stationary using KPSS. For the services sector growth, it failed to reject the non-stationary 
null hypothesis of the ADF, but rejected the null hypothesis of the PP and failed to reject 
the stationary hypothesis of the KPSS. Accordingly, agricultural sector growth, industrial 
sector growth and services sector growth were stationary at level.  
Table 18. Sector growth VAR model: unit and stationary tests results 
Variables ADF PP KPSS 
 Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
Level 1st. 
difference 
PROILP 0.0018* - 0.0015* - 0.5000* - 
NROILP 0.0209* - 0.0180* - 0.1989* - 
Agriculture 0.0180* - 0.0021* - 0.5000* - 
Industry 0.0281* - 0.0009* - 0.5000* - 
Services 0.1792 - 0.0128* - 0.5000* - 
   *indicate significance at 5% 
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6.3 Lag length selection criteria 
 
The next step before estimating the VAR model is to select the appropriate lag length that 
captures the relationships among the variables. By knowing the integrated order of the 
model, it will be easy to run the VAR model and conduct the required tests. Similar to the 
stationary test, the research uses three tests to identify the optimal lag length, namely 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) and 
Hannan-Quinn information Criterion (HQIC). According to these information criteria, lag 
that corresponds to the highest absolute value of the criterion will be selected. Generally, 
whenever there are conflicting results, researchers opt for the lag chosen by the majority.  
6.3.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
Table 19 displays the different criteria for selecting the optimal lag length of the VAR 
model. As it can be seen from the table, the majority of the criteria selects lag one. 
Table 19. Public budget VAR model: lag length selection criteria 
    
    
Lag AIC SC HQ 
    
    0 -55.20540  -54.91579* -54.49472  
1  -55.34395* -53.02706 -55.09925* 
2 -54.50001 -50.15583 -52.90769 
3 -54.33437 -47.96292 -51.99898 
    
                        *indicate significance at 5%. 
6.3.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
As can be seen from Table 20, the results suggest that the VAR model is integrated of 
order one, I (1).  
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Table 20. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model: lag length selection criteria 
 Lag AIC SC HQ 
    
0 -17.66458  -17.41382* -17.57327 
1  -18.71114* -16.95577  -18.07193* 
2 -18.51154 -15.25158 -17.32444 
3 -18.30273 -13.53816 -16.56774 
4 -18.57386 -12.30469 -16.29097 
* indicate significance at 5% 
6.3.3 current account VAR model 
Table 21 presents the different criteria for selecting the optimal lag length of the current 
account VAR model. As it can be seen from table 29, the majority of the criteria selected 
lag one. 
Table 21. Current account VAR model: lag length selection criteria 
        
 Lag AIC SC HQ 
        
0 -35.61994  -35.36918* -35.16375  
1  -35.80296* -34.04759 -35.52863* 
2 -34.74184 -31.48187 -33.55474 
3 -34.55394 -29.78938 -32.81895 
4 -34.36014 -28.09097 -32.07725 
        
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
    
 
6.3.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
Due to the short period of the time series data with regard to the real GDP growth rate and 
the unemployment rate, which both are available on an annual basis, the standard lag 
length is one (Brooks, 2008). That is, the VAR model is of order one. 
6.3.5 Sectors growth VAR model 
Due to the short period of the time series data with regard to the agricultural sector growth 
rate, industrial sector growth rate and services sector growth rate, which were available on 
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an annual basis, the recommended lag length was one (Hamilton, 1994, Brooks, 2008). 
That is, the VAR model was of order one. 
6.4 Models estimation 
This section discusses the outcomes of the five estimated VAR models using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). Following Hamilton (1983), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Mork 
(1989), Mork et al. (1994), Lee et al. (1995), Chuku (2012), and Gunu and Kilishi (2010), 
the sign of the VAR model coefficients was used to explain the direction and the effect of 
the explanatory variables on the dependant variables over the period 200: q1 – 2011: q2. 
That is, negative sign of the coefficient shows negative relationship, while the positive sign 
means positive link. According to Chuku et. al. (2011) the sign of the coefficients gives a 
baseline intuition of the basic relationship among the variables. 
6.4.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
Table 22 presents the estimates of the budget VAR model using an ordinary least squares 
method. Each column constitutes an equation in the VAR model. The entire system of 
equations is provided in Appendix 4.   As can be seen from Table 22, positive real oil price 
has a positive relationship with the entire set of the public budget variables. The negative 
real oil price shock showed a negative relationship with all budget variables.  
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Table 22. Public budget VAR model estimated coefficients 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
        
 PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
PROILP(-1)  0.1562 -0.1803  0.0005  0.0065  0.0029  0.0023 -0.0030 
  (0.1542)  (0.1864)  (0.0034)  (0.006)  (0.0045)  (0.0028)  (0.0045) 
 [ 1.0134] [-0.9670] [ 0.1649] [ 1.0592] [ 0.6510] [ 0.8274] [-0.6728] 
        
NROILP(-1) -0.0636  0.2476 -0.0046 -0.0303 -0.0214 -0.0020  0.0073 
  (0.1439)  (0.1739)  (0.0032)  (0.0058)  (0.0042)  (0.0026)  (0.0042) 
 [-0.4423] [ 1.4234] [-1.4211] [-5.2386] [-5.1020] [-0.7773] [ 1.7545] 
        
TAX(-1)  3.8223 -1.9011  0.6719 -0.8131 -0.4062 -0.1886 -0.1682 
  (5.8522)  (7.0761)  (0.1323)  (0.2358)  (0.1708)  (0.1087)  (0.1714) 
 [ 0.6531] [-0.2686] [ 5.0771] [-3.4480] [-2.3778] [-1.7351] [-0.9811] 
        
D(REV(-1)) -4.7548  4.0790  0.0550  0.0069  0.0323  0.0304  0.1219 
  (5.8183)  (7.0351)  (0.1315)  (0.2344)  (0.1698)  (0.1080)  (0.1704) 
 [-0.8172] [ 0.5798] [ 0.4183] [ 0.0298] [ 0.1906] [ 0.2815] [ 0.7155] 
        
D(CUREXP(-1)) -10.5112  4.9786 -0.0373 -0.2643 -0.1682 -0.0012  0.0865 
  (7.9969)  (9.6693)  (0.1808)  (0.3222)  (0.2334)  (0.1485)  (0.2343) 
 [-1.3144] [ 0.5148] [-0.2066] [-0.8202] [-0.7208] [-0.0082] [ 0.3693] 
        
D(DEVEXP(-1)) -0.6792 -8.3855 -0.1187 -0.5607 -0.0351 -0.3021  0.0960 
 
 (11.4104
)  (13.796)  (0.2580)  (0.4597)  (0.3330)  (0.2119)  (0.3343) 
 [-0.0595] [-0.6077] [-0.4601] [-1.2194] [-0.1054] [-1.4253] [ 0.2872] 
        
D(DEFICIT(-1))  3.0524 -2.7645 -0.0043  0.3146  0.1376  0.0295 -0.1087 
  (6.9404)  (8.3919)  (0.1569)  (0.2796)  (0.2026)  (0.1289)  (0.2033) 
 [ 0.4398] [-0.3294] [-0.0278] [ 1.1249] [ 0.6793] [ 0.2292] [-0.5346] 
        
C  0.0196  0.0698  0.0049  0.0125  0.0068  0.0026  0.0024 
  (0.0850)  (0.1028)  (0.0019)  (0.0034)  (0.0024)  (0.0015)  (0.0024) 
 [ 0.2311] [ 0.6792] [ 2.5753] [ 3.6475] [ 2.7410] [ 1.6466] [ 0.9846] 
        
        
 R-squared 0.3286 0.1425  0.4906  0.6136  0.5245  0.5108  0.6155 
S.E equation 0.0818 0.0990 0.0018 0.0033 0.0023 0.0015 0.0023 
 
6.4.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
Table 23 presents the estimated selected macroeconomic variables VAR model using the 
ordinary least square method. Each column constitutes an equation in the VAR model. The 
151 
 
entire system of equations is provided in Appendix 7. As can be seen from Table 23, 
positive real oil price had a positive relationship with money supply, inflation rate and 
Murabaha profit margin rate, while it had a negative relationship with the real exchange 
rate. The negative relationship between positive real oil price and the real exchange rate 
means that when oil price increase exchange rate appreciates as it becomes stronger due to 
an increase of foreign exchange reserve at the central bank of Sudan. On the other hand, 
negative real oil price shock showed a negative relationship with inflation and Murabaha 
profit margin rate, while exhibit a positive relationship with real exchange rate and money 
supply. 
Table 23. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model estimated coefficients 
   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
              
 PROILP NROILP M2 INF D(RER) MUR 
              
PROILP(-1) -0.0218 -0.0762  0.0262  0.0844 -0.1280  0.0023 
  (0.1747)  (0.1740)  (0.0659)  (0.0669)  (0.2192)  (0.0178) 
 [-0.1247] [-0.4383] [ 0.3983] [ 1.2618] [-0.5840] [ 0.1311] 
       
NROILP(-1) -0.0468  0.1953  0.0602 -0.0295  0.1980  -0.0046 
  (0.1714)  (0.1707)  (0.0646)  (0.0656)  (0.2150)  (0.0174) 
 [-0.2735] [ 1.1439] [ 0.9314] [-0.4502] [ 0.9209] [ -0.2683] 
       
M2(-1) -0.3583  0.2640  0.2919 -0.0072  0.2465 -0.0298 
  (0.4427)  (0.4408)  (0.1670)  (0.1695)  (0.5553)  (0.0451) 
 [-0.8094] [ 0.5989] [ 1.7477] [-0.0428] [ 0.4439] [-0.6609] 
       
INF(-1) -0.3354  1.0545 -0.1684  0.4729  0.4425  0.0009 
  (0.4049)  (0.4033)  (0.1528)  (0.1550)  (0.5080)  (0.0412) 
 [-0.8283] [ 2.6149] [-1.1026] [ 3.0498] [ 0.8712] [ 0.0223] 
       
D(RER(-1))  0.1691 -0.1283 -0.0638  0.0286 -0.3031 -0.0068 
  (0.1394)  (0.1388)  (0.0526)  (0.0534)  (0.1749)  (0.0142) 
 [ 1.2124] [-0.9238] [-1.2137] [ 0.5367] [-1.73279] [-0.4846] 
       
MUR(-1) -0.6975  0.7884  0.0582 -0.2897 -0.4673  0.8663 
  (0.5358)  (0.5336)  (0.2021)  (0.2051)  (0.6722)  (0.0546) 
 [-1.3017] [ 1.4774] [ 0.2883] [-1.4121] [-0.6952] [ 15.868] 
       
C  0.2228 -0.1777  0.0495  0.0843  0.0422  0.0161 
  (0.1062)  (0.1058)  (0.0400)  (0.0406)  (0.1332)  (0.0108) 
 [ 2.0976] [-1.6795] [ 1.2362] [ 2.0731] [ 0.3171] [ 1.4918] 
              
 R-squared  0.0897  0.2114  0.5078  0.4252  0.5205  0.8961 
S.E equation 0.0941 0.0937 0.0355 0.0360 0.1180 0.0096 
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6.4.3 current account VAR model 
Table 24 presents the current account VAR model estimates using ordinary least square 
method. Each column constitutes an equation in the VAR model. The entire system of the 
equations is provided in Appendix 10.  As can be seen from Table 24, positive real oil 
price had a negative relationship with non-oil exports, trade balance and current account 
balance, while it had a positive relationship with imports. The negative relationship 
between positive real oil price and trade balance and current account balance means that 
when oil price increase these two variables improve as the gap in the two accounts narrows 
down. On the flip side, decrease in real oil price showed a positive relationship with all 
variables in the model except imports. That is, negative real oil price shock increases gap 
in the trade balance and the current account balance, while enhancing non-oil exports. 
Table 24. Current account VAR model estimates 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       
 PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB) 
              
PROILP(-1) -0.1105  0.0225 -0.0003  0.0266 -0.0279 -0.0383 
  (0.1683)  (0.1983)  (0.0031)  (0.0159)  (0.0193)  (0.0220) 
 [-0.6563] [ 0.1136] [-0.1286] [ 1.6701] [-1.4443] [-1.7379] 
       
NROILP(-1)  0.2354 -0.0752  0.0062 -0.0220  0.0193  0.0485 
  (0.1739)  (0.2049)  (0.0032)  (0.0164)  (0.0200)  (0.0227) 
 [ 1.3534] [-0.3671] [ 1.9546] [-1.3377] [ 0.9673] [ 2.1309] 
       
D(NOEX(-1))  9.6561 -7.5508 -0.2425 -0.7916  0.5311 -0.1864 
  (8.3811)  (9.8722)  (0.1542)  (0.7937)  (0.9649)  (1.0979) 
 [ 1.1521] [-0.7648] [-1.5717] [-0.9972] [ 0.5504] [-0.1698] 
       
D(IMP(-1))  0.9146 -3.7079  0.0312 -0.8414  0.6450  0.8538 
  (2.1199)  (2.4970)  (0.0390)  (0.2007)  (0.2440)  (0.2777) 
 [ 0.4314] [-1.4849] [ 0.8017] [-4.1907] [ 2.6430] [ 3.0745] 
       
D(TB(-1)) -1.7315 -5.0545  0.0690  0.0710 -0.1399  0.0385 
  (3.2084)  (3.7792)  (0.0590)  (0.3038)  (0.3693)  (0.4203) 
 [-0.5397] [-1.3374] [ 1.1691] [ 0.2337] [-0.3789] [ 0.0918] 
       
D(CAB(-1))  6.3290 -0.6422 -0.0128 -0.4307  0.6648  0.6389 
  (2.2973)  (2.7060)  (0.0422)  (0.2175)  (0.2644)  (0.3009) 
 [ 2.7549] [-0.2373] [-0.3044] [-1.9796] [ 2.5137] [ 2.1230] 
       
C  0.0770  0.0436 -0.0003 -0.0009  0.0015  0.0012 
  (0.0190)  (0.0224)  (0.0003)  (0.0018)  (0.0021)  (0.0025) 
 [ 4.0426] [ 1.9435] [-1.0355] [-0.5086] [ 0.6923] [ 0.5028] 
       
       
 R-squared  0.3092  0.1626  0.5465  0.4770  0.6595  0.7031 
S.E equation 0.0819 0.0965 0.0015 0.0078 .0094 0.0107 
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6.4.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
Table 25 presents the GDP and employment VAR model estimates using Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method. Each column constitutes an equation in the VAR model. The entire 
system of equations provided in Appendix 13.  As can be seen from Table 25, positive real 
oil price had a positive relationship with the real GDP growth, but negatively related to the 
unemployment rate. The negative relationship between positive real oil price and 
unemployment rate means more jobs will be created during the oil price boom. Looking at 
the negative real oil price shock, it negatively related to the growth rate of the GDP and 
unemployment rate as well. That is, negative real oil price shock shrank GDP growth rate 
and reduced unemployment rate. 
Table 25. GDP and unemployment VAR model estimates 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]  
     
      PROILP NROILP RGDPG UNEM 
     
     PROILP(-1) -0.4838  0.5643  0.0914 -0.0665 
  (0.2926)  (0.2441)  (0.0387)  (0.0703) 
 [-1.6533] [ 2.3118] [ 2.3626] [-0.9462] 
     
NROILP(-1) -0.4325  0.1916  -0.0240 -0.0272 
  (0.4207)  (0.3510)  (0.0556)  (0.1011) 
 [-1.0279] [ 0.5460] [ -0.4322] [-0.2692] 
     
RGDPG(-1) -1.2119  1.2044  0.2401  0.4142 
  (1.9208)  (1.6025)  (0.2540)  (0.4617) 
 [-0.6309] [ 0.7516] [ 0.9453] [ 0.89716] 
     
UNEM(-1)  1.6024  1.1039 -0.4381  0.5425 
  (1.5102)  (1.2600)  (0.1997)  (0.3630) 
 [ 1.0610] [ 0.8761] [-2.1938] [ 1.4943] 
     
C  0.1170 -0.3447  0.1063  0.0642 
  (0.3443)  (0.2872)  (0.0455)  (0.0827) 
 [ 0.3399] [-1.2000] [ 2.3356] [ 0.7761] 
     
      R-squared  0.4332  0.5336  0.7119  0.3847 
 S.E. equation  0.1219  0.1017  0.0161  0.0293 
6.4.4 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
Table 26 presents the sectors growth VAR model estimates using ordinary least square 
method. Each column constitutes an equation in the VAR model. The entire system of 
equations is provided in Appendix 16.  As can be seen from Table 26, positive real oil 
price had a positive relationship with the agricultural sector growth rate and growth rate of 
154 
 
the service sector, while it had a negative relationship with the industrial sector growth 
rate. The positive relationship between positive real oil price and agricultural and services 
growth means that when real oil price increased these two sectors witnessed a boom. On 
the flip side, negative real oil price shock had shown a positive relationship with the 
growth rate in agricultural and negative impact on both the industrial and the service sector 
growth rates. That is, negative real oil price shock increased the rate of growth in the 
agricultural sector, while retarding growth in the industrial and the services sectors. 
Table 26. Sectors growth VAR model estimated coefficients 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
       PROILP NROILP AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES 
      
      PROILP(-1) -0.0704  0.5544  0.1369 -0.2187  0.2021 
  (0.5038)  (0.4423)  (0.0663)  (0.3892)  (0.2273) 
 [-0.1398] [ 1.2534] [ 2.0648] [-0.5619] [ 0.8893] 
NROILP(-1) -0.0929  0.2453  0.1540 -0.5321 -0.6553 
  (0.5119)  (0.4494)  (0.0673)  (0.3955)  (0.2309) 
 [-0.1814] [ 0.5457] [ 2.2863] [-1.3453] [-2.8372] 
AGRICULTURE(-1) -3.7089  0.8935 -0.9427  1.5174 -2.6076 
  (2.6945)  (2.3656)  (0.3546)  (2.0817)  (1.2157) 
 [-1.3764] [ 0.3777] [-2.6581] [ 0.7289] [-2.14492] 
INDUSTRY(-1) -0.1768 -0.0960 -0.1183  0.1532 -0.2693 
  (0.4891)  (0.4294)  (0.0643)  (0.3779)  (0.2207) 
 [-0.3615] [-0.2236] [-1.8385] [ 0.4055] [-1.2205] 
SERVICES(-1) -0.4050  0.3298  0.1229  0.3491 -0.3006 
  (0.4115)  (0.3613)  (0.0541)  (0.3179)  (0.1856) 
 [-0.9841] [ 0.9129] [ 2.2700] [ 1.0980] [-1.6192] 
C  0.4675 -0.1243  0.0922  0.0626  0.2670 
  (0.1521)  (0.1335)  (0.0200)  (0.1175)  (0.0686) 
 [ 3.0740] [-0.9307] [ 4.6064] [ 0.5330] [ 3.8913] 
      
       R-squared  0.5188  0.5616  0.7170  0.4499  0.8812 
 S.E. equation  0.1231  0.1081  0.0162  0.0951  0.0555 
6.5 Diagnostic tests 
For testing the adequacy of the VAR model, four tests were carried out, namely serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity, stability and normality tests.  
6.5.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
As can be seen from Table 27, the outcomes of the tests were that no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity, VAR satisfies the stability condition (detailed information provided in 
Appendix 5). However, the VAR model failed to pass the normality test using the Jarque-
Bera test. Generally speaking, the Jarque - Bera test suffers from low power when used for 
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small samples (Thadewald and Buning, 2004). Moreover, normality is not a necessary 
condition for validating most of the VAR model statistical tests (Lütkepohl, 2009). This 
statement is further emphasised by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998: 146). They also claim 
that the violation of the assumption of normality is not serious and the estimated 
coefficient will remain unchanged, however the intercept will pick up the effect. 
Table 27. Summary of the public budget VAR model adequacy tests 
Type of test Null Hypothesis p-value Decision 
Autocorrelation 
(Portmanteau test) 
No residual autocorrelations up to 
lag h 
Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Normality 
(Jarque-Bera test) 
Residuals are multivariate normal  Less than 
5% 
Null hypothesis rejected 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Whit test) 
VAR residuals are homoscedasticity Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Stability 
(Roots of characteristic 
polynomial) 
No root lies outside the unit circle N.A* Null hypothesis 
accepted 
*Not applicable 
6.5.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
As can be seen form table 28, the outcome is that no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity, VAR satisfies the stability condition (detailed information provided in 
Appendix 8). However, the VAR model fails to pass the normality test using the Jarque-
Bera test. As mentioned earlier, Jarque-Bera test suffers from low power when used for 
small sampling (Thadewald and Buning, 2004). Moreover, normality is not a necessary 
condition for validating most of the VAR model statistical tests (Lütkepohl, 2009). This 
statement is further emphasised by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998: 146). They further claim 
that the violation of the assumption of normality is not a serious and the estimated 
coefficient will remain unchanged, however the intercept will pick up the effect. 
Table 28. Summary of the selected macroeconomic variables  VAR model adequacy tests 
Type of test Null Hypothesis p-value Decision 
Autocorrelation 
(Portmanteau test) 
No residual autocorrelations up to 
lag h 
Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Normality 
(Jarque-Bera test) 
Residuals are multivariate normal  Less than 
5% 
Null hypothesis rejected 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Whit test) 
VAR residuals are homoscedasticity Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Stability 
(Roots of characteristic 
polynomial) 
No root lies outside the unit circle N.A* Null hypothesis 
accepted 
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6.5.3 Current account VAR model 
As can be seen from Table 29, the outcome was that no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity, VAR satisfies the stability condition (detailed information provided in 
Appendix 11). However, the VAR model failed to pass the normality test using the Jarque-
Bera test. But this is not a serious problem as Jarque-Bera test suffers from low power 
when used for the small sample (Thadewald and Buning, 2004). Also, normality is not a 
necessary condition for validating most of the VAR model statistical tests (Lütkepohl, 
2009). This statement is further emphasised by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998: 146). They 
also claim that the violation of the assumption of normality is not a serious problem and 
the estimated coefficient will remain unchanged, however the intercept will pick up the 
effect. 
Table 29. Summary of the current account VAR model adequacy tests 
Type of test Null Hypothesis p-value Decision 
Autocorrelation 
(Portmanteau test) 
No residual autocorrelations up to 
lag h 
Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Normality 
(Jarque-Bera test) 
Residuals are multivariate normal  Less than 
5% 
Null hypothesis rejected 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Whit test) 
VAR residuals are homoscedasticity Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Stability 
(Roots of characteristic 
polynomial) 
No root lies outside the unit circle N.A* Null hypothesis 
accepted 
*not applicable 
6.5.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
As can be seen from Table 30, the outcome was that no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity, VAR satisfied the stability condition and the VAR model passed the 
normality test using the Jarque-Bera test (detailed information provided in Appendix 14).  
Table 30. Summary of the GDP growth VAR model adequacy tests 
Type of test Null Hypothesis p-value Decision 
Autocorrelation 
(Portmanteau test) 
No residual autocorrelations up to 
lag h 
Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Normality 
(Jarque-Bera test) 
Residuals are multivariate normal  Less than 
5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Whit test) 
VAR residuals are homoscedasticity Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Stability 
(Roots of characteristic 
polynomial) 
No root lies outside the unit circle N.A* Null hypothesis 
accepted 
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6.5.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
 As can be seen from Table 31, the outcome was that no serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity, VAR satisfied the stability condition and the VAR model passed the 
normality test using the Jarque-Bera test (detailed information provided in Appendix 17).  
Table 31. Summary of the sectors growth VAR model adequacy tests 
Type of test Null Hypothesis p-value Decision 
Autocorrelation 
(Portmanteau test) 
No residual autocorrelations up to 
lag h 
Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Normality 
(Jarque-Bera test) 
Residuals are multivariate normal  Less than 
5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Heteroscedasticity 
(Whit test) 
VAR residuals are homoscedasticity Greater 
than 5% 
Null hypothesis 
accepted 
Stability 
(Roots of characteristic 
polynomial) 
No root lies outside the unit circle N.A. Null hypothesis 
accepted 
 
6.6 Delphi method analysis 
6.6.1 Impact on Public budget variables 
Figure 19 displays the response of the panel of experts on some items of the public budget. 
More than 60 per cent of the experts reported that increase in oil prices had a positive 
impact on revenue, development expenditure, current expenditure, tax revenues and budget 
deficit. The positive impact on revenue, current expenditure and development spending 
was consistent with the findings obtained by Eltoni and Al-Awadi (2001) and Lorde et al. 
(2009) in Kuwait and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. Less than 13 per cent, agreed 
upon the negative impact on development expenditure, current expenditure, tax revenue 
and budget deficit. Approximately 7 per cent of the experts reported that impact on tax 
revenue and current expenditure was neutral.  
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Figure 19. Experts' response: impact of positive real oil price on public budget 
 
 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the impact of the decrease (negative) in oil prices on the budget items. 
More than 67 per cent of the experts suggested that the decrease in oil prices negatively 
impacted the five variables. However, 27 per cent of the experts claimed that decrease in 
oil prices positively affected tax revenue while less the 27 per cent opted for positive 
impact on development expenditure, current expenditure, and budget deficit. Moreover, 7 
per cent of the experts reported neutral effect on the current expenditure and tax revenue as 
a result of a decrease in oil prices. Similar findings of negative impact on government 
expenditure was reported in Nigeria by Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011). 
Figure 20 Experts’ response: impact of negative real oil price on public budget 
 
 
6.6.2 Impact on selected macroeconomic variables 
As can be seen from Figure 21 below, 60 per cent to 80 per cent of the experts claimed 
positive relationship between the increase in real oil prices and money supply, inflation 
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rate, in addition to exchange rate appreciation. Similar results were reported by Al-mulali 
and Che Normee (2010), Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) and Aliyu (2009) in Qatar, 
Iran and Nigeria, respectively. A few experts explained that the surge in oil prices had a 
negative impact on the above mentioned four macroeconomic variables. Murabaha profit 
margin rate was reported as neutrally affected by the increase in oil prices, respectively 
 
Figure 21. Experts’ response: impact of positive real oil price on selected macroeconomic variables 
 
 
On the other hand, more than 60 per cent of the experts reported that the decrease in oil 
prices had a positive impact on inflation and money supply (Figure 22). This corroborated 
with findings by Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009). Real exchange rates were found to be 
negatively affected by decrease in oil prices. The negative impact on unemployment rate 
was confirmed in Algeria by Bochaour et al. (2012). The negative impact of the decrease 
in oil prices on real exchange was found in similar studies in Nigeria (Iwayemi and 
Fowowe, 2011) and Iran (Farzangean and Markwardt, 2009) 
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Figure 22. Experts’ response: impact of negative real oil price on selected macroeconomic variables 
 
 
 
6.6.3 Impact on the Current Account variables  
It is clear from Figure 23 that the majority of the experts supported the positive effects of 
increase in oil prices on real exchange rate, import, trade balance and current account 
balance. An interesting result is that 60 per cent of the experts reported that increase in oil 
prices negatively impacted none-oil exports. This result was explained by the shift of 
resources from the tradable to non-tradable sector. This result showed some signs of Dutch 
disease during the oil sector boom. Positive effect on import and export was found in 
Trinidad & Tobago (Lorde et al., 2009). 
Figure 23. Experts' response: impact of positive real oil price on current account variables 
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On the flip side, a consensus was reached among experts that the decrease in oil prices had 
a negative impact on imports, trade balance and current account balance (Figure 24). This 
result reflected that Sudan was heavily dependent on oil export proceeds as the main 
source of foreign exchange. Almost 60 per cent of the experts reported that the decrease in 
oil prices positively impacted non-oil exports. This could be explained as a sign of the 
restoration of the tradable sectors to their vital role in the economy, especially agricultural 
sector. The negative impact of the decrease in oil prices on import was reported in similar 
studies conducted in Nigeria (Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2011) and Iran (Farzangan and 
Markwardt, 2009). 
 
Figure 24. Experts' response: impact of negative real oil price on current account variables 
 
 
 
6.6.4 Impact on GDP growth and unemployment rates 
Figure 25 shows that 93 per cent of the panel of experts agreed on the positive impact of 
increase in real oil prices on GDP growth and 60 per cent confirmed the positive effect on 
the unemployment rate. They explained that oil windfalls during oil price hikes made 
available huge foreign exchange resources. This helped create a boom in other sectors such 
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as trade, transport and other services, which in turn led to an increase in the value added in 
the economy. On the other hand, figure 26 shows that 86 per cent and 67 per cent of the 
experts supported the negative effects of real oil price decrease on GDP growth and 
unemployment rate, respectively. 
Figure 25. Experts' response: impact of positive real oil price on GDP growth and unemployment rates 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Experts' response: impact of negative real oil price on GDP growth and unemployment 
rates 
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6.6.5 Impact on sectors growth rates 
Figure 27 reveals that more than 60 per cent of the experts reported a negative impact of 
the increase in real oil prices on agricultural and industrial sectors. This result was 
attributed to the effect of the appreciation of the exchange rate. However, they all agreed 
that the increase in real oil prices led to a boom in the services sector. Less than 40 per cent 
of the experts suggested that the surge in real oil prices positively affected the agricultural 
and industrial sectors. They claimed that the rise in real oil prices made huge foreign 
resources available for the government to invest in the latter two sectors.  
Figure 27. Experts' response: impact of positive real oil price on sectors growth rates 
 
 
 
Figure 28 shows that almost more than 60 per cent of the experts supported the positive 
impact of real oil price decreases on the agricultural and industrial sectors. Again, there 
were unanimous agreement among the experts that the services sector growth rate was 
negatively affected by the drop in real oil prices. A range of 26.7 per cent to 40 per cent of 
experts suggested a negative effect on agricultural and industrial sectors as a result of a fall 
in real oil prices. 
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Figure 28. Experts' response: impact of negative real oil price on sectors growth rates 
 
 
6.7 External validation of the estimated VAR models using Delphi 
Methods’ results 
6.7.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
Tables 32 presents the relationships between oil price shocks and the public budget 
variables obtained from the VAR model and Delphi method as well as the decision reached 
regarding the corroboration and validation of the VAR model estimates. As can be seen 
from Table 32, the surge in the real oil prices resulted in a positive effect on the tax 
revenues, total revenues, current expenditure and improved the budget deficit. These 
findings, which have been obtained from the estimated budget VAR model, were 
corroborated by the experts’ responses. On the other hand, a decrease in real oil price 
showed a negative effect on the tax revenues, total revenues, current expenditure, 
development expenditure and worsened the budget deficit. It is clear that results obtained 
from both methods were consistent with each other. In other words, no conflicting results 
were reported and the estimated public budget VAR model was validated by the experts. 
Accordingly, the estimated VAR model will be used for further analysis to investigate the 
relationship between real oil price shocks and the public budget variables. 
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Table 32. Public budget VAR model and Delphi results comparison 
 
Variables 
Estimated VAR model results Delphi results  
Decision  Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
TAX Increase 
(+ 0.0005) 
Decrease 
(- 0.0046) 
increase Decrease Validated 
REV Increase 
(+ 0.0056) 
Decrease 
(- 0.0303) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
CUREXP Increase 
(+ 0.0029) 
Decrease 
(- 0.0214) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
DEVEXP Increase 
(+ 0.0023) 
Decrease 
(- 0.00020) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
DEFICIT Decrease 
(- 0.0030) 
Increase 
(+ 0.0073) 
Decrease Increase  Validated 
* VAR model coefficients are in parenthesis. 
6.7.2 Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model 
Table 33 displays the comparison between the results obtained from the selected 
macroeconomic variables VAR model with those reported by the Delphi method regarding 
the impact of the real oil price shocks on the selected macroeconomic variables. It is clear 
from Table 33 that the impact of real oil price increase on the macroeconomic variables, 
based on the two methods is positive, with an exception of the impact on Murabaha profit 
margin rate. The experts’ response was that oil price shocks had no effect on the Murabaha 
rate as it is administratively determined; however, the oil price coefficient sign that 
obtained from the estimated VAR model had shown that it did affect the Murabaha rate 
positively. Turning to the impact of decrease in real oil price, there were conflicting results 
on two variables, namely inflation and Murabaha profit margin rates. In order to reach to a 
decision on which result is correct, the estimated macroeconomic VAR model will be used 
to simulate the historical data of the inflation and Murabaha rates over the period 2000: q1 
– 2011: q2. Figure 29 shows that the simulation of the inflation rate traced the actual data 
quite well. This conclusion was further confirmed by the lower values of the simulation 
measures as shown in table 23, RMSE (0.05269), Theil inequality coefficient (0.1555412), 
with zero value of bias proportion and 0.208318 for variance proportion (Table 34). 
Accordingly, the estimated VAR model will be used for further analysis to investigate the 
relationship between real oil price shocks and the public budget variables. 
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Table 33. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model and Delphi results comparison 
 
Variables 
Estimated VAR model results Delphi results  
Decision 
regarding 
results 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
M2 Increase 
(+ 0.0262) 
Increase 
(+ 0.0602) 
Increase Increase  Validated 
INF Increase 
(+ 0.0844) 
decrease* 
(- 0.0295) 
Increase increase* Not validated 
RER Appreciate 
(- 0.1280) 
Depreciate 
(+ 0.1980) 
Appreciate Depreciate Validated 
MUR increase* 
(+ 0.0023) 
decrease* 
(- 0.0046) 
Neutral* neutral*  Not validated 
 
Figure 29. Historical simulation of inflation rate versus actual values 
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Table 34. Summary statistics for evaluating the historical simulation of the inflation rate over the 
period 2000:q1 - 2011: 
    
Root Mean Squared Error 0.032604 
Theil inequality coefficient  0.155412 
    Bias proportion         0.000000 
    Variance proportion  0.208318 
    Covariance proportion 0.791682 
  
 
Figure 30 shows the comparison between the simulated Murabaha profit margin rate and 
the actual data. As can be observed from Figure 30, that the simulated value of the 
Murabaha profit margin rate captured the trend but fell below the actual values. Looking at 
the simulation evaluating measures in Table 35, the RMSE was small which indicates a 
good fit, Theil inequality is in the favourable range, bias and variance showing lower 
values as well. All in all, the VAR model has, to a great extent, well simulated the values 
of inflation and Murabaha rates over the period 2011: q1 to 2011: q2. Accordingly, an 
increase and decrease of the real oil prices is said to have a positive effect on Murabaha 
rate, while a decrease in the real oil price has a negative effect on the inflation rate. 
Figure 30. Historical simulation of Murabaha margin profit rate versus actual values 
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Table 35. Summary statistics for evaluating the historical simulation of Murabaha profit margin rate 
over the period 2000:q1 - 2011:q2  
  Root Mean Squared Error 0.008787 
Theil inequality coefficient  0.034109 
    Bias proportion         0.000000 
    Variance proportion  0.027411 
    Covariance proportion 0.972589 
  
 
6.7.3 Current account VAR model 
Table 36 presents the results obtained from the estimated current account VAR model and 
Delphi method. With regard to the impact of the increase in real oil price on non-oil 
exports, imports, trade balance and current account balance, both experts' responses and 
the sign of the estimated coefficients of the VAR model were consistent and corroborating 
each other. Likewise, the sign of the coefficient of the negative oil price that have been 
obtained from the estimated VAR model have been confirmed by the experts who 
participated in the Delphi method. Hence, the estimated current account VAR model was 
validated by the experts. Accordingly, the estimated VAR model will be used for further 
analysis to investigate the relationship between real oil price shocks and the public budget 
variables. 
Table 36. Current account VAR model and Delphi results comparison 
 
Variables 
Estimated VAR model results Delphi results  
Decision 
regarding 
results 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
NOEX Decrease 
(- 0.0004) 
Increase 
(+ 0.0062) 
Decrease Increase Validated 
IMP Increase 
(+ 0.0266) 
Decrease 
(- 0.0220) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
TB Decrease 
(-0.0279) 
Increase 
(+ 0.1937) 
Decrease Increase Validated 
CAB Decrease 
(- 0.0383) 
Increase 
(+ 0.0485) 
Decrease Increase Validated 
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6.7.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
Table 37 displays the results obtained from the GDP growth and the unemployment VAR 
model and the experts’ responses. It is clear from Table 37 that the coefficients of the real 
oil price increase have shown a positive effect on GDP growth and unemployment rates. 
These results were further confirmed by the experts who participated in the Delphi method. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the real oil price decrease showed a negative effect 
on GDP growth and positive effect on unemployment rates. That means there was a 
conflict on the impact of the negative real oil price on the unemployment rate. In order to 
reach to a decision on which result was correct, the estimated macroeconomic VAR model 
was used to simulate the historical data of the unemployment rates over the period 2000:q1 
– 2011:q2. Figure 31 showed that the simulation of the unemployment rate traced the 
actual data quite well. This conclusion was further confirmed by the lower values of the 
simulation measures as shown in table 40, RMSE (0.010044), Theil inequality coefficient 
(0.032731), with zero value of bias proportion and 0.166082 for variance proportion (Table 
38). Accordingly, the estimated VAR model will be used for further analysis to investigate 
the relationship between real oil price shocks and the public budget variables. 
 
Table 37. GDP and unemployment VAR model and Delphi results comparison 
 
Variables 
Estimated VAR model results Delphi results  
Decision 
regarding 
results 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
RGDPG Increase 
(+0.0479) 
Decrease 
(-0.0508) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
UNEM Decrease 
(-0.0014 
Decrease 
(-0.0028) 
Decrease Increase Not validated 
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Figure 31. Historical simulation of unemployment rate versus actual values 
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Table 38. Summary statistics for evaluating the historical simulation of the unemployment rate over 
the period 2000-2011 
  
  Root Mean Squared Error 0.021660 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.062869 
     Bias Proportion         0.000000 
     Variance Proportion  0.206608 
     Covariance Proportion  0.793391 
  
 
6.7.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
Table 39 depicts the results obtained from the estimated sectors growth rates VAR model 
and the experts’ responses. According to the coefficients of VAR model, the real oil price 
increase had a positive effect on the agricultural growth rate, which contradicted the views 
of the experts who participated in the Delphi method. Also, the negative real oil price has 
shown negative impact on the industrial growth rate based on the VAR model estimates, 
which was also not in line with the experts’ responses. However, both methods have 
agreed on the positive impact on service growth rate when the real oil price goes up and 
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negative impact on services growth rate when the real oil price goes down. Accordingly, 
the agricultural and industrial equations were used to simulate the historical series. Then 
the simulation of agricultural growth rate and the industrial growth rate was evaluated 
using four simulation evaluating criteria mentioned earlier in chapter five, section 5.5. 
Table 39. Sectors growth VAR model and Delphi results comparison 
 
Variables 
Estimated VAR model results Delphi results  
Decision 
regarding 
results 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Positive real 
oil price shock 
Negative real 
oil price shock 
Agriculture Increase 
(+0.1179) 
Increase 
(+0.1836) 
Decrease* Increase Not validated 
Industry Decrease 
(-0.2118) 
Decrease 
(-0.5608) 
Decrease Increase* Not validated 
Services Increase 
(+0.0093) 
Decrease 
(-0.7671) 
Increase Decrease Validated 
*indicate contradicting results. 
Figure 33 shows the comparison between the simulated agricultural sector growth rate and 
the actual series. As can be seen from figure 33 the simulated series of the agricultural 
sector growth rate captured the general trend of the data quite well. Looking at the 
simulation evaluating measures, the RMSE is small which indicates good fit, Theil 
inequality was in the favourable range, bias and variance showed lower values as well 
(Table 40). All in all, the VAR model had, to a great extent, well simulated the actual 
values of the agricultural sector growth rate over the period 2000-2011. Hence, increase 
and decrease of real oil price were said to have a positive effect on the agricultural growth 
rate. Accordingly, the estimated VAR model was used for further analysis to investigate 
the relationship between real oil price shocks and the public budget variables. 
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Figure 32. Historical simulation of the agricultural sector growth rates versus actual values 
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Table 40. Summary statistics for evaluating the historical simulation of the agricultural sector growth 
rates 
  
  Root Mean Squared Error 0.010926 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.092506 
     Bias Proportion         0.000000 
     Variance Proportion  0.082968 
     Covariance Proportion  0.917032 
  
   
Figure 33 shows the comparison between the simulated industrial growth rate and the 
actual series. The simulation was performed to evaluate the model's ability to replicate the 
actual data. The simulation timeframe was 2000 – 2011. It was virtually clear from Figure 
33 that the simulated industrial growth rates well captured the trend and turns pattern of the 
actual series. Turning to the simulation evaluating measures, the RMSE was small which 
indicate good fit, Theil inequality measure was in the favourable range, bias portion and 
variance portion had shown lower values as well (table 49). Therefore, the final result was 
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that the VAR model had well simulated the historical actual industrial sector growth series 
over the period 2000 to 2011. Accordingly, an increase and decrease of real oil price were 
said to have a negative effect on industrial sector growth rates. 
Figure 33. Historical simulation of the industrial sector growth rates versus actual values 
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Table 41. Summary statistics for evaluating the historical simulation of industrial sector growth rate 
  
  Root Mean Squared Error 0.059888 
Theil Inequality Coefficient  0.208717 
     Bias Proportion         0.000073 
     Variance Proportion  0.227722 
     Covariance Proportion  0.772205 
  
   
6.8 Granger causality test 
The Granger causality test was employed using exogeneity Wald tests. The research focus 
on the causality that running from the real oil price to other macroeconomic variables as oil 
prices is entirely determined in the global market. The null hypothesis was set to no 
causality between variables, if p value is found to be less than 5 per cent then the null 
hypothesis will be rejected.  
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6.8.1 Public budget VAR model 
Table 42 shows the Granger causality test between the real oil price shocks and the budget 
variables. It is clear that decrease in real oil price Granger cause all budget variables, 
except tax revenues and development expenditure at 5 per cent significance level. The 
decrease in real oil price very significantly influences total revenues and current 
expenditure as it can be seen from the very small p value, while significantly Granger 
cause budget deficit with p value of 0.03 per cent. Furthermore, there is unidirectional 
causality running from tax revenues to total revenues, current and development 
expenditure. Interestingly, the increase in real oil prices does not Granger causes a single 
variable in the VAR model. This result is plausible in the case of Sudan, as the oil price 
was set to be fixed (bench mark price) during the preparation of the annual public budget. 
According to this policy, any increase in oil prices above the benchmark price would be 
deposited into the Oil Stabilization Account at the Central Bank of Sudan. This is why the 
increase in oil prices did not affect the public budget variables. 
Table 42. Public budget VAR model: Granger causality test 
    
        
Dependent variable: TAX  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.027190 1  0.8690 
NROILP  2.019660 1  0.1553 
D(REV)  0.175035 1  0.6757 
D(CUREXP)  0.042710 1  0.8363 
D(DEVEXP)  0.211762 1  0.6454 
D(DEFICIT)  0.000773 1  0.9778 
    
    All  3.883029 6  0.6925 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(REV)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  1.121954 1  0.2895 
NROILP  27.44327 1  0.0000 
TAX  11.88882 1  0.0006 
D(CUREXP)  0.672815 1  0.4121 
D(DEVEXP)  1.487108 1  0.2227 
D(DEFICIT)  1.265513 1  0.2606 
    
    All  55.08239 6  0.0000 
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Dependent variable: D(CUREXP)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.423900 1  0.5150 
NROILP  26.03115 1  0.0000 
TAX  5.654300 1  0.0174 
D(REV)  0.036351 1  0.8488 
D(DEVEXP)  0.011127 1  0.9160 
D(DEFICIT)  0.461449 1  0.4969 
    
    All  39.18501 6  0.0000 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(DEVEXP)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.684706 1  0.4080 
NROILP  0.604217 1  0.4370 
TAX  3.010569 1  0.0827 
D(REV)  0.079265 1  0.7783 
D(CUREXP)  6.84E-05 1  0.9934 
D(DEFICIT)  0.052575 1  0.8186 
    
    All  5.810465 6  0.4448 
    
        
Dependent variable: D(DEFICIT)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.452718 1  0.5010 
NROILP  3.078360 1  0.0793 
TAX  0.962594 1  0.3265 
D(REV)  0.512054 1  0.4743 
D(CUREXP)  0.136406 1  0.7119 
D(DEVEXP)  0.082524 1  0.7739 
    
    All  9.642057 6  0.1406 
    
        
 
6.8.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
Table 43 reveals the causality analysis between the real oil price shocks and the selected 
macroeconomic variables. NROILP and PROILP do not influence any variable in the 
model; however, the inflation rate does influence money supply and statistically significant 
at 10 per cent. The other variables have not shown causality between them. This could be 
attributed to the heavy intervention of the government in the economic activities. 
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Table 43. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model: Granger causality test results 
    
    Dependent variable: M2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.158688 1  0.6904 
NROILP  0.867560 1  0.3516 
INF  1.215797 1  0.0731 
D(RER)  1.473064 1  0.2249 
MUR  0.083117 1  0.7731 
    
    All  5.908967 5  0.3152 
    
    Dependent variable: INF  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  1.592315 1  0.2070 
NROILP  0.202698 1  0.6526 
M2  0.001834 1  0.9658 
D(RER)  0.288125 1  0.5914 
MUR  1.994097 1  0.1579 
    
    All  6.089049 5  0.2977 
    
    Dependent variable: D(RER)  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.341121 1  0.5592 
NROILP  0.848058 1  0.3571 
M2  0.197125 1  0.6571 
INF  0.759010 1  0.3836 
MUR  0.483310 1  0.4869 
    
    All  3.561319 5  0.6141 
    
    Dependent variable: MUR  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.017191 1  0.8957 
NROILP  0.072035 1  0.7884 
M2  0.436858 1  0.5086 
INF  0.000499 1  0.9822 
D(RER)  0.234895 1  0.6279 
    
    All  1.106520 5  0.9535 
    
    
 
6.8.3 Current account VAR model 
Table 44 shows the Granger causality test between the real oil shocks and the different 
current account variables. It is clear that positive real oil price Granger caused imports and 
current account balance at 10 per cent significance level, but failed to reject the null 
hypothesis for the exports and trade balance. Similar result was obtained in study carried 
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out in Malaysia by Le and Chang (2013). With regard to the negative real oil price, it 
Granger caused non-oil exports and current account balance at 5 per cent level of 
significance.  It also found that there was bidirectional causality between imports and 
current account balance. Furthermore, imports and current account balance variables 
significantly Granger caused trades balance. 
Table 44. Current account VAR model: Granger causality test results 
    
Dependent variable: D(NOEX)  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
PROILP  0.016553 1  0.8976 
NROILP  3.820831 1  0.0506 
D(IMP)  0.642818 1  0.4227 
D(TB)  1.366937 1  0.2423 
D(CAB)  0.092670 1  0.7608 
    
    
All  3.975287 5  0.5530 
    
    
    
Dependent variable: D(IMP)  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
PROILP  2.789459 1  0.0949 
NROILP  1.789643 1  0.1810 
D(NOEX)  0.994573 1  0.3186 
D(TB)  0.054652 1  0.8152 
D(CAB)  3.918978 1  0.0477 
    
    
All  9.353795 5  0.0958 
    
    
    
Dependent variable: D(TB)  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
PROILP  2.086070 1  0.1486 
NROILP  0.935774 1  0.3334 
D(NOEX)  0.303005 1  0.5820 
D(IMP)  6.985519 1  0.0082 
D(CAB)  6.319027 1  0.0119 
    
    
All  12.63933 5  0.0270 
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Dependent variable: D(CAB)  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
PROILP  3.020429 1  0.0822 
NROILP  4.541126 1  0.0331 
D(NOEX)  0.028841 1  0.8651 
D(IMP)  9.452524 1  0.0021 
D(TB)  0.008428 1  0.9269 
    
    
All  15.65130 5  0.0079 
    
    
 
6.8.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
It is clear from Table 45 that positive real oil price and unemployment rate strongly 
influence real GDP growth at 5 per cent significance level. This was evidenced from the 
small p value. However, positive and negative real oil prices failed to cause unemployment 
rate at 5 per cent significance level. 
Table 45. GDP and unemployment VAR model: Granger causality test results 
Dependent variable: RGDPG  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  5.582082 1  0.0181 
NROILP  0.186850 1  0.6656 
UNEM  4.812837 1  0.0282 
    
    All  12.59132 3  0.0056 
    
        
Dependent variable: UNEM  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.895336 1  0.3440 
NROILP  0.072494 1  0.7877 
RGDPG  0.804905 1  0.3696 
    
    All  2.277630 3  0.5168 
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6.8.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
Table 46 displays the outcomes of the Granger causality test using Wald statistical test. It 
was obvious that positive and negative real oil price shocks significantly Granger cause the 
agricultural sector growth rate. It was also clear that negative real oil price significantly 
influenced the services sector growth rate at 5 per cent significance level. This was 
evidenced from the small p value. In contrast, real positive and negative real oil prices 
failed to significantly Granger cause industrial sector growth rate at 5 per cent significance 
level. 
Table 46. Sectors growth VAR model: Granger causality test 
    
Dependent variable: AGRICULTURE  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  4.263429 1  0.0389 
NROILP  5.227200 1  0.0222 
INDUSTRY  3.380333 1  0.0660 
SERVICES  5.153253 1  0.0232 
    
    All  8.860749 4  0.0647 
    
        
Dependent variable: INDUSTRY  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.315800 1  0.5741 
NROILP  1.809969 1  0.1785 
AGRICULTURE  0.531340 1  0.4660 
SERVICES  1.205798 1  0.2722 
    
    All  4.010607 4  0.4046 
    
        
Dependent variable: SERVICES  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    PROILP  0.790889 1  0.3738 
NROILP  8.050126 1  0.0046 
AGRICULTURE  4.600690 1  0.0320 
INDUSTRY  1.489672 1  0.2223 
    
    All  32.04864 4  0.0000 
    
    
 
6.9 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
To understand the dynamic relationship between the real oil price shocks and the budget 
variables, the IRFs derived from the VAR model were used. A unit of standard deviation 
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shock was applied to the error term in each equation and then the effect on the VAR 
system through 10 periods was traced. In order to identify orthogonalised innovation in 
each equation and the dynamic responses to these shocks, the Cholesky decomposition 
method was used, which had been proposed by Doan (1992). This method entails a 
selection of the ordering of the variables in the VAR model. The variables were arranged 
from the most exogenous to the less exogenous. It is worth mentioning that the dotted lines 
in the IRFs refer to the confidence bands and when the horizontal line (zero line) falls 
between the two confidence bands, the impulse response is said to be statistically 
insignificant (Dizaji, 2014; Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009). Moreover, as all the 
variables are in per centage, the response will be on per centage change. Thus, Y axis 
(vertical axis) shows the per centage changes, while X axis (horizontal axis) shows the 
time horizon (Weinhagen, 2002).  
6.9.1 Public budget VAR model 
 
Figure 34 shows that the impulse response functions of the budget variables to the one 
standard deviation shock in both positive and negative real oil prices. The ordering of the 
variables is set as follows: PROIP, NROILP, TAX, REV, CUREXP, DEVEXP and 
DEFICIT. The initial response of the tax revenues to an increase in real oil price was 
positive and reached its peak with a magnitude of 0.02 per cent in the second quarter, after 
that it continued positive and faded away from the third quarter. In contrast, the response 
of the tax to decrease in real oil price was negative and statistically not significant up to the 
third quarter, and then it was fluctuating above and below the zero line and finally died out 
from the seven quarter.  
For the total revenues, the increase in the real oil price resulted in positive effect lasted for 
two quarters, but it was not significant, reaching its peak of 0.01 per cent increase in the 
second quarter. Then the effect became negative and close to the baseline during the third 
and the fourth quarters before dying out from the fifth quarter. The positive relationship 
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between the real oil price increase and government revenues was found in a similar study 
in Trinidad and Tobago (Lorde et al, 2009). In regard to the response of the total revenues 
to decrease in real oil price, a statistically negative response was reported, reaching its 
lowest point of -0.3 per cent in the mid of the second quarter, after that it was hovering 
around the baseline and the shock disappeared from the seventh quarter.  
Figure 34 Public budget VAR model: IRFs of shock to positive and negative real oil prices 
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Moreover, the current expenditure responded positively to shock in increase of real oil 
prices up to the third quarter, reaching its peak of 0.05 per cent in the second quarter. 
During the fourth and the fifth quarter, the response of the current expenditure was 
negative and after that it faded away. A negative and statistically significant response was 
reported in current expenditure due to a decrease in real oil price over the first and second 
quarters. The drop of current expenditure was almost -0.2 per cent in the second quarter. 
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The response became positive during the third, the fourth and the fifth quarters, then again 
negative by the end of the sixth quarter. After that it showed a negative response for very 
short period before it died away from the eighth quarter. This finding is consistent with 
those of Jbir and Zouri-Ghorbel (2009) and Ibrahim and Mohamed (2012) in the Tunisian 
and Iranian economies, respectively. It is clear that current expenditure is very sensitive to 
oil price decrease, which has been reflected in a significant drop. Therefore, the 
government has to secure other sources during the oil price drop or performing a cut in 
current expenditure. This is evidence that impact of oil price shock in exporting countries 
pass through government expenditure. This finding corroborates that of Eltony and Al-
Awadi (2001). 
The response of the development expenditure to the increase in real oil prices was positive 
in the first and the second quarters but statistically not significant. It became slightly 
negative in the following quarter, then positive, but close to the baseline and faded away 
thereafter. On the other side of the coin, the initial response of the development 
expenditure to decrease in real oil price was declining in the first quarter and became 
negative in the second quarters, with magnitude of -0.05 per cent. Then the response turned 
to be positive during the third and fourth quarters. After that it declined during the fifth and 
the sixth quarters, and then the shock vanished through the rest of the period. This result 
was in line with those of Ibrahim and Mohamed (2012) in the Iranian economy. 
The budget deficit initially shrank during the first and second quarters as a result of oil 
price increase and then slightly worsened during the third and the fourth quarters. This 
result was similar to those obtained by Omojolaiba and Eqwaikhide (2014) in some 
African oil exporting countries.  Then slightly the budget deficit worsened during the third 
and fourth quarters, and after that the shock faded away from the fifth quarter. In contrast, 
the budget deficit increased by almost 0.07 per cent in the second quarter due to decrease 
in real oil price. This response continued up to the mid of the third quarter, then it was 
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evolving around the zero line up and down till it faded away from the seventh quarter. 
From figure 20, it is clear that there is a delay of two months for the effect to take place. 
This result is very plausible in the case of Sudan as the government sells its crude oil and 
gets in return the export proceeds in the course of two months. Based on the above 
discussion, the government has to put in place policy measures that sustain the level of oil 
revenues used in the annual budget, broadening the tax base and lifting oil subsidies to 
improve fiscal stance. It is clear that the effect of oil price shock pass through the 
government expenditure to the economy. In other words, the effect passed into the 
economy through income transfer channel from oil importing countries to oil exporting 
countries (Brown and Yucel, 2002’ Eltony and Al-Awadi, 2001). However, the effect of 
oil price increase was not fully captured due to incomplete pass through to domestic 
economy as result of fuel subsidy. 
6.9.2 Selected macroeconomic VAR model 
Figure 35 shows that the impulse response functions of the macroeconomic variables to the 
one standard deviation shock to both positive and negative real oil prices. The ordering of 
the variables is set as follows: PROIP, NROILP, M2, INF, RER and MUR. The initial 
response of the money supply to one unit shock in the positive real oil price is positive. 
The money supply increased by almost 0.03 per cent in the second quarter. This finding 
was consistent with those of Omojolaibi (2013) and Mohsen and Nooshin (2013) in the 
Nigerian and Iranian economies, respectively. However, the response was slightly negative 
in the fourth and the fifth quarters. Then the response started to die out from the sixth 
quarter. On the other hand, money supply showed a decline trend due to a unit shock to the 
negative oil price. It declined by almost 1.3 per cent in the first quarter. However, in the 
second quarter, the money supply became positive with an increase of 1.2 per cent. The 
response of the money supply faded away from the fourth quarter. The result showed that 
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the monetary authority increased money supply during the era of oil price decrease to 
finance the budget deficit.  
For the inflation rate, a shock to the positive real oil price led to an increase of inflation 
reaching its maximum of 0.7 per cent in the second quarter. This finding corroborates with 
those obtained by Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud (2012) and Ebrahim and Mohammed (2012) in 
the Algerian and Iranian economies, respectively. The positive response last for the first 
three quarters, then became slightly negative and continued that way to the end of the 
period. The negative effect could be explained by the fact that the government adopted an 
inflation target policy, which generally introduced on annual base. The response of the 
inflation to shock to the negative real oil price was negative throughout the first three 
quarters. That is, a unit standard deviation shock to the negative real oil price led to a 
decline in the inflation rate. The percentage change in the inflation rate was almost -0.2 per 
cent. Then it turned to be slightly positive in the fourth quarter and continued that way up 
to the end of the period. The increase might be attributed to the increase of money supply 
as mentioned earlier. Looking at the response of real exchange rate to positive oil price 
shock, it is apparent that the real exchange rate declined, which means a positive impact as 
domestic currency starts to be stronger against the US dollar. In other words, the exchange 
rate was appreciated by 2 per cent in the second quarter. After that the exchange rate 
showed mild positive response in the third and fourth quarter. Then, the exchange rate 
remained unchanged and closed to the zero line through the rest of the predicted period. On 
the other side of the coin, the real exchange rate increased as a result of the negative real 
oil price shock. It increased by almost 1.8 per cent in the first two quarters. Then the 
exchange rate showed a mild negative response in the fourth quarter and after that it 
exhibited mild positive response up to the end of the forecasted period. The increase of the 
exchange rate means that the Sudanese currency became weaker against the US dollar 
when oil prices go down.  This finding was in line with those obtained by Farzanegan and 
Markwardt (2009) and Katsuya (2012) in the Iranian and Russian economies, respectively. 
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For the Murabaha profit margin rate, it can be seen that a positive oil price shock led to an 
increase of the Murabaha rate by 0.17 per cent in the first quarter and then continued 
positive up to the last quarter. Whereas, the Murabaha profit margin rate showed a mild 
persistent negative response to the negative real oil price shock through the entire period.  
From the above discussion, it is obvious that real oil price shocks were transmitted to 
Sudan economy through terms of trade (Misati, Nyamongo and Mwangi, 2013). That is, 
increase of oil price appreciates exchange rate and thus harm the competitiveness of Sudan 
exports, while a drop in oil prices positively affected non-oil exports. 
Figure 35. Selected macroeconomic VAR model: IRFs of shocks to positive and negative real oil price 
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6.9.3 current account VAR model 
Figure 36 shows that the impulse response functions of the current account variables to the 
one standard deviation shock in both positive and negative real oil prices. the ordering of 
the variables was as follows: PROIP, NROILP, NOEX, IMP, TB, and CAB. As can be 
seen from Figure 36, positive real oil price had a negative effect on the non-oil exports and 
last for five quarters, then the shock faded away from the sixth quarter. The non-oil exports 
were reduced by almost 0.1 per cent in the first quarter. This might be attributed to the 
appreciation of the local currency, which negatively affected the competitiveness of 
Sudan’s non-oil exports. This also showed that the existence of some symptoms of the 
Dutch disease in the economy. On the other hand, non-oil exports responded positively to 
the negative real oil price shock. This was attributed mainly to the increase of the 
competitiveness of Sudanese exports due to the depreciation of the exchange rate. It's clear 
that the non-oil exports increased by 0.3 per cent in the second quarter. However, from the 
third quarter and thereafter the response of non-oil exports was small and fluctuating 
around the zero line.  
With regard to the imports, it responded positively to positive real oil price shock during 
the first three quarters, with an increase of 0.5 per cent. In the fourth and fifth quarter the 
response was slightly negative and became positive again in the sixth and seven quarters 
before vanishing from the eighth quarter. Looking at the other side of the coin, negative 
real oil price shock influenced imports to decline and reached its lowest point in the second 
quarter, with a magnitude of 0.1 per cent. From quarter four and thereafter the response 
was swinging around the zero line throughout the remaining period. This decline in 
imports was due to the shortage of foreign exchange that emanated from the drop in oil 
revenues. This result is consistent with the findings of Frazanegan and Markwardt (2009) 
in the Iranian economy. 
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Figure 36. Current account VAR model: IRFs of shock to positive and negative real oil price 
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Turning to the trade balance, shock to the positive real oil price resulted in a positive effect 
during the first two quarters, with a magnitude of 0.3 per cent in the first quarter. It showed 
negative response in the third quarter, but became positive again from the fourth quarter 
and continued that way to the end of the period. However, the response of the trade balance 
to the negative real oil price shock was significantly negative in the first two quarters, 
worsening it by almost 0.5 per cent. Then it became positive in the third quarter and 
returned to exhibit a negative response thereafter. This analysis showed that Sudan was 
depending on the oil exports as a main source of foreign exchange and its trade balance 
deteriorated as a result of the drop in oil prices. 
 For the current account balance, its response to shock to the positive real oil price was 
positive and statistically significant in the first quarter, improving it by 0.5 per cent. This 
finding is in line with those of Allegret et al (2014) in some African oil exporting 
countries. In the second and the third quarter, the current account balance showed a 
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negative response, then became positive in the fourth quarter and continued that way to the 
seventh quarter. On the flip side, the response of the current account balance to a decrease 
in real oil price sock was negative and statistically significant in the first quarter, 
increasing the deficit by almost 0.5 per cent. After that its response started to fluctuate up 
and down around the zero line. The analysis has shown that oil increase improved the trade 
and current account balance, but at the expense of non-oil exports, which mainly were 
agricultural and livestock products. Therefore, the government has to support agricultural 
and animal wealth sectors during the oil price boom, through investing part of the oil 
revenues in infrastructure, provision of production inputs, technology and   research.  
6.9.4 GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model 
Figure 37 shows the impulse response functions for the positive real oil price and the 
negative real oil price over five years’ time horizon. Variables were arranged from the 
most exogenous to the less exogenous. Accordingly, the ordering of the variables was set 
as follows: PROIP, NROILP, RGDPG and UNEM. It is apparent from Figure 37 that the 
initial response of RGDPG to positive real oil price shock was positive reaching its peak in 
the second year. That is, one-unit standard deviation shock to the positive real oil price 
resulted in a 0.019 per cent increase in the real GDP growth rate. The positive response 
continued through the third year and the first quarter of the fourth year. These results were 
consistent with those findings of other studies (Berument et al., 2010; Mendoza and Vera, 
2010; Omojolaibi, 2013; Al-Mulali and Che Normee, 2013). Then the response of RGDPG 
became negative and continued that way to the fifth year. However, negative real oil price 
shock negatively influenced RGDPG throughout the first three years and half. It retarded 
the RGDPG by almost 0.9 per cent in the second year. Similar results of the negative effect 
on GDP growth when the oil prices decrease was reported in Nigeria and Iran by Akin and 
Babajide (2011a) and Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), respectively. 
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Figure 37. GDP and unemployment VAR model: IRFs of shocks to positive and negative real oil price 
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Turning to the unemployment rate, the positive real oil price shock caused a decline in the 
unemployment rate through the first two years and half, and then increased over the fourth 
and fifth years. The unemployment reduced by almost 0.8 per cent in the second year. 
Looking to the other side of the coin, unemployment rate initially responded positively to 
real oil price decrease. However, its response gradually started to decline during the first 
two years and half, and then turned to be negative thereafter and remained below the zero 
line up to the fifth year. That is, the unemployment rate increased during those periods and 
the magnitude of the effect was 1.9 per cent in the first year. These findings showed the 
stylized facts about the effect of oil price shocks on oil exporting countries. The above 
discussion showed that positive real oil price shock increased the RGDP growth rate and 
reduced the unemployment rate, whereas negative real oil price shock retarded RGDPG 
growth and increases unemployment rate. Also, negative real oil price shock found to have 
a greater effect on the real GDP growth and unemployment rates. Therefore, the 
government has to diversify its economy to escape the negative effects of the drop in crude 
oil prices. 
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6.9.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
Figure 38 shows the impulse response functions for the positive real oil price and the 
negative real oil price over five years’ time horizon. A unit standard deviation shock was 
applied to the innovation of both positive and negative oil prices and the effect was traced 
out on the dependent variables. Variables were arranged from the most exogenous to the 
less exogenous. Accordingly, the ordering of the variables was set as follows: PROIP, 
NROILP, agriculture, industry and services sector's growth rate. It was apparent that the 
response of the agricultural sector growth rate to positive oil price shock was positive in 
the first three years. It reached its peak at 1.4 per cent in the third year. This finding is 
consistent with those obtained by Binuomote and Odeniyi (2013) in Nigeria. However, the 
response of agricultural sector growth rate became negative in the following year before 
turning to be positive in the mid of the fifth year. Interestingly, the negative real oil price 
shock had resulted in a boom in the agriculture sector over the first two years. The growth 
rate of the agricultural sector was increased by almost 1 per cent in the second year. After 
that the response of the agricultural sector growth rate to negative real oil price shock 
became negative in the third year, but turned to positive thereafter. This result was in line 
with the effect of the negative real oil price on non-oil exports, which were mainly 
agricultural products. This might be attributed to the depreciation of the exchange rate, 
which in turn makes agricultural exports more competitive in the global market. 
Turning to the industrial growth rate, the positive real oil price shock caused the industrial 
sector to decline through the entire forecasted period, except in the last period of the third 
year. Looking at the other side of the coin, the decrease in real oil price influenced the 
industrial growth rate to decline throughout the first four years, before changing to positive 
in the fifth year. This result was consistent with those of Ahmed and Wadud (2011) in the 
Malaysian economy.  
Finally, the initial response of the services sector growth rate to positive real oil price 
shock was negative, and then became positive with a magnitude of almost 0.8 per cent in 
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the second year. Then, the service growth rate declined through the third and the fourth 
year, before turning to be positive again in the fifth year. On the other hand, the response 
of the services sector growth rate to negative real oil price shock in the first year and half 
was significantly negative, declining by almost 0.5 per cent in the second year. From the 
mid of the third year to almost the mid of the fifth year, the response of the services sector 
growth rate became positive before declining again thereafter.  
Figure 38. Sectors growth rates VAR model: IRFs of shocks to positive and negative real oil price 
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6.10 forecast error variance decomposition analysis 
Variance decomposition explains the proportion of the movement in the dependent 
variables as a result of their own shocks and shocks to the other variables in the VAR 
system. Similar to the impulse response function, ordering of the variables is very 
important. However, if the error terms are uncorrelated, ordering has no significant 
importance (Brooks, 2002). Therefore, the same order of the variables used in the IRFs 
was used in this analysis.  
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6.10.1 Public budget VAR model 
Table 47 shows the decomposition analysis of the budget variable for ten quarters horizon. 
The decrease in real oil price was the most second determinant factor on changes in tax, 
after the shock of the tax variables itself, with an average contribution of 5 per cent. While 
the increase in real price had an insignificant effect on the tax revenues, contributed by 2.4 
per cent on average throughout the entire period.  For the total revenues, the average 
contribution of an increase in real oil price was 4.6 per cent, while a decrease in real oil 
price explained more than 32 per cent of the variation through the whole period. However, 
tax significantly explained the major variation in the total revenues by 36.4 per cent on 
average. This result showed that the government was dependent to a greater extent on the 
tax revenues as a main source of financing the public budget. For the current expenditure, 
the major determinants were the tax and decrease in real oil prices, with contribution on 
average of 22.5 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively. The increase in real oil price 
accounted on average for 3.6 per cent of the current expenditure.  
Table 47. Budget VAR model: variance decomposition analysis 
        
         Variance Decomposition of TAX:     
 Period PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
         1  0.136823  2.979993  96.88318  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  2.489637  4.509465  86.32688  0.485529  0.360692  0.135260  5.692535 
 3  2.941145  6.212321  78.31526  1.004734  0.332503  0.204781  10.98925 
 4  2.688150  5.709031  75.84189  1.345643  0.374362  0.298185  13.74274 
 5  2.541382  5.492366  75.11173  1.333973  0.464886  0.291598  14.76407 
 6  2.477243  5.339141  74.83386  1.315997  0.503089  0.286451  15.24422 
 7  2.452600  5.271668  74.57783  1.317548  0.516391  0.286898  15.57706 
 8  2.435207  5.222995  74.40511  1.325299  0.523921  0.288693  15.79877 
 9  2.422674  5.191841  74.31432  1.328652  0.529566  0.289364  15.92359 
 10  2.415272  5.173560  74.26727  1.329256  0.533242  0.289427  15.99198 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(REV):      
 Period PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
         1  1.515649  0.003227  41.81589  56.66523  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  4.592905  33.87450  34.23003  26.46287  0.000239  0.211291  0.628159 
 3  4.475006  32.84003  33.52381  27.09655  0.325976  1.006290  0.732331 
 4  4.687229  34.44109  32.51219  26.28807  0.370366  0.982001  0.719053 
 5  4.695063  34.33727  32.41699  26.29008  0.373070  1.008840  0.878679 
 6  4.695766  34.36251  32.39188  26.23875  0.376088  1.007552  0.927458 
 7  4.694571  34.34529  32.42285  26.21880  0.378779  1.007063  0.932645 
 8  4.694173  34.34028  32.43147  26.21139  0.379104  1.006820  0.936764 
 9  4.694379  34.33759  32.43182  26.20773  0.379077  1.006798  0.942606 
 10  4.693986  34.33444  32.43304  26.20583  0.379117  1.006832  0.946757 
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 Variance Decomposition of D(CUREXP):     
 Period PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
         1  0.116343  0.213431  66.71811  2.701869  30.25025  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  3.364228  37.33574  40.04170  1.407380  15.72333  0.110225  2.017393 
 3  3.184469  35.34922  39.79186  3.252281  14.97216  0.714135  2.735876 
 4  3.566978  36.91806  38.48579  3.173106  14.50402  0.702337  2.649702 
 5  3.618508  36.85738  38.31335  3.250872  14.45308  0.729705  2.777106 
 6  3.617281  36.87993  38.25337  3.262257  14.41776  0.731781  2.837623 
 7  3.618762  36.86729  38.27477  3.259063  14.40620  0.731298  2.842616 
 8  3.618083  36.85881  38.28576  3.258533  14.40232  0.731230  2.845263 
 9  3.618728  36.85656  38.28508  3.258257  14.39976  0.731190  2.850425 
 10  3.618486  36.85300  38.28542  3.258558  14.39842  0.731275  2.854843 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(DEVEXP):     
 Period PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
         1  0.003347  3.932074  57.84686  0.069720  7.277734  30.87027  0.000000 
 2  1.275043  6.007867  56.92196  0.329103  7.171340  24.72866  3.566022 
 3  1.642882  5.775016  56.21960  1.575156  7.140532  24.18512  3.461687 
 4  1.848247  7.489594  54.88727  1.592769  6.989723  23.61365  3.578751 
 5  1.841407  7.470830  54.74289  1.674221  6.949957  23.51229  3.808402 
 6  1.839402  7.515845  54.72137  1.670964  6.933746  23.42122  3.897450 
 7  1.836506  7.504023  54.75478  1.668329  6.926910  23.38423  3.925225 
 8  1.836869  7.502837  54.75940  1.667321  6.921875  23.36399  3.947717 
 9  1.836825  7.500219  54.75721  1.667934  6.918800  23.35246  3.966553 
 10  1.836318  7.497863  54.75755  1.668284  6.917021  23.34524  3.977730 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(DEFICIT):     
 Period PROILP NROILP TAX D(REV) D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
        
         1  0.521386  3.211899  5.375174  71.33436  2.016172  8.871069  8.669942 
 2  0.714830  13.10751  9.293269  60.52879  1.729932  7.252476  7.373194 
 3  0.768492  14.89145  9.805464  58.46270  1.741404  7.215072  7.115423 
 4  0.768500  14.92202  9.805129  58.36808  1.784880  7.254032  7.097351 
 5  0.771006  14.99161  9.800718  58.31366  1.784345  7.247279  7.091386 
 6  0.773825  14.99184  9.802331  58.30585  1.784151  7.246810  7.095189 
 7  0.773781  14.99107  9.803120  58.30265  1.784092  7.246422  7.098869 
 8  0.773830  14.99100  9.805497  58.29984  1.784098  7.246078  7.099654 
 9  0.773814  14.99066  9.806967  58.29854  1.784119  7.245916  7.099981 
 10  0.773835  14.99058  9.807505  58.29786  1.784111  7.245832  7.100272 
        
 
With regards to the development expenditure, positive real oil price is marginally 
contributed to changes in itself, while a real oil price decrease showed better influence of 
6.4 per cent on average through the entire period. Interestingly, tax significantly 
contributed to changes in development expenditure by 56 per cent on average. Finally, the 
total revenues significantly contributed to changes in budget deficit. It contributed by 71.3 
per cent in the first quarter, and then declined gradually up to the fourth quarter, after that 
it remained unchanged at around 58.3 per cent. Similar to the previous results, decrease in 
real oil price had a greater contribution in the variation of the budget deficit compared to 
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increase in real oil prices. The negative real oil price accounted for 14.1 per cent on 
average in the budget deficit changes, while positive oil price explained on average 0.76 
per cent of changes in the budget deficit. However, the total revenues accounted for 66.7 
per cent of the variation in budget deficit. The result of the decomposition analysis was 
consistent with those results obtained from the IRFs analysis. It is apparent that the effect 
of increase and decrease in real oil prices on the budget variables in the first quarter one 
was marginal, but increasing in the consecutive quarters. That is to say, there was a delay 
for the effect to take place on the budget variables. This could be attributed to the two 
months’ delay in receiving the oil export proceeds. 
6.10.2 Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model  
The findings in Table 48 showed that positive real oil price had greater importance in 
explaining the variations in the macroeconomic variables than the negative real oil price 
shock. As can be seen from Table 48, the positive real oil price accounted for 0.09 per cent 
on average of the variation in the money supply, while negative real oil price responsible 
for 9.03 per cent on average in the variations of the money supply. The contribution of the 
positive real oil price shock in the variation of the money supply in the first quarter was 
less than the contribution of the negative real oil price shocks; however, as time passed its 
explanatory power increased slightly. This entails immediate precautionary measures to 
curtail or mitigate the impact of oil drops. It is clear that the shock to money supply has 
greater influence on itself. It is responsible on average 84.3 per cent of the variations in 
itself throughout the period. With regard to the inflation rate, the positive real oil price 
shock account for 0.43 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 3.9 per cent of the variations in the 
inflation rate in the first, second and third quarter, respectively. From the fourth quarter to 
the end of the period, it almost explained 3.7 per cent of the variation in the inflation rate. 
Turning to the negative real oil price shock, its contribution to the variation in the inflation 
rate was small and at the best contributed by 0.6 per cent. However, the shock in the 
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inflation rate explained more than 87.1 per cent of the variation in itself. With regard to the 
real exchange rate, the positive real oil price contributed by 0.1 per cent and 3.2 per cent of 
the variations in the first and the second quarters, respectively.  Then its contribution stood 
at 3.4 per cent during the remaining seven quarters. On the other hand, negative real oil 
price showed lesser contribution to the variation in the exchange rate, its contribution 
ranged from 0.9 per cent to1.6 per cent throughout the entire period. The variation in the 
real exchange rate was mostly explained by the shock to itself, with an average of 77.9 per 
cent over the entire period. With regard to the variation in the Murabaha rate, positive real 
oil price contributed 2.17 per cent on average throughout the period. While negative real 
oil price shock is responsible for 0.63 per cent on average in the variation of the Murabaha 
rate. However, shock on the Murabaha has considerable contribution to changes in itself. 
The decomposition analysis showed that shock to the variables had greater influence on 
their values. 
 
Table 48. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model: Variance decomposition analysis  
        
         Variance Decomposition of M2:     
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP M2 INF D(RER) MUR 
        
         1  0.094052  0.043398  10.55938  89.39722  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.096442  0.049943  9.056942  81.88821  5.936034  3.049994  0.018879 
 3  0.096930  0.074599  8.923108  80.73505  7.015608  3.065667  0.185968 
 4  0.097045  0.104343  8.869214  80.15371  7.293655  3.159850  0.419224 
 5  0.097128  0.103999  8.839929  79.88878  7.326774  3.180964  0.659556 
 6  0.097189  0.105749  8.818323  79.70508  7.322767  3.188175  0.859901 
 7  0.097234  0.108783  8.801948  79.57064  7.312938  3.190185  1.015508 
 8  0.097267  0.111767  8.789659  79.47147  7.303929  3.190671  1.132507 
 9  0.097291  0.114275  8.780549  79.39853  7.296794  3.190660  1.219194 
 10  0.097309  0.116234  8.773841  79.34504  7.291401  3.190521  1.282964 
        
         Variance Decomposition of INF:      
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP M2 INF D(RER) MUR 
        
         1  0.093658  0.436192  0.254580  1.926068  97.38316  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.101337  3.609119  0.610928  1.631311  93.07091  0.676450  0.401283 
 3  0.104270  3.907099  0.617773  1.567972  91.22194  1.254628  1.430584 
 4  0.104966  3.837229  0.606200  1.540736  89.97346  1.429759  2.612613 
 5  0.105100  3.787601  0.597945  1.570892  88.90107  1.503319  3.639170 
 6  0.105127  3.760583  0.592608  1.629025  88.03257  1.537501  4.447709 
 7  0.105133  3.745942  0.589229  1.689079  87.36305  1.555467  5.057235 
 8  0.105134  3.737522  0.587028  1.740378  86.86143  1.565895  5.507748 
 9  0.105135  3.732275  0.585535  1.780765  86.49105  1.572500  5.837877 
 10  0.105135  3.728789  0.584492  1.811354  86.21944  1.576942  6.078979 
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         Variance Decomposition of D(RER):      
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP M2 INF D(RER) MUR 
        
         1  0.035486  0.116307  0.976701  1.288012  19.67847  77.94051  0.000000 
 2  0.038595  3.179831  1.609737  1.203695  17.68722  76.20281  0.116708 
 3  0.038985  3.383065  1.623301  1.239896  18.43511  75.19458  0.124040 
 4  0.039130  3.389074  1.620853  1.239254  18.50425  75.08380  0.162768 
 5  0.039195  3.387295  1.619646  1.239701  18.51575  75.03427  0.203336 
 6  0.039243  3.385845  1.618906  1.241378  18.51247  75.00197  0.239437 
 7  0.039280  3.385037  1.618366  1.243663  18.50743  74.97723  0.268274 
 8  0.039309  3.384626  1.617977  1.245879  18.50294  74.95819  0.290394 
 9  0.039329  3.384402  1.617694  1.247755  18.49939  74.94379  0.306967 
 10  0.039345  3.384271  1.617488  1.249236  18.49671  74.93306  0.319237 
        
         Variance Decomposition of MUR: 
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP M2 INF D(RER) MUR 
        
         1  0.036009  2.043622  1.378282  2.239303  1.728867  2.473220  90.13671 
 2  0.041608  2.042845  0.812138  4.504315  2.154793  3.806789  86.67912 
 3  0.042908  2.112960  0.654762  5.834639  1.897422  3.673315  85.82690 
 4  0.043372  2.149231  0.584137  6.630553  1.709230  3.614579  85.31227 
 5  0.043672  2.193360  0.548559  7.122293  1.578997  3.554233  85.00256 
 6  0.043897  2.226718  0.527676  7.441400  1.492995  3.510886  84.80032 
 7  0.044068  2.250533  0.514504  7.654411  1.435251  3.480221  84.66508 
 8  0.044196  2.267267  0.505779  7.799743  1.395788  3.458791  84.57263 
 9  0.044292  2.279063  0.499818  7.900599  1.368380  3.443727  84.50841 
 10  0.044362  2.287424  0.495661  7.971523  1.349100  3.433066  84.46323 
        
        
6.10.3 Current account VAR model 
Generally speaking, the findings in Table 49 are consistent with those from the IRFs 
presented and in figure 26. As can be seen from table 34, negative real oil price shock had 
a greater contribution to the variation in the current account variables compared to the 
shock in positive real oil price. The negative real oil price shock responsible for 0.2 per 
cent in non-oil exports in quarter one, however, it increased to 4.7 per cent in the third 
quarter and continued that way to the end of the period. While a unit standard deviation 
shock to the positive real oil prices responsible for 0.7 per cent on average throughout the 
period. This support the conclusion that negative real oil price had a considerable 
contribution in explaining the changes in the non-oil exports. However, most of the 
variation explained by the shock of the non-oil exports itself, which accounted for more 
than 88.8 per cent throughout the period. With regard to the variation in the imports, 
negative real oil price shock accounted for 1.8 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the 
variance in the first, the second and the third quarter, respectively. Then its explanatory 
power slightly increased to 2.7 per cent in quarters, four and five, then remained 
197 
 
unchanged at 2.8 per cent in the remaining periods. Turning to shock to the positive real oil 
price, its contribution to the variation in the imports range from approximately 0.4 per cent 
to 0.9 per cent in the first three quarters, then remained constant at 0.9 per cent over the 
rest of the period. Interestingly, shock in non-oil exports explained small portion of 
changes in the import, but as time passed, its contribution reached 8.3 per cent. This result 
may be attributed to the fact that foreign exchanges receive from the exporting of non-oil 
products enabled the government to import more. Again, the considerable change in the 
import was explained by the shock of the variable itself.  
Table 49. Current account VAR model: error forecast decomposition analysis 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(NOEX):     
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB) 
        
         1  0.081934  0.661100  0.245410  99.09349  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.091986  0.631280  4.709339  91.08633  0.180666  3.249278  0.143107 
 3  0.096793  0.708749  4.691093  89.38344  0.185580  4.524634  0.506509 
 4  0.098262  0.717230  4.763490  89.03697  0.252260  4.550154  0.679901 
 5  0.098515  0.724528  4.795947  88.88076  0.331944  4.588030  0.678795 
 6  0.098579  0.724532  4.792379  88.83035  0.362885  4.607465  0.682392 
 7  0.098606  0.724493  4.791980  88.81862  0.375254  4.606761  0.682891 
 8  0.098615  0.724460  4.791730  88.81361  0.379916  4.606433  0.683852 
 9  0.098617  0.724443  4.791783  88.81182  0.381011  4.606297  0.684646 
 10  0.098617  0.724451  4.791910  88.81132  0.381188  4.606291  0.684835 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(IMP):     
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB) 
        
         1  0.096512  0.382774  1.780695  0.173116  97.66342  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.104445  0.767181  2.205481  2.368513  87.61694  2.568390  4.473493 
 3  0.105204  0.862114  2.374069  6.666518  80.76711  3.259252  6.070942 
 4  0.105426  0.860846  2.725330  8.126660  78.94318  3.175842  6.168140 
 5  0.105505  0.853168  2.774222  8.315595  78.49893  3.237427  6.320655 
 6  0.105524  0.852064  2.810958  8.368083  78.31371  3.243266  6.411915 
 7  0.105527  0.853324  2.832962  8.382619  78.25221  3.254069  6.424814 
 8  0.105528  0.853223  2.836907  8.382442  78.23890  3.262346  6.426183 
 9  0.105529  0.853195  2.837413  8.382157  78.23663  3.264075  6.426525 
 10  0.105529  0.853198  2.837518  8.382131  78.23632  3.264363  6.426470 
        
         Variance Decomposition of D(TB): 
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB) 
        
         1  0.001508  11.68460  27.44173  0.105261  32.33339  28.43502  0.000000 
 2  0.001611  9.374860  22.03143  0.945275  31.49122  27.24233  8.914885 
 3  0.001627  9.371543  22.00826  3.973349  30.22304  25.65753  8.766270 
 4  0.001630  9.277333  21.89633  4.173308  30.15264  25.81368  8.686710 
 5  0.001631  9.265032  21.85343  4.171904  30.13949  25.78907  8.781067 
 6  0.001632  9.263702  21.85957  4.186152  30.11758  25.77058  8.802417 
 7  0.001632  9.262509  21.86215  4.187621  30.11250  25.77428  8.800946 
 8  0.001632  9.262261  21.86136  4.187820  30.11178  25.77610  8.800680 
 9  0.001632  9.262179  21.86118  4.187983  30.11205  25.77594  8.800667 
 10  0.001632  9.262149  21.86110  4.188016  30.11223  25.77585  8.800652 
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         Variance Decomposition of D(CAB): 
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB) 
        
         1  0.007760  21.43007  22.06835  0.000472  20.10120  16.93816  19.46175 
 2  0.009643  17.29799  19.49029  0.000704  22.74246  19.23885  21.22971 
 3  0.010397  16.70520  18.86365  3.442497  21.86081  19.02511  20.10274 
 4  0.010615  16.46510  18.75255  3.952389  22.00579  19.00914  19.81504 
 5  0.010671  16.43063  18.68688  3.956453  22.09951  18.97667  19.84985 
 6  0.010688  16.41281  18.68048  3.986295  22.08558  18.95223  19.88261 
 7  0.010692  16.40857  18.68689  3.997849  22.07811  18.95106  19.87751 
 8  0.010693  16.40765  18.68640  3.997704  22.07677  18.95471  19.87676 
 9  0.010693  16.40749  18.68633  3.997678  22.07665  18.95480  19.87706 
 10  0.010693  16.40745  18.68636  3.997662  22.07675  18.95478  19.87699 
        
 
Looking at the trade balance variable, negative real oil price shocks had a prominent 
contribution compared to positive real oil price shock. Negative real oil price shock 
account for 27.4 per cent of the variation in the import in the first quarter, however, it 
declined to 22 per cent in the second and the third quarter. Then its contribution witnessed 
a slight drop in the fourth quarter and stood at 21.8 per cent during the remaining period. 
On the other hand, the positive real oil price shock responsible of approximately 11.9 per 
cent of the variation of the trade balance in the first quarter then started its declining 
journey from the second quarter. From the fourth quarter to the end of the period the 
positive real oil price accounted for 9.3 per cent of the variation. Looking at the 
components of trade balance, the non-oil exports accounted for less than 1 per cent of the 
variation in the trade balance over the first two quarters. Then increased to 3.9 per cent in 
the third quarter and to 4.5 per cent in the fourth quarter, and remained that way to the end 
of the period. Furthermore, shock to imports significantly contributed to the variation in 
the trade balance. Its contribution was 32.3 per cent in the first quarter, and then gradually 
declined in the second and the third quarter. From the fourth quarter its contribution stood 
at 30.1 per cent and continued that way for the rest of the periods. This result confirmed 
that an import was the key variable in explaining the variation in the trade balance as 
Sudan was heavily depending on imported commodities. 
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 With regard to the current account balance, negative real oil price shock was responsible 
for 22.1 per cent of the variation in the current account balance in the first quarter, then its 
explanatory power declined to 19.5 per cent, 18.9 per cent, and 18.8 per cent in the second, 
the third and the fourth quarter, respectively. Through the remaining period, its 
contribution stood at 18.6 per cent. Whereas, the positive real oil price shock accounted for 
21.4 per cent in the first quarter, and then dropped to 16.7 per cent in the third quarter. Its 
contribution further declined to 16.4 per cent and continued that way to the end of the 
period. On the other hand, the non-oil exports had an insignificant contribution to the 
current account balance during the first two quarters. However, it became accounted for 
3.4 per cent though the rest of the period. Interestingly, shock in imports was found to have 
a greater contribution to the variation in the current account balance, ranging from 20.1 per 
cent to 22.1 per cent over the entire period. This result also substantiated the significant 
contribution of the imports in the variations of both the trade balance and the current 
account balance. 
6.10.4 growth and unemployment rates VAR model  
The variance decomposition of the real GDP growth (RGDPG) and the unemployment 
(UNEM) due to their own shock and shock to real oil price for five years’ horizon is 
presented in table 50. As can be seen from Table 50, apart from the first year, the PROILP 
account for 18.9 per cent of the variations in the RGDPG in the second quarter. Then, its 
importance in explaining the variation gradually increased through the following four 
years, reaching 21.2 per cent at the end of the period. Unlike the ROILP, the NROILP was 
responsible for almost 23 per cent of the variation in the real GDP growth rate in the first 
year. That is, the initial variations in real GDP growth rate were higher when oil prices 
went down compared to an increase in real oil prices. In the second year, the contribution 
of the NROILP increased to 25.2 per cent, and then dropped to 23.9 per cent in the third 
year. Its contribution to the RGDPG variations stood at 23.4 per cent through the 
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remaining period. This result showed that negative oil price shock had relatively greater 
explanatory power in the real GDP growth compared to the increase in real oil prices. On 
the other side of the coin, the shock of the RGDPG had a significant proportion of the 
variations in itself in the first year amounting to 77 per cent. But this explanatory power 
dropped by 50 per cent in the second year. The variation of the RGDPG in the remaining 
period remained unchanged at 37.5 per cent.   For the UNEM, it did not contribute to the 
variations in RGDPG in the first year. However, it accounted for 17.6 per cent of the 
variations in the RGDPG in the second year, then its contribution increased slightly to 18.3 
per cent. After that its contribution remained unchanged at 17.9 per cent over the last two 
years. Looking at the unemployment, the positive real oil price at the best was responsible 
for 5.5 per cent of the variations throughout the forecasted period, while negative real oil 
prices were accounted for more than 29.5 per cent over the five forecasted years. 
Table 50. GDP and unemployment VAR model: error forecast decomposition analysis 
      
       Variance Decomposition of RGDPG:   
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP RGDPG UNEM 
      
       1  0.121998  0.003142  22.96276  77.03410  0.000000 
 2  0.130383  18.89002  25.22782  38.27623  17.60594 
 3  0.134692  20.38553  23.78630  37.51488  18.31330 
 4  0.135673  20.85230  23.46890  37.69042  17.98838 
 5  0.136030  21.19935  23.42724  37.45864  17.91477 
      
       Variance Decomposition of UNEM:   
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP RGDPG UNEM 
      
       1  0.101781  0.511952  37.90267  5.703966  55.88141 
 2  0.120221  4.466554  30.15925  12.18379  53.19040 
 3  0.123915  4.381814  29.80390  14.02390  51.79038 
 4  0.124791  5.791722  29.55200  13.65041  51.00586 
 5  0.125302  5.855729  29.49551  13.74156  50.90720 
      
 
6.10.5 Sectors growth rates VAR model 
The same order of the variables used in the IRFs was used in this analysis. The variance 
decomposition of the agricultural sector growth rate, industrial sector growth rate and 
services sector growth rate is shown in Table 51. As can be seen from Table 51 the 
PROILP account for 4.8 per cent of the variations in the agricultural sector growth rate in 
201 
 
the second year. Then its importance in explaining the variation was gradually increased to 
30.3 per cent in the third year, then it increased dramatically to 52.2 per cent in the last 
year. On the other hand, the NROILP was responsible for almost 2.4 per cent of the 
variation in the agricultural growth rate in the first year. That is, the initial variations in the 
agricultural growth rate were higher when oil prices went down compared to an increase in 
real oil prices. In the second year, the contribution of NROILP increased to 20.5 per cent, 
and then gradually decreased to 19.6 per cent in the third year. This result showed that 
negative real oil price shock had relatively lower explanatory power in the agricultural 
sector growth rate compared to the increase in the real oil prices. On the other side of the 
coin, shock to the agricultural growth rate had a significant proportion in its own 
variations, amounting to 97.5 per cent in the first year. But this explanatory power dropped 
to 22.6 per cent at the end of the forecasted period.    
Table 51. Sectors growth rates VAR model: variance decomposition analysis 
       
        Variance Decomposition of AGRICULTURE:    
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP 
AGRICULTU
RE INDUSTRY SERVICES 
       
        1  0.123129  0.006066  2.466700  97.52723  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.130368  4.822500  20.47898  60.09204  14.51925  0.087225 
 3  0.150291  30.25757  19.62453  37.47703  12.44625  0.194623 
 4  0.162278  52.59530  16.07677  22.98312  8.224521  0.120296 
 5  0.204316  52.19891  15.52161  22.58521  9.534957  0.159310 
       
        Variance Decomposition of INDUSTRY:    
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP 
AGRICULTU
RE INDUSTRY SERVICES 
       
        1  0.108102  3.875554  1.947792  65.06566  29.11099  0.000000 
 2  0.119288  4.232942  26.51753  47.94292  21.27639  0.030216 
 3  0.134209  4.363483  28.04785  46.99938  20.56047  0.028811 
 4  0.141947  5.073593  28.05971  45.20268  21.61206  0.051963 
 5  0.161357  14.00840  26.66853  39.99710  19.25509  0.070871 
       
        Variance Decomposition of SERVICES:    
 Period S.E. PROILP NROILP 
AGRICULTU
RE INDUSTRY SERVICES 
       
        1  0.016206  53.84221  21.09108  8.296740  15.77548  0.994490 
 2  0.023066  62.49794  28.97454  4.061438  4.204808  0.261277 
 3  0.029362  65.57672  21.65487  3.142787  9.364758  0.260864 
 4  0.037561  68.31078  19.29792  5.118584  7.013531  0.259188 
 5  0.038354  71.04249  13.70802  5.548594  9.502738  0.198160 
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For the industrial sector growth rate, positive real oil price was responsible for 3.8 per cent 
in the first year. Then its explanatory power increased gradually reaching 14 per cent at the 
end of the period. However, the negative real oil price shock accounted for 1.9 per cent in 
the first year, but from the second year its contribution in the variation of the industrial 
sector growth rate jumped to 26.5 per cent, and by the end of the period it reached 26.7 per 
cent. These results showed that negative real oil price shock had greater influence in the 
industrial sector growth rate compared to positive real oil price shocks. Interestingly, the 
agricultural sector had a considerable contribution in the variations of the industrial sector 
growth rate in the first year, amounting to 65.1 per cent. After that its power started to 
decline gradually reaching 40 per cent at the end of the forecasted period. This result was 
plausible in the case of Sudan, as the industrial sector depended to a great extent on the 
agricultural product as main production inputs.  
Finally, positive real oil price accounted for 53.8 per cent and 62.5 per cent of the 
variations in the services sector growth rate in the first and the second year, respectively. 
Then the positive real oil price became responsible for 65.6 per cent of the variations in the 
third year. By the end of the fifth year, positive real oil price shock became responsible for 
71 per cent of the variation in the services sector growth rate. This result showed that real 
oil price increase had a significant contribution to the variance of the services sector 
growth rate. On the other hand, the negative real oil price was responsible for 21.1 per cent 
of the variations in the services sector growth rate in the first year. However, its 
explanatory power increased to 30 per cent in the second year and then gradually declined 
to reach 13.7 per cent in the fifth year. It was clear that both real positive and negative oil 
prices had greater influence in the services sector growth rate compared to their effects on 
the agricultural and industrial sector's growth rate. This might be attributed to the fact that 
most services activities were associated directly or indirectly with the boom and bust in the 
oil sector. 
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6.11 Summary 
This chapter has empirically assessed the impact of real oil price shocks on the economy of 
Sudan. To achieve that purpose The VAR model and Delphi methods were adopted under 
the framework of mixed methods approach. Consequently, five VAR models, namely, 
public budget model, selected macroeconomic variables model, current account model, 
GDP growth and unemployment model, and sectors’ growth model. Each VAR were 
developed and estimated using ordinary least squares, and then adequacy tests were 
performed to check the validity of the estimated models. After performing the validation 
tests, a further external validation was applied using the results obtained from the Delphi 
method. Based on the external validation, it was found that there were some contradictions 
in the sign of the coefficient of five variables, namely inflation, Murabaha profit margin 
rate, unemployment rate, agriculture sector growth rate and industrial sector growth rate. 
Accordingly, historical simulation was performed for those variables and results were 
evaluated using the simulation evaluating measures. The outcome of the simulation 
evaluation was that the signs of the estimated coefficients obtained from the VAR model 
were correct. Subsequently, the Granger causality test, Impulse Response Functions and 
Variance decomposition analysis were conducted.  
For the public budget VAR model, the Granger causality test results suggested that 
decrease in oil price significantly influenced oil revenues, current expenditure and budget 
deficit. However, the increase in real oil price did not Granger cause budget variables. 
Results from the impulse response functions and variance decomposition analysis 
suggested that oil price shocks had an asymmetric effect on the public budget. For the 
selected macroeconomic variables VAR model, the impulse response functions showed 
that real oil price shocks, to a certain degree, impacted other variables symmetrically. 
However, the variance decomposition findings suggested that negative oil price shocks 
accounted for greater variation compared to the positive real oil prices. Looking at the 
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current account VAR model, the main findings were that negative and positive shocks 
impacted current account and trade balances in a symmetric fashion. Granger causality 
tests showed that real oil price increase had a significant effect on current account balance 
and imports, while oil real price decrease had a significant effect on non-oil exports and the 
current account balance. Impulse response functions showed that the initial response of the 
trade and current account balances to positive and negative real oil price shocks was 
statistically significant. Variance decomposition analysis suggests that negative real oil 
price shocks were responsible for the major variations in current account variables other 
than the variables own shocks. With regard to the real GDP growth and unemployment 
rates VAR model, the Granger causality test results suggested that oil price increase and 
unemployment statistically and significantly influenced real GDP growth. Results from the 
Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decomposition analysis suggested that real oil 
price shocks had shown a symmetric effect on GDP growth.  However, the negative real 
oil price had a significant impact on the unemployment rate in the first year. Turning to the 
sectors growth rate VAR model, the Granger causality test results suggested that negative 
real oil price shocks significantly influenced the agricultural sector growth and services 
sector growth rates. Also, positive real oil price shocks significantly Granger caused the 
agricultural sector growth rate. In contrast, positive and negative real oil prices failed to 
significantly cause industrial sector growth rate at 5 per cent significance level. Impulse 
response functions showed that the agricultural sector growth rate responded positively to 
both positive and negative shocks. While the response of the growth rate of the industrial 
and services sectors to real oil price shocks was to some extent symmetrical. Furthermore, 
the variance decomposition findings suggested that both real positive and negative oil 
prices have greater influence in the services growth rate compared to their effects on the 
agricultural and the industrial sectors’ growth rates. 
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Chapter seven: Conclusion and policy recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
Sudan’s economy was agricultural-led before the commencement of crude oil production. 
The agricultural sector had a higher share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (almost 48 
per cent) and employed approximately 80 per cent of the labour force (BBC, 2013). 
However, the discovery of the crude oil and the advent of crude oil export in the third 
quarter of 1999 caused a notable change in Sudan’s economic structure. In 2008, oil export 
earnings constituted 95 per cent of the total export proceeds, leading to crude oil revenues 
contributing 60 per cent of the total government revenues (International Monetary Fund, 
2009). Since then, the economy has become reliant on crude oil revenues to finance the 
government budget and to pay the import bill as well. During the period 2000 – 2011, 
Sudan witnessed a higher growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product, driven mainly by the 
oil sector (World Bank, 2009). This situation has exposed the economy to the negative 
effects of fluctuations of oil prices in the global markets. It is worth noting that during the 
period under investigation, Sudan was a net oil exporter, this manifested in the quantities 
of crude oil produced compared to the domestic consumption. That is, crude oil supply 
outweighed domestic demand. 
Furthermore, the government has not fully acknowledged the implications of instability in 
the world crude oil markets and their impact on the economic activities. The government 
priority was to increase the amount of foreign inflows through increasing crude oil 
production and exporting to finance its budget and other financial commitments. That is, 
the focus was on the oil revenues side rather than considering the effect of shocks in the 
global crude oil markets and how that could affect the macroeconomy. In this respect, 
although the government established an Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund (ORSF) to cater 
for the drop in the crude oil prices, the amount of crude oil revenues that was deposited in 
the ORSF has been poorly managed, thus the Fund failed to serve its intended purpose. 
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Most of the resources of that Fund were utilized in financing the growing government 
current expenditure (Abdulwahab, 2012). Moreover, the persistent interventions of the 
central bank to stabilize the exchange rate in the foreign exchange market accelerated the 
depletion of the Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund resources and foreign reserve. Despite the 
high dependency on crude oil revenues and given that Sudan is a price taker; no effort was 
exerted to study the relationship between the movements of crude oil prices and the key 
macroeconomic variables in Sudan. This was the main motivating factor for undertaking 
this research in order to enable the government to clearly understand the effect of 
fluctuations of crude oil price on macroeconomic variables. Accordingly, the government 
will be in a better position to prudently adopt the appropriate economic policy response to 
enhance further the positive effects and to put in place precautionary measures to mitigate 
the negative impacts of the crude oil price drops as well. 
The overall objective of this thesis was to assess the impact of oil price shocks on the 
government budget, selected macroeconomic variables, current account, real GDP growth 
and unemployment rates, and the growth rates of the agricultural, industrial and services 
sectors during the period 2000 – 2011. In addition to identify a potential gap in 
methodologies and techniques in the literature. To attain these objectives, the following 
were questioned is answered: 
 How is crude oil price shocks transmitted to the Sudanese economy as measured by: 
f) The public budget? 
g) key macroeconomic variables?  
h) The current account?  
i) Real GDP growth and unemployment rates? 
j) The growth rate of agricultural, industrial and services sectors? 
Also, the gap in research methodologies and techniques is identified. 
Chapter two presented a brief background on the economic activities of Sudan. The 
economy has shown a steady growth since the advent of oil production, thanks to increase 
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in crude oil production and the associated high oil prices up to mid-2008.  According to 
Nour (2010), Sudan was amongst the fastest growing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
achieving GDP growth of 9 per cent on averages, occupying the third rank in terms of 
crude oil production in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and Angola. Concerning the 
sectoral level, the share of the agriculture sector in the GDP declined, which showed some 
signs of Dutch disease in the economy, while industrial and services sectors had increased 
over the study period. The increasing contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP was 
mainly triggered by the increase in oil production and prices. Moreover, the inflation rate 
was in the range of 5-9 per cent up to 2007, and then started to climb due to the increase of 
money supply. The real exchange rate was relatively stable with an appreciation and 
depreciation in few years of the sample period.   This might be attributed to managed float 
exchange regime adopted by the Central Bank of Sudan. Murabaha profit margin rate had 
shown a descending trend over the sample period. However, Money supply, in nominal 
terms, had steadily increased during the study period. Likewise, the government total 
revenues increased dramatically, thanks to crude oil revenues, which contributed on 
average 48.6 per cent of the total government revenues. Similarly, government expenditure 
increased, which resulted in worsening the budget deficit. This typically showed the 
consequences of adopting expansionary fiscal policy during the oil boom. On the other 
hand, the overall balance of payments performance improved as a result of increase in oil 
production, the surge in crude oil prices and an increase in Foreign Direct Investment 
inflows. Despite the improvement in the performance of some macroeconomic variables, 
Sudan’s external debt grew at an accelerated rate due to the build-up of arrears. Although 
Sudan was eligible for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) initiative and fulfilled 
all technical conditions, other political factors hindered it from benefiting from the 
initiative.  
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Chapter two, an exhaustive overview of studies that had investigated the relationship 
between oil price shocks and the macroeconomy were carried out. The effect of oil price 
shocks on economic activities was to a great extent identified and explained in the 
literature. Generally speaking, net-oil exporting countries are found to exhibit positive 
effects on their economies when oil prices mount, while net-oil importing countries suffer. 
On the contrary, the net-oil importing countries benefit from the drop in oil prices and their 
counterparts witness a negative economic impact. These results did not remain true 
through time due to differences in the development stages, economic structure and counter 
monetary and fiscal policies to oil price shocks. Nevertheless, some variations in research 
findings might be attributed to numerous factors, among which are oil price specifications, 
type of data used and using different timeframes. With regard to the pass through of oil 
price shocks to the economy, six transmission mechanisms of oil price shock were 
acknowledged in the literature with some changes in the name of the channel and minor 
differences with regard to their interpretation. 
A short glimpse of the oil sector evolution was provided in chapter three.  The oil 
exploration operations were limited to the western and south-central parts of Sudan due to 
civil war. Oil productions started in the early 1990s with assistance from Asian companies, 
but oil exports started in late 1999. Since then, oil production has shown an upward trend, 
reaching approximately 461 thousand barrels per day in 2007. This production is supported 
by well-established oil infrastructure, in terms of pipelines, central processing units, 
storage facilities and refineries, which entirely are exist in the north of the country.  
As a consequence of the separation of South Sudan from the Government of Sudan a 
remarkable decline in GDP growth was witnessed. However, from 2013 the economy 
started to gradually recover from the shock and achieved a GDP growth of 3.6 per cent up 
from 1.6 per cent in 2012. Furthermore, another leap of 4.4 per cent GDP growth rate was 
achieved in 2014. The main reason of the notable good performance might be attributed to 
209 
 
the increase in non-oil exports, gold export proceeds and foreign inflows from the 
Transitional Financial Arrangements with the government of South Sudan. Likewise, some 
other macroeconomic indicators had shown slight improvement in their performance. 
Chapter four shed light on the proven reserves of crude oil in the world, global crude oil 
demand and supply, debate about the peak oil theory, pricing mechanism of crude oil, 
various factors that affect crude oil prices, a glimpse of the historical oil price shocks and 
the recent plunge in crude oil prices. It is apparent that the world proven oil reserves 
showed an increase of   29.4 per cent over the last ten years. In this context, the peak 
theory introduced by M. King Hubbert in 1956 was criticized by a number of scholars.  
Although the theory in principle was sound, the timing was difficult to predict due to lack 
of accurate data about oil reserves and unexplored areas, among other factors. With regard 
to the world crude oil supply, it steadily increased through the period 2000 – 2009, but 
dropped by approximately 4.9 per cent in 2009. This fall was attributed to cutting in oil 
output by the OPEC countries to boost prices.  On the other hand, in the last fifteen years, 
the average growth rate of world crude oil demand was almost 2.6 per cent. It was 
observed that the surge in the world demand was mainly driven by increasing consumption 
in developing and emerging countries. Pricing of crude oil has witnessed significant 
changes throughout history. The Seven Sister companies were the major determinants of 
crude oil prices up to 1970s, followed by the OPEC era. In the early 1980s, a new system 
of pricing was presented, in which prices were determined as a differential to certain 
benchmark or reference prices (e.g. Brent, WTI and Dubai).  Notwithstanding crude oil 
prices were generally determined by demand and the supply conditions. Other factors play 
a significant role in crude oil prices. For example, geopolitical events, speculative 
activities, environmental conditions and the US dollar exchange rate.  These factors caused 
a series of oil price shocks in the past. Recently, the drop of crude oil prices can be 
attributed to a number of factors, similar to those that occurred in earlier times.  However, 
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the newest factor is the increase of crude oil from the non-conventional sources e.g. oil 
shale and oil sands. 
In chapter five, the research methodology was developed under the philosophical 
framework of pragmatic paradigm. In view of that, the Convergent Parallel Mixed 
Methods Design was used, in which quantitative and qualitative data were collected 
concurrently, analysed separately and then compared to each other (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011). It is worth noting that the thesis used mixed methods design for 
corroboration and validation. This chapter explained the various steps and tests used in 
analysing the quantitative and qualitative data. The starting point was to develop five VAR 
models to analyse the quantitative data. Then, a number of specification tests for the five 
VAR models were articulated, namely, checking the stationarity of time series through the 
most common tests (ADF, PP and KPSS) and selecting the optimal lag length using HQIC, 
AIC and SBIC. The next step was the use of ordinary least squares methods to estimate the 
VAR model followed by adequacy tests for internal validation. Likewise, Delphi method 
was expounded in addition to the steps of designing the semi-structured questionnaire, 
selecting the panel of experts and analysing the qualitative data. Then the chapter 
elucidated how the outcomes of the Delphi method will be used as an external validation 
for the VAR model estimates. Also, the historical simulation technique was explained as 
an alternative tool for validation whenever a contradiction observed in the results obtained 
from the estimated VAR model and the Delphi method. Finally, in investigating the 
impacts of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy, three tests were explained, namely, 
Granger causality test, impulse response function and Variance Decomposition analysis. 
Chapter six was devoted to empirically examining the effects of real oil price shocks on the 
various macroeconomic variables in Sudan. In doing so, five VAR models, namely, public 
budget model, selected macroeconomic variables model, current account model, GDP 
growth and unemployment model, and sectors’ growth model were developed and 
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estimated using ordinary least squares, and then adequacy tests were performed to check 
the validity of the estimated VAR models. After performing the adequacy tests, a further 
external validation was conducted using the results obtained from the Delphi method. 
Based on the external validation, the sign of five variables coefficients obtained from the 
Delphi method were in contradiction to those of the VAR model estimates. The five 
variables were Murabaha profit margin rate, unemployment rate, inflation, agriculture 
sector growth rate and industrial sector growth rate. For that reason, historical simulation 
was performed for those variables and its results were evaluated using the simulation 
evaluating measures. The outcomes of the simulation evaluation measures using the Root 
Mean Squared Error, Theil equity coefficient, bias proportion, variance proportion and 
covariance proportion were that signs of the estimated coefficients obtained from the VAR 
model were correct. Then the Granger causality test, impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition analysis were conducted. The main findings were summarized as 
follows: 
  With reference to the public budget VAR model, the results of the Granger causality 
test suggested that the decrease in oil price significantly influenced oil revenues, 
current expenditure and budget deficit. In contrast, the increase in real oil price did not 
Granger cause budget variables. This was attributed to the predetermined oil price 
during the preparation of the annual government budget. Results from the impulse 
response functions and variance decomposition analysis suggested that oil price shocks 
had an asymmetric effect on the public budget. That is, the magnitude of the impact of 
oil price decrease was greater than the oil price increase. The response of total revenues 
and current expenditure to shock in oil price decrease was negative and statistical 
significant. This result showed the vulnerability of the country to negative oil price 
shock.  It also reveals that negative oil price shocks pass through the government 
budget to the economy. Therefore, the policy makers have to plan ahead by putting in 
place efficient precautionary measures. 
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 As regards the selected macroeconomic variables VAR model, Granger causality test 
results did not show a significant relationship between oil price shocks and the selected 
macroeconomic variables. The impulse response functions showed that real oil price 
shock impacted other variables to some extent symmetrically. However, the magnitude 
of the positive real oil price shock was greater in the case of inflation and exchange 
rate. In the same manner, the magnitude of the response of money supply to negative 
real oil price shock was greater than in the case of positive real oil price shock. 
However, the variance decomposition results suggested that negative oil price shocks 
accounted for greater variation compared to the positive real oil prices. The increase in 
the money supply when the oil price drop was attributed to extensive borrowing from 
the central bank to finance the budget deficit. 
 With regard to the current account VAR model, the main findings were that negative 
and positive oil price shocks impacted current account and trade balances in a 
symmetric fashion. The results of the Granger causality test depicted that real oil price 
increase had a significant effect on the current account balance and imports, while oil 
real price decrease had a significant effect on non-oil export and the current account 
balance. Impulse response functions showed that the initial response of the trade and 
current account balances to positive and negative real oil price shocks were statistically 
significant. That is, as a result of increase in oil price, trade and current account 
balances were significantly improved, while a decrease in oil price had worsened them. 
The variance decomposition analysis suggested that negative real oil price shocks were 
responsible for the major variations other than the variables own socks. That is to say, 
the current account is highly sensitive to changes in oil prices. Moreover, the oil price 
shocks were assumed to be passed to the economy through the current account. 
 Turning to the real GDP growth and unemployment rates VAR model, Granger 
causality test results suggested that oil price increase and unemployment statistically 
and significantly influenced real GDP growth. However, there was no significant 
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relationship between oil price shocks and the UNEM variable. Results from the 
Impulse Response Functions suggested that real oil price shocks had shown a 
symmetric effect on GDP growth. However, the negative real oil price had a significant 
impact on the unemployment rate in the first year. In contrast, variance decomposition 
analysis showed that the contribution of negative real oil price shock in the variations 
of real GDP growth and unemployment rates were greater than those of oil price 
increase.  
 As for the sectors growth rate VAR model, the results of the Granger causality test 
depicted that negative real oil price shock significantly influenced the agricultural 
sector growth and service sector growth rates. Also, positive real oil price shock 
significantly Granger caused the agricultural sector growth rate. In contrast, positive 
and negative real oil price shocks failed to significantly cause industrial sector growth 
rate at 5 per cent significance level. On the other hand, impulse response functions 
showed that the agricultural sector growth rate responded positively to both positive 
and negative oil price shocks. This unexpected effect could be attributed to increase of 
oil revenue during oil boom which in turns enable the government to support the 
irrigated agricultural sub-sector. On the other hand, the drop of oil price depreciates 
Sudanese currency, thus increasing the competitiveness of the non-exports which were 
mainly agricultural products. Therefore, the agricultural sector has to be supported in 
order to cushion oil price shocks in the future. The response of the growth rate of the 
industrial and services sectors to real oil price shocks was to some extent symmetrical. 
Furthermore, the variance decomposition findings suggested that both positive and 
negative real oil prices have greater influence in the services growth rate compared to 
their effects on the agricultural and the industrial sector growth rates. 
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7.2 Contribution to knowledge  
This thesis attempted to contribute to the existing knowledge from different perspectives: 
exploring the relationship between oil price shock and the macroeconomy in Sudan, 
applying an existing technique in a new context (new research area), bringing technique 
together that have not been put together before and complementing the existing knowledge 
with regard to oil price shocks and the macroeconomy relationship in oil exporting 
developing economies. These elements of contribution to knowledge are explained as 
follows:  
1. Since the start of oil production and up to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, 
the government tended to deal with the economic instabilities with discrete policies. 
Thus, no consideration was paid for the dynamic effect of oil price shocks on the 
macroeconomic variables within the economic system. That is, Sudan has been 
neglected from serious studies related to oil price shocks. Therefore, this research 
attempted to thoroughly investigate the impact of oil price shocks on Sudan’s economy 
over the period 2000: q1 – 2011: q2. As a matter of fact, there was only one research 
paper which used four variables VAR model to assess the impact of oil price shock on 
the Sudan, during the period 2000-2008. That research had been criticized on a number 
of technical grounds as mentioned in chapter four, section 4.3.1. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first comprehensive empirical study that assessed the impact of 
oil price shocks on the macroeconomy over the entire period when Sudan was a net oil 
exporter.  
2. All previous studies conducted elsewhere used quantitative methods only to assess the 
relationship between oil price shocks and the macroeconomy. This research, however 
attempted to employ the convergent parallel mixed method design (quantitative and 
qualitative approach) to investigate the research questions using the VAR model and 
Delphi method. Under this framework, bringing Delphi method with the VAR model in 
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one research is another element of innovation. To the best of my knowledge, no 
previous studies had empirically used Convergent Parallel Mixed design to assess the 
relationship between oil price shocks and the macroeconomy with Delphi used as an 
external validation method. 
3. This research also complemented and contributed to the expansion of the existing 
knowledge on the impact of oil price shocks on developing countries in general and in 
oil producing and exporting countries in particular. Generally, speaking there is paucity 
of researches in developing exporting countries compared to the huge studies carried 
out in developed oil importing countries such as the US and OECD countries. 
7.3 Policy recommendations 
Based on the aforementioned concluding remarks and in order to mitigate the negative 
impact of oil price shocks on the Sudan’s economy a prudent economic policy has to be 
adopted and adhered to in the short and medium term. Therefore, the following set of 
policy recommendations were proposed to help in containing the adverse effects of oil 
price shocks: 
7.3.1 Efficient Oil Revenue Fund 
An effective and efficient management system of the Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund 
(ORSF) has to be in place to better manage the oil windfalls and support the public budget 
during periods of low oil prices. Accordingly, the government is supposed to have a 
benchmark price for the oil during the process of the preparation of the annual national 
budget. If oil prices are higher than the benchmark price, the surplus should be deposited in 
the ORSF. However, the government has to adopt a conservative approach in determining 
the benchmark oil price that will be used in the public budget to avoid persistent 
withdrawals from the bank and non-bank sources. To attain that, the government has to 
thoroughly study the movement of crude oil prices in the global markets. In other words, 
the estimation of oil price to be used in the government budget has to be based on solid 
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scientific prediction. There are a number of oil producing countries that have successfully 
managed their oil revenue funds, but the most prominent is the Norwegian Oil’s Fund. The 
other option is to prudently manage the oil revenue by moving it out from the budget and 
channelling oil revenues directly to the fund similar to Norway’ practice. However, this 
option requires a concrete legislative framework to govern the financial resources in an 
efficient, accountable and transparent manner. Decoupling oil revenues from budget 
revenues will help maintain the stability of fiscal stance and protect it from external 
shocks. 
7.3.2 Encourage non-oil exports  
In fact, Sudan was historically dependent on raw agricultural products and livestock 
exports proceeds as main sources of foreign exchange. However, since the advent of oil, a 
radical change occurred in the economic structure. That is, the oil sector started to lead the 
rest of the economy. As noticed from the findings, non-oil exports deteriorated as a result 
of appreciation of the exchange rate. In Trinidad and Tobago, Lorde et al. (2009) 
elucidated the negative impact of net exports on the ground of appreciation of the exchange 
rate, which drive imports to increase and reduce non-oil exports. To overcome this 
negative effect, there is a need for a policy that advocates diversification of the economy 
through boosting the non-oil exports. This policy would help the government to absorb any 
shocks in the oil sector in the future. In this respect, the government of the Sudan has to 
restore the role of the agricultural sector in the economy through creating an enabling 
investment environment and providing special incentives to the domestic private sector to 
encourage them to invest in this sector. Also, the government should encourage the 
domestic national banks (private and public) to provide farmers with the required funds at 
a reasonable cost of finance to meet the cost of cultivation and harvesting and marketing. 
Similarly, the central government has to put in place legislations that prohibit state and 
local authorities from imposing taxes and other fees on agricultural activities in their 
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regions. Furthermore, the government needs to subsidize oil products that are used in the 
agricultural production. In short, the government has to invest oil revenues in the real 
sector to broadening and diversifying the productive base of its economy, which in turn 
sustain the economic growth when the oil price drops. Some developing countries have 
adopted exports diversification policy which resulted in an improvement of current account 
balance, reducing of unemployment, stabilizing export earnings and attaining high 
economic growth (Adesoji and Sotubo, 2013). 
7.3.3 Curtailing non-productive imports 
A rational import policy is highly recommended in which a priority should be given to the 
import of production inputs. That is, import of consumables and luxurious goods needed to 
be curtailed by imposing higher tariff and import customs to save foreign exchanges for 
other productive sectors and to reduce the demand for foreign exchanges. Also, restraining 
the import of intensive energy consumption appliances is important to rationally use the oil 
resources.  Furthermore, having these policies in place, would improve the trade balance 
and the current account. Some developing countries imposing restriction in importing 
unnecessary imported goods Such as India, Nigeria and Kenya to reduce trade deficit and 
increase foreign exchange reserves (Somashekar, 2003: 349). 
7.3.4 Adoption of efficient public expenditure management policy 
Government should give more attention to its spending behaviour through prioritizing the 
projects and programs with focus on activities that have greater value added to the 
economy. A serious step towards reducing current expenditure in favour of development 
expenditure has to be adopted. Without having an effective management of government 
expenditure, the public budget will witness persistent deficit. The problem is that 
increasing government expenditure through borrowing from the central bank will result in 
an inflationary effect, which in turn harms the economic stability. Therefore, current 
expenditure has to be controlled and cut down to improve the fiscal balance stance.  Also, 
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the composition of public expenditure has to be revisited and geared towards increasing the 
financial resources to development spending. In similar study in Turkey, Korhan et al., 
(2015) emphasised the importance of directing the expenditure towards productive sectors, 
infrastructure and education to achieve higher economic growth rate. 
7.3.5 Lifting subsidies and voiding tax exemptions 
The government had partially started to implement a fuel subsidy cut in September 2013, 
but still there are considerable subsidies in place (Laura, 2014). Lifting of subsidies on oil 
products and voiding of tax exemptions will rectify the existing distortions in the market. 
This in turn would induce rational behaviour of consuming the oil products. Furthermore, 
subsidies cut, especially on crude oil sold to a refinery, will help assess the efficiency of 
refinery operations compared to similar plants in neighbouring countries. Because the 
selling of crude oil at a price lower than its real market rate to the refinery will result in 
some elusive profitable indicators of all refinery processes, whereas in reality it is not. 
Furthermore, low cheap fuel will promote smuggling to neighbouring African countries 
with higher domestic prices. However, this policy should be preceded by meticulous cost 
analysis for the subsidized items and products. Then, dynamic pricing mechanism has to be 
adopted to de-politicize oil products prices from continuing interventions of politicians. 
However, necessary measures have to be introduced to mitigate the devastating negative 
effect of lifting subsidies on the large low income individuals in the society. On the other 
side of the coin, this policy would enable the government to allocate these huge financial 
resources for other productive sectors. Furthermore, a prudent tax policy should be put in 
place to broadening the tax base rather than increasing tax rates during the periods of oil 
price drop. According to Persley and Boqiang (2016), removal of fuel subsidies in Ghana 
generated benefits in terms of budget deficit, reduce the government financial burden and 
curbed wasteful consumption. 
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7.4 Future research 
This research focused on the period where Sudan was a net-oil exporter and a unified 
country (e.g. before the separation of South Sudan) That is, the research was undertaken 
covering the period before the separation of the southern Sudan. As a result of the 
secession of the South Sudan, the north (Government of Sudan) lost approximately 70 per 
cent of the existing oil producing fields, one fifth of the land and almost 23 per cent of the 
total population. This situation will have a greater impact on the structure of the economy. 
However, the loss of oil revenue has been relatively compensated by a persistent increase 
in gold production. One the other hand, according to the IMF (2013) the crude oil 
production in Sudan stood at 133 thousand barrels per day as of 2012 and it is expected to 
increase to 325 thousand barrels per day by 2017 as new concessions were already signed, 
with substantial incentive for international oil companies to explore in the new areas. In 
this respect, six agreements were signed in 2012 for the following blocks: 18, 15, 14, 12-B, 
10, 9 and 8 (Sidahmed, 2014). Therefore, a further analysis of the impact of crude oil price 
shocks after the separation is crucial. It also helps compare the results that will be obtained 
from analysing of the post sample period (after 2011) with those before the separation.  
Furthermore, the findings of this thesis have shown that the full pass through of oil price 
shocks was not observed on domestic prices due to fuel subsidy. Therefore, upon removal 
of the fuel subsidy as recommended earlier, the effect of lifting subsidy from fuel oil on the 
consumer price index, budget deficit, and consumption of refined oil product will need to 
be investigated. These variables are selected to help in examining the improvement in the 
fiscal stance, discourage wasteful consumption due to low prices and effect on household 
income after fuel subsidy removal. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of experts participated in the Delphi method 
 
  
Title 
 
Qualifications 
 
Experience 
 
Department 
 
Institution 
1 Senior economic 
advisor 
MSc 
Economics 
32 years - The Council of 
Ministers 
2 Ex-State Minister of 
Finance 
PhD, 
Economics 
35 years - MoFNE* 
3 Deputy 
Undersecretary 
MSc, 
Economics 
30 years Policies and 
planning 
MoFNE 
4 Deputy Director 
General 
MSc, 
Economics 
28 years Policies and 
Planning 
MoFNE 
5 Director General MSc, 
Development 
Economics 
30 years International 
Financial 
Cooperation 
MoFNE 
6 Director PhD, 
Economics 
24 years Macroeconomic 
Models 
MoFNE 
7 Director MSc, 
Economics 
20 years Petroleum unit MoFNE 
8 Director PhD, 
Economics 
26 years Research and 
Development 
Central Bank of 
Sudan 
9 Chief Economist MSc, 
Economics 
24 years Research and 
Development 
Central Bank of 
Sudan 
10 Director General MSc, 
Economics 
26 years Sudan External 
Debt Unit 
Central Bank of 
Sudan 
11 Chief Economist PhD, 18 years - The World Bank, 
235 
 
Economics Country Office 
12 Chief Economist PhD, 
Economics 
26 years - International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Country 
Office 
13 Chief Economist MSc, 
Economics 
18 years - African 
Development Bank, 
Country Office 
14 International Expert PhD, 
Economics 
14 years -  Intergovernmental 
Authority on 
Development 
(IGAD) 
15 Senior Economist MSc, 
Economics 
16 years Minister’s Office MoFNE 
*Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MoFNE) 
  
236 
 
Appendix 2. Delphi method questinnaire 
Assessing the impact of crude oil price Shocks on Sudan’s Economy 
Respondent No.______    
Sending Date __/___/________    Receiving Date____/____/________ 
Purpose of the questionnaire: 
This questionnaire intends to collect data for assessing the impact of world oil price shock 
on different macroeconomic variables. It also aims at exploring its effects on the economic 
sectors during the period 2000:Q1 – 2011:Q2. In addition to reaching an agreement on 
the list of the macroeconomic variables that will be included in the VAR model. 
 
Section 1: Impact of crude oil price shocks on selected macroeconomic variables 
1. Please tick the appropriate relationship between crude oil price shocks (increase 
and decrease) and the listed macroeconomic variables? 
 Oil price increase Oil price decrease 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
Positive  Negative  Neutral Positive  Negative  Neutral 
money supply       
Interest rate 
/Murabaha 
      
inflation rate        
Real exchange 
rate 
      
 
Comment, if any 
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………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section II: Impact of oil price shocks on the current account 
2. Please indicate in the table below the impact of the crude oil price shocks (increase 
and decrease) on the listed current account items?  
 Crude oil price increase Crude oil price decrease 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
Positive  Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral 
Non-oil exports       
Import       
Trade balance        
Current account 
balance 
      
Comments, if any 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Section III: Impact of crude oil price shocks on the GDP growth and unemployment 
rates. 
3. What was the impact of oil price shocks (increase and decrease) on the GDP 
growth and unemployment rates during the period 2000-2011? 
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………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
Section IV: Impact of crude oil price shocks on the public budget 
4. Please indicate in the table below the impact of crude oil price shocks (increase and 
decrease) on the listed public budget variables? 
 
 Crude oil price increase Crude oil price decrease 
 Items Positive  Negative Neutral Positive Negative Neutral 
Total revenues       
Development 
expenditure 
      
Current spending       
Tax revenues       
Budget deficit       
 
Comments, if any 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Section V: Impact of crude oil price shocks on the sectors’ growth (agriculture, 
industry and services sectors) 
5. Would you please explain how the crude oil price shocks (increase and decrease) 
impacted the following sectors? 
Agricultural sector 
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
Industrial sector 
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
Services sector 
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Section VI: Macroeconomic Variables 
The following list of the macroeconomic variables has been selected from similar 
empirical studies (impact of oil price shocks on oil-exporting and oil-importing countries). 
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Please declare whether you agree or disagree to the inclusion of these macroeconomic 
variables in the proposed econometric model of this study. 
 
Macroeconomic Variables Agree Disagree 
Real oil Price   
Inflation rate   
Money Supply   
Unemployment rate   
Interest rate/ Murabaha    
Non-oil Export    
Import    
Current account balance    
Trade Balance    
Real exchange rate    
Growth Domestic Product    
Total Revenue    
Development Expenditure    
Recurrent Spending    
Tax Revenue    
Budget Deficit    
Agricultural sector growth rate   
Industrial sector growth rate   
Services sector growth rate   
 
Other macroeconomic variables need to be included, please specify 
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………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you so much for your cooperation 
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Appendix 3. Public budget VAR model: plotting of the time series 
data 
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Appendix 4. Public Budget VAR model equations  
 
proilp = 0.156293147782*proilp(-1) - 0.0636457046524*nroilp(-1) + 3.82236019615*tax(-1) - 
4.75487227916*d(rev(-1)) - 10.5112220772*d(curexp(-1)) - 0.67920705338*d(devexp(-1)) + 
3.05244312484*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.0196578261921 
nroilp = -0.180339069277*proilp(-1) + 0.247670514276*nroilp(-1) - 1.90114032866*tax(-1) + 
4.07900450353*d(rev(-1)) + 4.97861666567*d(curexp(-1)) - 8.38550898317*d(devexp(-1)) - 
2.76452923528*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.069849846529 
tax = 0.000575130142222*proilp(-1) - 0.00462488670762*nroilp(-1) + 0.67197186808*tax(-1) + 
0.0550511207356*d(rev(-1)) - 0.0373765064087*d(curexp(-1)) - 0.118749509329*d(devexp(-1)) - 
0.00436537097178*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.00495321439068 
d(rev) = 0.00658263779031*proilp(-1) - 0.0303762755248*nroilp(-1) - 0.813119853211*tax(-1) + 
0.0069887339302*d(rev(-1)) - 0.264322432821*d(curexp(-1)) - 0.560704365441*d(devexp(-1)) + 
0.314619003929*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.0124997552537 
d(curexp) = 0.00293118654958*proilp(-1) - 0.0214319996386*nroilp(-1) - 0.406232009905*tax(-
1) + 0.0323828064978*d(rev(-1)) - 0.168279014597*d(curexp(-1)) - 0.0351351333604*d(devexp(-
1)) + 0.137630022056*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.00680483989437 
d(devexp) = 0.00237068992221*proilp(-1) - 0.00207789279738*nroilp(-1) - 
0.188633920004*tax(-1) + 0.030430523872*d(rev(-1)) - 0.00122886026035*d(curexp(-1)) - 
0.302133122215*d(devexp(-1)) + 0.0295631795321*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.00260148247653 
d(deficit) = -0.00304043547351*proilp(-1) + 0.00739751408203*nroilp(-1) - 
0.168235007574*tax(-1) + 0.121990371489*d(rev(-1)) + 0.0865391103275*d(curexp(-1)) + 
0.0960420860525*d(devexp(-1)) - 0.108731585992*d(deficit(-1)) + 0.00245365153495 
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Appendix 5.  Statistics of the diagnostic tests for the public budget 
VAR model 
1 Autocorrelation 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 09/20/15   Time: 20:37    
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2    
Included observations: 44    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  19.05943 NA*  19.50267 NA* NA* 
2  47.53963  0.5325  49.33908  0.4596 49 
3  92.65571  0.6335  97.75633  0.4879 98 
4  145.7044  0.5147  156.1099  0.2879 147 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
      
 
2. Normality test 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 09/20/15   Time: 20:40 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2  
Included observations: 44  
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  0.196819  0.284077 1  0.5940 
2  3.188807  74.56892 1  0.0000 
3 -0.568867  2.373138 1  0.1234 
4 -1.006421  7.427803 1  0.0064 
5  2.050099  30.82130 1  0.0000 
6  0.052288  0.020049 1  0.8874 
7 -0.009029  0.000598 1  0.9805 
     
     Joint   115.4959 7  0.0000 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.621725  0.262335 1  0.6085 
2  16.25335  322.0275 1  0.0000 
3  2.719555  0.144190 1  0.7042 
4  5.899856  15.41681 1  0.0001 
5  9.134445  68.99092 1  0.0000 
6  7.982682  45.51640 1  0.0000 
7  4.708878  5.353820 1  0.0207 
     
     Joint   457.7120 7  0.0000 
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Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.546412 2  0.7609  
2  396.5964 2  0.0000  
3  2.517328 2  0.2840  
4  22.84461 2  0.0000  
5  99.81222 2  0.0000  
6  45.53644 2  0.0000  
7  5.354418 2  0.0688  
     
     Joint  573.2079 14  0.0000  
     
     
 
3. Heteroskedasticity test 
Null Hypothesis: VAR Residuals are Homoscedasticity 
Date: 09/20/15   Time: 20:44 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2 
Included observations: 44 
      
         Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       421.9492 392  0.1429    
      
         Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(14,29) Prob. Chi-sq(14) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.310541  0.932995  0.5376  13.66378  0.4750 
res2*res2  0.211525  0.555706  0.8767  9.307121  0.8109 
res3*res3  0.495020  2.030572  0.0523  21.78088  0.0832 
res4*res4  0.165066  0.409521  0.9596  7.262913  0.9241 
res5*res5  0.417266  1.483242  0.1795  18.35969  0.1909 
res6*res6  0.358049  1.155343  0.3571  15.75417  0.3286 
res7*res7  0.230642  0.620982  0.8258  10.14823  0.7513 
res2*res1  0.544532  2.476482  0.0190  23.95940  0.0463 
res3*res1  0.214098  0.564306  0.8704  9.420322  0.8032 
res3*res2  0.147310  0.357857  0.9770  6.481625  0.9529 
res4*res1  0.414047  1.463716  0.1874  18.21807  0.1970 
res4*res2  0.298822  0.882782  0.5838  13.14815  0.5149 
res4*res3  0.227114  0.608694  0.8359  9.993021  0.7627 
res5*res1  0.199386  0.515871  0.9040  8.772985  0.8453 
res5*res2  0.169179  0.421803  0.9546  7.443893  0.9162 
res5*res3  0.388626  1.316726  0.2568  17.09956  0.2509 
res5*res4  0.164276  0.407175  0.9605  7.228143  0.9256 
res6*res1  0.324751  0.996225  0.4817  14.28906  0.4284 
res6*res2  0.196299  0.505935  0.9103  8.637170  0.8536 
res6*res3  0.423119  1.519310  0.1658  18.61724  0.1801 
res6*res4  0.362258  1.176637  0.3423  15.93934  0.3171 
res6*res5  0.341740  1.075396  0.4166  15.03656  0.3757 
res7*res1  0.468563  1.826356  0.0832  20.61675  0.1119 
res7*res2  0.585404  2.924827  0.0071  25.75777  0.0278 
res7*res3  0.139067  0.334598  0.9829  6.118938  0.9634 
res7*res4  0.145695  0.353266  0.9783  6.410582  0.9551 
res7*res5  0.221435  0.589143  0.8515  9.743134  0.7807 
res7*res6  0.223828  0.597346  0.8450  9.848428  0.7732 
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4. Stability test 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: ROILP ROILN TAX D(REV) 
D(CUREXP) D(DEVEXP) D(DEFICIT) 
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 09/20/15   Time: 20:47  
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.771482  0.771482 
 0.122229 - 0.512767i  0.527134 
 0.122229 + 0.512767i  0.527134 
-0.202311 - 0.247666i  0.319794 
-0.202311 + 0.247666i  0.319794 
 0.316411  0.316411 
-0.156602  0.156602 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Appendix 6. Selected macroeconomic variables VAR model: plotting 
of the time series data 
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Appendix 7. selected macroeconomic variables VAR model 
equations 
proilp  =  - 0.0218016565027 * proilp(-1)  - 0.046899081745 * nroilp(-1)  - 0.358369892556 * m2(-
1)  - 0.335485385362 * inf(-1)  + 0.169109055645 * d(rer(-1))  - 0.697584807877 * mur(-1)  + 
0.222890011197 
nroilp  =  - 0.0762949475269 * proilp(-1)  + 0.195317620138 * nroilp(-1)  + 0.264074990549 * 
m2(-1)  + 1.05458187742 * inf(-1)  - 0.128314019006 * d(rer(-1))  + 0.788413681187 * mur(-1)  - 
0.177718615589 
m2  = 0.0262684356322 * proilp(-1)  + 0.0602547732168 * nroilp(-1)  + 0.291940357581 * m2(-1)  
- 0.168486169931 * inf(-1)  - 0.0638702542692 * d(rer(-1))  + 0.0582900289495 * mur(-1)  + 
0.0495622201735 
inf = 0.084437*proilp(-1) - 0.029555*nroilp(-1) - 0.007259*m2(-1) + 0.472901*inf(-1) + 
0.028664*d(rer(-1)) - 0.289721*mur(-1) + 0.084338 
rer =  - 0.128046*proilp(-1) + 0.198063*nroilp(-1) + 0.246574*m2(-1) + 0.442595*inf(-1) - 
0.303167*d(rer(-1)) - 0.467315*mur(-1) + 0.042272 
mur =  + 0.002335*proilp(-1) - 0.004688*nroilp(-1) - 0.029814*m2(-1) + 0.000922*inf(-1) - 
0.006887*d(rer(-1)) + 0.866348*mur(-1) + 0.016151 
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Appendix 8. Statistics of the diagnostic tests for the selected 
macroeconomic variables VAR model 
 
 
 
1. Autocorrelation test 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 09/22/15   Time: 10:35    
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2    
Included observations: 44    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  6.778514 NA*  6.936154 NA* NA* 
2  50.34374  0.0567  52.57591  0.0366 36 
3  80.12240  0.2395  84.53350  0.1482 72 
4  114.0675  0.3262  121.8731  0.1707 108 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
 
 
 
 
      
2. Normality test 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 09/22/15   Time:10:39 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2  
Included observations: 44  
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  0.851526  5.317370 1  0.0211 
2  2.536448  47.17950 1  0.0000 
3 -1.033857  7.838302 1  0.0051 
4  0.296890  0.646388 1  0.4214 
5  1.224540  10.99633 1  0.0009 
6 -1.298219  12.35940 1  0.0004 
     
     Joint   84.33729 6  0.0000 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  3.816600  1.222532 1  0.2689 
2  11.70723  138.9957 1  0.0000 
3  4.245068  2.842022 1  0.0918 
4  4.330587  3.245844 1  0.0716 
5  6.400449  21.19893 1  0.0000 
6  8.458399  54.62255 1  0.0000 
     
     Joint   222.1276 6  0.0000 
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Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  6.539903 2  0.0380  
2  186.1752 2  0.0000  
3  10.68032 2  0.0048  
4  3.892232 2  0.1428  
5  32.19525 2  0.0000  
6  66.98196 2  0.0000  
     
     Joint  306.4649 12  0.0000  
     
     
 
 
 
3. Heteroskedasticity tests 
Null Hypothesis: VAR Residuals are Homoscedasticity 
Date: 09/22/15   Time: 10:41 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2 
Included observations: 44 
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       250.6218 252  0.5127    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(12,31) Prob. Chi-sq(12) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.399756  1.720469  0.1102  17.58924  0.1287 
res2*res2  0.364905  1.484297  0.1830  16.05580  0.1887 
res3*res3  0.269950  0.955238  0.5089  11.87781  0.4555 
res4*res4  0.294171  1.076663  0.4114  12.94350  0.3732 
res5*res5  0.454721  2.154304  0.0425  20.00773  0.0669 
res6*res6  0.192760  0.616871  0.8115  8.481436  0.7465 
res2*res1  0.264223  0.927696  0.5326  11.62582  0.4762 
res3*res1  0.324065  1.238533  0.3025  14.25886  0.2845 
res3*res2  0.384899  1.616518  0.1380  16.93555  0.1520 
res4*res1  0.196647  0.632356  0.7985  8.652469  0.7323 
res4*res2  0.199945  0.645610  0.7872  8.797571  0.7201 
res4*res3  0.205277  0.667275  0.7684  9.032185  0.7002 
res5*res1  0.278479  0.997068  0.4740  12.25310  0.4256 
res5*res2  0.330137  1.273177  0.2824  14.52603  0.2684 
res5*res3  0.242552  0.827243  0.6227  10.67229  0.5572 
res5*res4  0.389702  1.649570  0.1285  17.14688  0.1442 
res6*res1  0.188355  0.599503  0.8257  8.287620  0.7623 
res6*res2  0.229662  0.770171  0.6752  10.10511  0.6067 
res6*res3  0.187611  0.596589  0.8281  8.254890  0.7649 
res6*res4  0.133761  0.398907  0.9532  5.885480  0.9217 
res6*res5  0.320055  1.215994  0.3162  14.08242  0.2955 
      
      
 
 
     
 
  
251 
 
4. Stability test 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: PROILP NROILP D(NOEX) 
D(IMP) D(TB) D(CAB)  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 09/22/15   Time: 10:44 
 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.862844  0.862844 
 0.468764  0.468764 
 0.001417 - 0.345430i  0.345433 
 0.001417 + 0.345430i  0.345433 
-0.235992  0.235992 
-0.070248  0.070248 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Appendix 9. Current account VAR model: plotting of time series data 
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Appendix 10. Current account VAR model equations 
proilp  =  - 0.110505082478  * proilp(-1)  + 0.235471474125  * nroilp(-1)  + 9.65614446912  * 
d(noex(-1))  + 0.91464857448  * d(imp(-1))  - 1.73159526329  * d(tb(-1))  + 6.32907254713  * 
d(cab(-1))  + 0.0770156896079 
nroilp  = 0.0225296734904  * proilp(-1)  - 0.0752371268372  * nroilp(-1)  - 7.55085689228  * 
d(noex(-1))  - 3.70797810304  * d(imp(-1))  - 5.05450460559  * d(tb(-1))  - 0.642244185694  * 
d(cab(-1))  + 0.0436128879396 
d(noex)  =  - 0.000398755571808 * proilp(-1)  + 0.0062602963437 * nroilp(-1)  - 0.242502138599 
* d(noex(-1))  + 0.0312882330848 * d(imp(-1))  + 0.0690536902227 * d(tb(-1))  - 
0.0128738905796 * d(cab(-1))  - 0.000363177229504 
d(imp)  = 0.0266323398288 * proilp(-1)  - 0.0220434145525 * nroilp(-1)  - 0.791622224327 * 
d(noex(-1))  - 0.84140310068 * d(imp(-1))  + 0.0710389655487 * d(tb(-1))  - 0.430731430538 * 
d(cab(-1))  - 0.000917823769147 
d(tb)  =  - 0.0279962634121 * proilp(-1)  + 0.0193761477749 * nroilp(-1)  + 0.531141851581 * 
d(noex(-1))  + 0.645063212864 * d(imp(-1))  - 0.139985600546 * d(tb(-1))  + 0.664862072947 * 
d(cab(-1))  + 0.00151852211656 
d(cab)  =  - 0.0383325068682 * proilp(-1)  + 0.0485691967379 * nroilp(-1)  - 0.186461313344 * 
d(noex(-1))  + 0.853835165025 * d(imp(-1))  + 0.0385857001258 * d(tb(-1))  + 0.63895232325 * 
d(cab(-1))  + 0.00125498794577 
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Appendix 11. Statistics of the diagnostic tests for the current 
account model:  
 
1. Autocorrelation 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 09/24/15   Time: 13:14    
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2    
Included observations: 44    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  3.992713 NA*  4.085567 NA* NA* 
2  34.25438  0.5518  35.78827  0.4786 36 
3  60.68888  0.8266  64.15700  0.7333 72 
4  76.83351  0.9899  81.91609  0.9710 108 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
      
 
 
 
 
      
2. Normality test 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 09/24/15   Time: 13:17 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2  
Included observations: 44  
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  0.884787  5.740880 1  0.0166 
2  2.461439  44.43032 1  0.0000 
3  0.485654  1.729636 1  0.1885 
4 -0.411234  1.240166 1  0.2654 
5 -0.322994  0.765049 1  0.3818 
6  1.557839  17.79698 1  0.0000 
     
     Joint   71.70303 6  0.0000 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  4.158460  2.460386 1  0.1168 
2  11.15528  121.9324 1  0.0000 
3  6.363619  20.74222 1  0.0000 
4  3.541804  0.538178 1  0.4632 
5  4.061808  2.066968 1  0.1505 
6  7.946957  44.86603 1  0.0000 
     
     Joint   192.6062 6  0.0000 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
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     1  8.201266 2  0.0166  
2  166.3628 2  0.0000  
3  22.47185 2  0.0000  
4  1.778345 2  0.4110  
5  2.832017 2  0.2427  
6  62.66301 2  0.0000  
     
     Joint  264.3093 12  0.0000  
     
     
     
3. Heteroskedasticity test 
Null Hypothesis: VAR Residuals are Homoscedasticity 
Date: 09/24/15   Time: 13:21 
Sample: 2000Q1 2011Q2 
Included observations: 44 
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       237.9954 252  0.7277    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(12,31) Prob. Chi-sq(12) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.288031  1.045101  0.4356  12.67336  0.3932 
res2*res2  0.487611  2.458410  0.0218  21.45489  0.0441 
res3*res3  0.142232  0.428360  0.9397  6.258219  0.9025 
res4*res4  0.332130  1.284685  0.2760  14.61372  0.2632 
res5*res5  0.491269  2.494657  0.0201  21.61582  0.0421 
res6*res6  0.375141  1.550936  0.1589  16.50622  0.1691 
res2*res1  0.181521  0.572926  0.8467  7.986905  0.7862 
res3*res1  0.149718  0.454874  0.9258  6.587588  0.8836 
res3*res2  0.472173  2.310951  0.0301  20.77563  0.0538 
res4*res1  0.093053  0.265052  0.9909  4.094346  0.9817 
res4*res2  0.239663  0.814284  0.6346  10.54518  0.5682 
res4*res3  0.142698  0.429994  0.9388  6.278691  0.9014 
res5*res1  0.103880  0.299464  0.9847  4.570704  0.9708 
res5*res2  0.524367  2.848021  0.0094  23.07213  0.0271 
res5*res3  0.390927  1.658086  0.1262  17.20079  0.1422 
res5*res4  0.395627  1.691067  0.1175  17.40757  0.1349 
res6*res1  0.119069  0.349171  0.9717  5.239048  0.9495 
res6*res2  0.533432  2.953554  0.0075  23.47102  0.0240 
res6*res3  0.518200  2.778504  0.0109  22.80080  0.0295 
res6*res4  0.393970  1.679382  0.1205  17.33468  0.1374 
res6*res5  0.478750  2.372706  0.0263  21.06502  0.0494 
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4. Stability test 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: ROILP ROILN D(NOEX) D(IMP) 
D(TB) D(CAB)  
Exogenous variables : C 
Lag specification : 1 1 
Date : 09/24/15   Time : 13 :25 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
  -0.522423 - 0.180316i  0.552666 
-0.522423 + 0.180316i  0.552666 
 0.109662 - 0.456056i  0.469055 
 0.109662 + 0.456056i  0.469055 
 0.154218  0.154218 
-0.099378  0.099378 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
 
  
257 
 
Appendix12. GDP and unemployment growth rates VAR model: 
plotting of time series data 
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Appendix 13: GDP and Unemployment VAR model equations  
 
proilp = -0.483811732548*proilp(-1) - 0.43252952413*nroilp(-1) - 1.21192559953*rgdpg(-1) + 
1.60248782459*unem(-1) + 0.117055042402 
nroilp = 0.564394014032*proilp(-1) + 0.191685439985*nroilp(-1) + 1.20447655266*rgdpg(-1) + 
1.10392575949*unem(-1) - 0.344722272759 
rgdpg = 0.0914295916588*proilp(-1) - 0.0240546035972*nroilp(-1) + 0.24013818716*rgdpg(-1) - 
0.438174517026*unem(-1) + 0.106351713885 
unem = -0.0665619637913*proilp(-1) - 0.0272363177941*nroilp(-1) + 0.414283939096*rgdpg(-1) 
+ 0.542559047238*unem(-1) + 0.0642425497467 
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Appendix 14. Statistics of the diagnostic tests for the GDP growth 
and unemployment rates VAR model 
1. Autocorrelation test 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 09/26/15   Time11:31    
Sample: 2000 2011     
Included observations: 11    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  8.448762 NA*  9.293638 NA* NA* 
2  26.55489  0.0667  31.42335  0.0519 16 
3  35.54731  0.3048  43.78793  0.0800 32 
4  49.01526  0.4322  64.95185  0.0519 48 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
2. Normality test 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 09/26/15   Time: 11:35   
Sample: 2000 2011    
Included observations: 11   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.785344  1.130736 1  0.2876 
2 -0.169065  0.052402 1  0.8189 
3 -0.198323  0.072108 1  0.7883 
4  0.847775  1.317659 1  0.2510 
     
     Joint   2.572906 4  0.6316 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.968816  0.000446 1  0.9832 
2  2.124237  0.351523 1  0.5533 
3  2.007431  0.451547 1  0.5016 
4  2.973616  0.000319 1  0.9857 
     
     Joint   0.803835 4  0.9379 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  1.131182 2  0.5680  
2  0.403926 2  0.8171  
3  0.523656 2  0.7696  
4  1.317978 2  0.5174  
     
     Joint  3.376741 8  0.9085  
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3. Heteroskedasticity tests 
Null Hypothesis: VAR Residuals are Homoscedasticity 
Date: 09/26/15   Time: 11:41    
Sample: 2000 2011     
Included observations: 11    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       88.00000 80  0.2531    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(8,2) Prob. Chi-sq(8) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.356284  0.138370  0.9839  3.919124  0.8643 
res2*res2  0.742767  0.721880  0.6956  8.170433  0.4170 
res3*res3  0.931173  3.382271  0.2482  10.24290  0.2484 
res4*res4  0.599452  0.374146  0.8709  6.593976  0.5810 
res2*res1  0.604912  0.382770  0.8661  6.654029  0.5744 
res3*res1  0.769700  0.835539  0.6490  8.466696  0.3893 
res3*res2  0.553403  0.309789  0.9062  6.087434  0.6374 
res4*res1  0.875368  1.755913  0.4128  9.629053  0.2920 
res4*res2  0.655428  0.475537  0.8155  7.209706  0.5142 
res4*res3  0.682200  0.536659  0.7834  7.504201  0.4833 
      
      
      
4. Stability test 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: PROILP NROILP RGDPG 
UNEM  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 09/26/15   Time: 11:45 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
  -0.043109 - 0.523495i  0.525267 
-0.043109 + 0.523495i  0.525267 
 0.288394 - 0.379164i  0.476378 
 0.288394 + 0.379164i  0.476378 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
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Appendix 15: Sectors growth rates VAR model: plotting of time 
series data 
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Appendix 16: Sectors growth rates VAR modle  
 
proilp =  - 0.0704474244489*proilp(-1) - 0.0929111979269*nroilp(-1) - 
3.70898987947*agriculture(-1) - 0.176872882068*industry(-1) - 0.405009350805*services(-1) + 
0.467588595457 
nroilp = 0.554439972432*proilp(-1) + 0.24531129488*nroilp(-1) + 0.893540949912*agriculture(-
1) - 0.0960420269071*industry(-1) + 0.329851237401*services(-1) - 0.12430196874 
agriculture = 0.136930017959*proilp(-1) + 0.154060935637*nroilp(-1) - 
0.942738146823*agriculture(-1) - 0.118380664363*industry(-1) + 0.122965906064*services(-1) + 
0.0922248184697 
industry =  - 0.218744487074*proilp(-1) - 0.532115189639*nroilp(-1) + 
1.51743239825*agriculture(-1) + 0.153281152676*industry(-1) + 0.349135030099*services(-1) + 
0.0626384736076 
services = 0.202161195328*proilp(-1) - 0.655360526539*nroilp(-1) - 2.60761423951*agriculture(-
1) - 0.269381262287*industry(-1) - 0.30066687633*services(-1) + 0.267053200683 
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Appendix 17: Statistics of the diagnostic tests for the sectors growth 
rates VAR model 
1. Autocorrelation test 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations  
Null Hypothesis: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h  
Date: 10/04/15   Time: 21:33    
Sample: 2000 2011     
Included observations: 12    
      
      Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
      
      1  21.94096 NA*  23.62872 NA* NA* 
2  42.52628  0.0658  47.64494  0.0541 25 
3  56.81200  0.2362  65.82676  0.0660 50 
4  81.93148  0.2731  100.9940  0.0744 75 
      
      *The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square distribution 
2. Normality test 
VAR Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 10/04/15   Time: 21:39   
Sample: 2000 2011    
Included observations: 12   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.680043  0.847840 1  0.3572 
2  0.051215  0.004809 1  0.9447 
3 -0.296953  0.161665 1  0.6876 
4  0.342097  0.214556 1  0.6432 
5  0.148977  0.040689 1  0.8401 
     
     Joint   1.269559 5  0.9380 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  3.437923  0.087897 1  0.7669 
2  3.306204  0.042974 1  0.8358 
3  2.970777  0.000391 1  0.9842 
4  2.752176  0.028149 1  0.8668 
5  3.085656  0.003363 1  0.9538 
     
     Joint   0.162775 5  0.9995 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.935738 2  0.6263  
2  0.047783 2  0.9764  
3  0.162057 2  0.9222  
4  0.242705 2  0.8857  
5  0.044052 2  0.9782  
     
     Joint  1.432334 10  0.9991  
     
264 
 
     
     
3. Heteroskedasticity test 
Null Hypothesis: VAR Residuals are Homoscedasticity 
Date: 10/04/15   Time: 21:43    
Sample: 2000 2011     
Included observations: 12    
      
            
   Joint test:     
      
      Chi-sq df Prob.    
      
       84.01741 80  0.3576    
      
            
   Individual components:    
      
      Dependent R-squared F(8,5) Prob. Chi-sq(8) Prob. 
      
      res1*res1  0.727246  1.666443  0.2975  10.18145  0.2525 
res2*res2  0.441462  0.493992  0.8209  6.180465  0.6270 
res3*res3  0.433022  0.477336  0.8316  6.062313  0.6403 
res4*res4  0.808855  2.644771  0.1495  11.32397  0.1840 
res2*res1  0.640814  1.115046  0.4736  8.971397  0.3447 
res3*res1  0.390866  0.401046  0.8796  5.472117  0.7061 
res3*res2  0.257236  0.216452  0.9720  3.601307  0.8912 
res4*res1  0.418219  0.449287  0.8496  5.855059  0.6635 
res4*res2  0.348733  0.334668  0.9181  4.882260  0.7701 
res4*res3  0.791614  2.374236  0.1779  11.08259  0.1971 
      
      
      
4. Stability test 
 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: PROILP NROILP 
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SERVICES  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 1 
Date: 10/04/15   Time: 21:48 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.749187  0.749187 
-0.683892  0.683892 
-0.170177 - 0.531431i  0.558013 
-0.170177 + 0.531431i  0.558013 
-0.368613  0.368613 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
 
